# DEMOCRACY QPQ CP

## NEGATIVE

### 1nc

**Counterplan: The United States federal government should condition its defense cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in [PLAN AREA] on allies’ compliance with incremental tailored standards for adopting democratic reforms.**

#### Allies say yes

Lee 19, graduated with a Master in Public Policy degree from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, et al, 2019 (Martha, “Partnering to Protect: Reforming US Security Assistance to Reduce Civilian Harm,” *Belfer Center*, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/partnering-protect-reforming-us-security-assistance-reduce-civilian-harm)//BB

Others argue that the “total package” approach of US security assistance does provide the United States with real influence over partners, and thus a real opportunity to enforce conditions. Partners are dependent on American expertise to operate, maintain, and modernize weapons systems throughout their entire life-cycles. This dependency should give US officials leverage, but one expert noted that the US government is often “constitutionally incapable or unwilling to use that leverage” for fear of disrupting the bilateral relationship.256 Given this mixed record, policymakers might try to identify opportunities to implement positive conditionality: a conditions-based framework where partners are incentivized to demonstrate good behavior over time in exchange for security assistance. Rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it when confronted with undesirable behavior, the United States could identify specific positive actions the partner is open to taking, and the specific incentives the United States would provide if benchmarks were met. To implement this, the State Department could negotiate a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and the partner. It should reflect the elements, including civilian protection measures, that would govern security assistance between the two countries over a certain period of time. Milestones should be built over the course of the MOU such that when the partner meets a goal, they are rewarded. If the partner fails to meet the milestone, they do not receive the agreed-upon security assistance. The implementation of this framework would have a real impact by lending predictability to the relationship and limit the potential for mismanaged expectations on both sides.257 One major hurdles would be overcoming entrenched bureaucratic tendencies to “shovel security assistance out the door,” as one expert put it.258 However, if tackled in a piecemeal fashion – for example, starting with a few “easy” partnerships and building on momentum and success – this approach could feasibly be implemented at either State or DoD.

#### Counterplan promotes democracy in NATO and is a pre-requisite to NATO viability

Matthijs 19 – Matthias Matthijs, assistant professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow for Europe Council on Foreign Relations (“Hearing on Democracy and the NATO Alliance: Upholding Our Shared Democratic Values”, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, 11/13/2019, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Democracy%20and%20the%20NATO%20Alliance.%20Upholding%20Our%20Shared%20Democratic%20Values.pdf>) FGY

What can the United States and the European Union Do?

Both the United States through NATO and our European allies through the EU should do more to **encourage common values** like the rule of **law and democracy in Turkey, Hungary and Poland**. While it may be hard to achieve concrete results in the very short term, both organizations should be aware that they are playing a long game, and that **none of the three current leaders** in Ankara, Budapest, and Warsaw **will be in power indefinitely**. While lecturing allies and friends on democratic principles may easily backfire and be quickly condemned as hypocrisy, the US especially should stand by its enduring commitment to democratic freedoms and the rule of law in all its official (and unofficial) foreign policy statements. Going forward, the European Union can: • **make its funding more conditional on abiding by democratic principles and rule of law** and **withhold funding if necessary**. The EU is currently debating instituting tougher ‘rule of law’ conditions on its funding in the next budget cyle. • **condemn anti-democratic countries directly**, rather than focusing on economics, the EU could also rank countries based on political freedoms, by naming and shaming the worst performers. • encourage its mainstream pan-European political parties – especially the center-right EPP and the center-left D&S – to not allow parties with autocratic or illiberal tendencies within their political groupings. Going forward, the United States should: • continue to support civil society groups and free media in countries experiencing democratic backsliding. For instance, recent reports that Radio Free Europe would be recommencing operations in Hungary are a step in the right direction. • **emphasize that NATO membership means rights** as well as responsibilities beyond spending 2% of GDP on defense. NATO must be an alliance based on **basic common democratic values**. The transatlantic alliance has proven so strong and enduring not simply because of Realpolitik, but also because it has been an alliance based on a shared commitment to freedom and democratic values. If those **values are no longer seen as common to the alliance, it will inevitably erode**. • encourage overseas investment through OPIC in countries that show a strong commitment to the rule of law and democracy while showing a higher level of reluctance to support investment in regimes that are distmantling those institutions.

#### That saves the LIO. AND illiberalism shreds all NATO initiatives.

Tome 21, Professor at the Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa where he is currently Director of the Department of International Relations (Luis, “Future of NATO: Significant Insights from 2021 Meeting of NATO Ministries of Foreign Affairs,” <https://cesran.org/interview-with-professor-luis-tome-future-of-nato-significant-insights-from-2021-meeting-of-nato-ministries-of-foreign-affairs.html)//BB>

Question: Rising rightist or leftist populist political groups in Europe and the US indicate that they would be quite influential in their own national politics in the near future. Do you think that this could complicate NATO’s stance regarding democracy and freedom?

Luis Tome: Of course it can. The spread of nationalism, populism, authoritarianism and extremisms threatens the liberal international order and the security environment. And if national egoisms, populisms, autocratic tendencies and “illiberal democracies” flourish in NATO member countries, as is already happening, then it makes it very complicated for the transatlantic Alliance to be the bulwark for the defence and promotion of freedom, democracy and liberal order. Fortunately, there seems to be a sense of urgency within NATO today to put democratic values back at the heart of the transatlantic Alliance’s action. But we must recognise that the virus of nationalism and populism is difficult to fight even within NATO countries.

Question: There are too many significant points to cover in an interview, but as a closing question, I would like to have your comments on an issue that is the most important one regarding NATO’s future.

Luis Tome: The decisive factor for the evolution and future of NATO is the strengthening of its political dimension, namely dialogue, articulation, cooperation and political cohesion among Allied countries. Organisations are what their members make of them, and NATO is no exception. NATO is a military alliance, but it is also the main political forum of the transatlantic community of shared values and interests. Without political cohesion among Allies, powerful deterrent and defence capabilities have less value. Without constructive political dialogue, differences between member countries cannot be overcome or minimised. Without political cooperation, it is not possible to formulate common and coherent strategies. Without political articulation, the transatlantic Alliance will face many difficulties in projecting security and stability in its periphery, whether to the East or to the South; effectively confronting the many risks and threats; managing crises and conflicts; establishing fruitful partnerships with external partners; or dealing with major rivals such as Russia and China. Without political cohesion, it will not be possible for NATO to make the necessary re-adaptation to a geopolitical and security context in great transformation. Nor to be the pillar of democracy and liberal order that the Allies want and preach NATO to be. NATO’s military dimension remains robust, but the Alliance’s political dimension and political role are undervalued and underused. NATO’s future success depends on the ability of the Allies to leverage the political dimension of the transatlantic alliance.

#### LIO solves nuclear war, climate change and tech disruption – all existential

Harari 18, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Yuval Noah, “We need a post-liberal order now,” *The Economist*, <https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now>)

The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians. This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly. But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?” Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game. Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind. An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.” Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”. The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans. Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world. This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

## solvency – t/l

### 2nc – solvency – general

#### Conditional SC incentives are more strategically valuable than the aff

* “security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably

Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/>) FGY

Hard Is Not Impossible

These failings notwithstanding, there exists no shortage of arguments in favor of the status quo and against shifting America’s focus in security assistance to security-sector reform and conditional aid. In an era of great-power competition, Russia, China, or regional competitors may simply step in to fill the gap with the partner nation if the United States insists upon unwelcome reforms in exchange for aid. I know this is a valid concern because I have sat in meetings where partners made thinly veiled reference to other nations which may provide assistance if the United States is unable or unwilling. Still, the quality and **technological** edge of **U.S.** kit and the total-package approach which includes **training and follow-on support do provide the United States a competitive advantage**. But the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for delivering aid is far too slow and, as a result, is a liability. To outcompete, the **security assistance enterprise itself requires major reform to shorten typical lead times** from years to months. The Pentagon and State Department need the agility to turn aid on and off like a switch or rheostat.

Another argument against placing preconditions on security assistance is that the stakes are too high to deny a partner a critical capability while waiting for reform to happen. This is the “we can’t let them fail” mentality. It is also valid — but only in certain crisis situations where aid is needed immediately, and reform truly cannot wait. Ukraine today is a good example. Rather than ceasing aid writ large until a condition is met, **place conditions on** discrete **packages of aid**. The **intent should be to provide sufficient incentive to the host-nation government to modify behavior**, not threaten national survival. During the years I spent in Afghanistan, the security threats faced by the government never appeared to afford the breathing space to withhold aid while institutional reform took place. In hindsight, doing so may have required coalition forces to carry a greater operational burden while the Afghan forces sorted themselves out, but it also would have been worth it. As the events of August 2021 demonstrated, 20 years of unconditional capacity-building built shockingly little capacity. Implementing this change requires a recurring review of Defense Department-led train and equip programs to determine which truly qualify as crisis situations. Those which do not should be moved under State Department control for more deliberate, reform-focused approach.

There is also the simple argument that instituting meaningful reform in a recalcitrant partner nation is hard. This is true. But hard is not impossible. The security assistance enterprise should approach reform not in broad, sweeping terms but incremental steps. Rather than requiring the partner to eliminate corruption wholesale across the security forces, perhaps require that a particularly corrupt commander be removed before providing assistance to that unit. In the case of Iraq in the late 2000s, the United States might have required Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to fire certain commanders guilty of sectarian excesses or modify the personnel policy to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive. In other cases, reform measures may be as mundane as switching to an electronic pay system to reduce the opportunity for graft. Such a change in approach would also require a change in how the United States prepares officers for security assistance duties. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has made great strides in its educational program to professionalize the security assistance workforce in recent years. It could further improve this program by embedding security sector reform more deeply into the curriculum.

Better Rewards, Tougher Inducements

The United States is **not getting the most for its security assistance dollars**. Programs intended to build partner capacity tend to underperform because **they fail to address underlying weakness in defense institutions** or take principal-agent problems into account. To build meaningful, long-lasting capacity in partners and better align security assistance with policy goals, the United States should shift from a “building partner capacity” **approach to a reform focus using conditional aid as leverage**. Doing so in an environment where security assistance is yet another **arena for strategic competition** with Russia, China, and others will require internal reform of the U.S. security assistance apparatus. Rather than a slow-moving bureaucracy, the United States needs an agile and streamlined security assistance enterprise able to deliver aid rapidly when needed and be paused or turned off just as easily when conditions require. In short, the **United States needs sweeter carrots and harder sticks**.

While the current U.S. effort to arm and equip Ukrainian forces is the most visible example today, it is not representative of the day-to-day work of security assistance which the United States carries out around the world. In most cases, the greater threat facing these partners is not an invading army but rather defense institutions for which reform is needed but not properly incentivized. **Modifying the U.S. approach to security assistance is one way to create that incentive and better align aid with policy goals.**

#### **Conditions have the potential to drastically increase cooperation and send a signal of US commitment to democracy – but unilateralism hampers effectiveness – the counterplan’s personalized framework is key to generate tangible reforms**

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment”, CSIS, 2/12/2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/oversight-and-accountability-us-security-sector-assistance>) FGY

Strengths, Weaknesses, and Gaps

When strategically applied, conditionality has the potential to **mitigate risks, strengthen security partnerships**, and **incentivize good behavior**. Policymakers can employ punitive conditionality to mitigate the risk that a partner country will abuse U.S. SSA. Transparent, positive conditionality, in which U.S. policymakers collaborate with recipient countries to develop a road map for SSA, would help **incentivize reform** and likely **result in stronger partnerships** and a better alignment of policy objectives between donor and recipient countries. **Conditioning SSA to promote international norms and human rights demonstrates U.S. commitment** to these values, mandates **better behavior among current partner countries**, and may also **signal and influence the behavior of those seeking SSA in the future**. U.S. policymakers **lack a common framework** that enables them to assess the various factors at play in a security relationship and make judgements about whether placing conditions on assistance will be effective. This deficit has led to the **ad hoc use** and narrow application of conditions. One of conditionality’s greatest weaknesses results from the narrow way policymakers employ it. Different interests between donor and recipient countries often lead to different policy objectives. To bring goals into alignment, donors place conditions on SSA, However, U.S. policymakers often fail to consider partner countries to establish mutually beneficial SSA programs and acceptable conditions. Instead, U.S. policymakers often impose **unilateral conditions, exacerbating disagreements** between partners.

#### The counterplan effectively changes partner behavior and signals to other non-democratic actors

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment”, CSIS, 2/12/2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/oversight-and-accountability-us-security-sector-assistance>) FGY

Conditionality Recommendations

U.S. policymakers should develop and adopt a set of **common principles** that will guide decision-making on conditioning SSA. This framework will help policymakers determine both whether to apply conditionality and the form **best suited for the relationship and objectives**. While policymakers should continue programming such as EUM to ensure oversight and accountability of U.S. defense articles, they should also proactively employ **positive conditionality**, linking the incentive of new capabilities, training, and equipment for the partner if it takes greater steps of security cooperation to achieve common goals. There are three ways in which U.S. policymakers can begin to implement positive conditionality. First, U.S. policymakers should collaborate with recipient countries to develop memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that articulate the partners’ shared goals and road maps that detail partners’ expectations and obligations. Second, U.S. SSA programs should **tie the ongoing provision of a consumable piece of equipment or weapons systems** to its use for a specific purpose – such as a shared operational objective. A key to this type of conditionality lies in the United States being able to **control the flow** of these good **based on a country’s behavior**. Thus, the United States would need to be the only provider of these goods or coordinate with those countries that could undermine the effort. Third, a portion of the total amount authorized for SSA to the partner country should be set aside for a grant program modeled on those administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation in the development sector. Partner countries would be **rewarding for achieving strategic and security goals that are linked to governance and stability**. Policymakers should look to the development community for lessons learned and best practices on how to effectively employ positive conditionality. Upfront positive conditionality will strengthen security partnerships by **encouraging collaboration, establish clear expectations, and help align donor and recipient objectives.** Other options for positive conditionality include developing SSA programs that make additional funds or assistance available to countries that achieve institutional reform milestones, or programs that allocate additional copies of defense articles to countries that are able to sustain the first batch of articles for a set number of years. Finally, when designing conditioned security assistance programs, U.S. policymakers should **account for the activities and efforts of other donors and actors in the** region. This will help ensure that policymakers properly understand their leverage, and may also highlight opportunities for coordination and collaboration. When the United States has the upper hand in the balance of leverage with a partner, punitive conditions or **withholding assistance may have more effect in changing partner**. behavior and/or providing demonstration effects to other partner countries

#### **The counterplan’s assessments guarantee compliance and prevent misuse of aid**

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations”, CSIS, 10/30/2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protection-civilians-us-partnered-operations) FGY

TOOLS FOR INFLUENCING PARTNER BEHAVIOR The U.S. and other actors can use a range of tools to encourage changes in conduct by state and non-state partner forces: ▪ Conditioning Support. By setting **antecedent conditions of compliance with human rights** and international humanitarian law (such as implementation of the Leahy laws), the United States defines basic parameters for itself and its partners: a form of conditionality on security assistance. This approach **establishes up-front expectations** that certain activities—such as training for specific units or other types of assistance— will be discontinued if items are misused or diverted, or if partners otherwise fail to fulfill their legal obligations. But “ultimatum” conditionality, where the United States publicly or privately threatens to end all support due to partner conduct, seldom occurs for several reasons, including the possibility that U.S. policymakers view the partnership as too critical to U.S. interests. Attempts to use the threat of deprivation as leverage are often thwarted by the reality that the U.S. government is more invested in a partnership than the partner, or driven by fears of peer competition over economics or influence.6 The United States can, however, creatively augment existing conditionality by calibrating and sequencing assistance based on an honest and **transparent assessment of risks** and the capabilities realistically needed to maintain the relationship. This process might entail **requirements for specific training** based on past incidents or gaps that create vulnerabilities, adding or strengthening terms for arms transfers and purchases, **limiting certain kinds of assistance** or materiel, or setting clearer expectations through diplomatic engagement in response to patterns of behavior that result in civilian harm. However, conditionality may not be the most effective approach when issues primarily result from legitimate capacity gaps. In these cases, the United States could also place the sale of defense items, such as munitions or aircraft, within a sequence that requires pre-assessment; robust, upfront, and continuous training and technical assistance; and indirect operational oversight or access following the transfer to ensure appropriate use of the equipment.7 Follow through on unacceptable behavior—in the form of **cutting off support to some security partners**—may ultimately be **necessary to prevent U.S. government liability for criminal conduct** and to **send a powerful political message** to a capable but abusive security force

#### The counterplan’s incentive gives allies the political will cooperate

Morcos 21 – Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow at the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, career diplomat with the French Foreign Service and Deputy Head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division focusing on NATO and European Defense Issues, B.A. and M.P.A. from the Paris Institute of Political Studies (“’Lifting Up Our Values at Home’: How to Revitalize NATO’s Political Cohesion”, CSIS, 3/12/2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lifting-our-values-home-how-revitalize-natos-political-cohesion>) FGY

First, allies should recommit to abide by the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. These principles are often mentioned in NATO’s official communiqués in a cursory way, reflecting the limited attention given to them within the alliance. Allies should, as a first step, adopt at the highest level a declaration reaffirming the spirit and letter of the Washington Treaty. This could happen in conjunction with or, ideally, be imbedded in the new Strategic Concept that NATO is likely to launch later this year. While this declaration is not an end in itself, it is a first step to focus member countries and remind them what they will be held accountable for. Regarding the substance of such a pledge, the recent Reflection Group provides a good template with its proposed [code of good conduct](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf). This includes the North Atlantic Treaty articles and two new tenets focused on good behavior.

Second, **NATO should monitor individual Allies’ compliance** with these principles. To have a meaningful effect, such declaration needs to be complemented by an evaluation of its actual implementation, on the basis of an annual report prepared by the International Secretariat under the authority of the assistant secretary general for political affairs or the deputy secretary general. Building on existing metrics and findings (from [nongovernmental organizations](https://freedomhouse.org/) or other international organizations such as the [European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en) or [Council of Europe](https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations)), this report would provide a basis for a periodic discussion on the political health of the alliance. Ideally, the assessment would be linked to NATO’s resilience metrics, in effect underscoring their link with external security threats. In addition to this cyclical process, an “emergency brake” mechanism, similar to what the European Union has established under its rule of law mechanism, could be put in place to allow an ally, or group of allies, to request a discussion at the North Atlantic Council or ministerial level when a serious violation of the declaration by an individual ally occurs. Such discussion would shed light on the problematic behavior of the ally in question and create political pressure in itself.

Third, NATO should **raise the political cost for allies who break the rules**. This is admittedly the most challenging course of action to implement given NATO’s consensus rule and the lack of legal mechanisms to sanction or expel members who violate NATO values and principles. As such, the alliance will need to be creative and **use a mixture of incentives and disincentives**, proceeding to this stage only when the above-mentioned monitoring and naming of violations of the code of conduct (behind closed doors) fail to achieve results. In terms of incentives, allies should make clear that decisions on NATO leadership positions, facility placement, or ministerial locations (once again planned to rotate among capitals) will consider **respect for the code of good conduct**. If this fails to induce better behavior, **allies should move to publicize the infringement**. If this further step also fails, allies would need to consider restrictions on the problem member, which could be decided by “[consensus minus one](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/natos-enemies-within)” and encompass the following measures: suspension from participation in a specific committee, military planning, or exercises; suspension of intelligence sharing; or cancellation of exercises, ministerial meetings, or visits of NATO officials. Additionally, pressure can be brought to bear through bilateral or [EU channels](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/stronger-together-strategy-revitalize-transatlantic-power#toc-2-0-0), in effect harnessing these instruments of power in support of NATO objectives.

Conclusion

**Political will is vital** to prevent such a framework from turning into a hollow shell. As the European Union has shown, actual implementation of the rules is not a given even when they are in place. NATO’s approach will also need to be proportional and graduated in order to give dialogue a chance to change behavior. If NATO moves too quickly or aggressively, it risks widening divisions in the alliance. Alternatively, if it moves too slowly or is overly technical in its approach, it will fail to achieve its broader political objective of repairing the values gap and restoring political cohesion. All in all, a careful balance between restraint and ambition will be paramount in this endeavor to renew NATO’s cohesion.

### 2nc – solvency – monitoring

#### Specificity in conditions is key to ensuring robust oversight, misuse of tech, and perception of US commitment to human rights

Mahanty 21 – Daniel Mahanty, director of the US Program for the Center for Civilians in Conflict, founder and former head of the Office of Security and Human Rights at the United States Department of State, adjunct professor at the Kansas University Center for Global and International Studies, non-resident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, M.A. in national security policy from Georgetown University, B.A. in economics from George Mason University (“Human Rights and Civilian Harm in Security Cooperation: A Framework of Analysis”, 2/16/2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/02/16/human-rights-and-civilian-harm-in-security-cooperation-a-framework-of-analysis/ ) FGY

A Framework of Analysis for Civilian Harm and Human Rights Risks in Security Cooperation

To establish a more suitable approach to managing the different kinds of risks associated with different kinds of security cooperation, policymakers, program managers and those who evaluate government practices from the outside, might look toward a new framework of analysis that **establishes the basis for designing programs with adequate controls and safeguards** in place. A well-designed framework would 1) align with the emerging policy consensus about the necessary components of effective and sustainable security cooperation programs; 2) identify the variables within several categories of analysis (e.g. political, legal, and operational) that correspond with the risks most worthy of attention; 3) **allow for customised application to a specific security cooperation activity**; 4) consider the risks that derive both from the ‘partner’ as well as from the ‘acts of partnership’, and 5) lend itself to relatively clear policy prescriptions that flow from the diagnosis it presents.

Each category of risks in the framework that follows includes a sample of representative risk indicators, along with an associated claim about how any perceived or deal deficits may impair the government’s ability to achieve a desired end-state with its partner. Ideally, the government could use the framework to make policy decisions about the viability of partnership (e.g. as **prerequisite conditions**); to **design and modify partnership activities**; and to prioritise and integrate risk mitigation measures. Among options that may be considered in response to analysis conducted on the basis of this framework, policymakers or program managers might consider moderating or reducing any forms of assistance that materially enhance the lethality of security forces (Kleinfeld 2018, 283–285).  The government may also elect to sequence support or **establish pre-requisite requirements (e.g. demonstrating a particular competency) prior to providing certain kinds of assistance** or partaking in certain kinds of partnership activities; (Shiel and Mahanty 2017, 32), or to require more direct oversight (‘operational end-use monitoring’) (Lewis 2019, 28) of operations that benefit from support or assistance.

### 2nc – solvency – advocate general

#### SC should be conditional

Young 20, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School (Thomas-Durell, “The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance,” DASA Dec Military Documents, <https://www.dasadec.army.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2344014/the-politics-of-security-cooperation-and-security-assistance/)//BB>

A final but important point is a desperate need for policy that makes the provision of SC and SA conditional. All too often, SC events and programs are programmed years in advance (as if they were an exercise or a training event) and are effectively immune from the political commitment of the partner nation’s senior leadership to make needed changes to enable the implementation in the defense institution of SC efforts. Again, Karlin is quite prescient in making this case: The biggest problem with Washington’s efforts to build foreign militaries is its reluctance to weigh in on higher-order questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel—issues that profoundly affect a military’s capacity but are often considered too sensitive to touch. Instead, both parties tend to focus exclusively on training and equipment, thus undercutting the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.36

### 2nc – solvency – interoperability

#### The counterplan ensures interoperability at the military AND political level. Solves best.

Mahanty 21 – Daniel Mahanty, director of the US Program for the Center for Civilians in Conflict, founder and former head of the Office of Security and Human Rights at the United States Department of State, adjunct professor at the Kansas University Center for Global and International Studies, non-resident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, M.A. in national security policy from Georgetown University, B.A. in economics from George Mason University (“Human Rights and Civilian Harm in Security Cooperation: A Framework of Analysis”, 2/16/2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/02/16/human-rights-and-civilian-harm-in-security-cooperation-a-framework-of-analysis/ ) FGY \*figures omitted

Legal Compliance and Interoperability Factors

Questions related to the interaction between security cooperation and international law fall loosely into two broad and distinct, but related, categories. The first category includes questions that relate to the obligations each state has under international law, how the cooperation activity accrues responsibility to each for their own action and how each might share responsibility for the actions of the other. The **degree of legal liability imparted to states that participate in security cooperation** activities largely depends on the applicable legal theory of state responsibility (and how it is being interpreted), and may depend on the nature and significance of the action, and whether and **how much a state ‘knows’ about any internationally wrongful acts it is supporting**. [[4]](https://www.e-ir.info/2021/02/16/human-rights-and-civilian-harm-in-security-cooperation-a-framework-of-analysis/#_ftn4) This category of concerns also raises questions about any gaps that are created with respect to attribution and accountability for actions among states in ‘coalitions of the willing’ (Tondini 2017, 11–13). Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions also obliges states to ‘undertake to respect and to ensure respect’ for international humanitarian law (IHL), which could, in theory, create an additional obligation on states to promote respect for IHL through both positive and negative means available.

Figure 5: Legal (partner state)

Other questions relate to the **degree of ‘legal interoperability’**[[5]](https://www.e-ir.info/2021/02/16/human-rights-and-civilian-harm-in-security-cooperation-a-framework-of-analysis/#_ftn5) **between the partnering states that ensures compatible interpretation** and **application of the law** (Goddard 2017, 211, 212). Legal interoperability might also include a **consideration for how any formal or informal legal arrangements dilute or strengthen accountability** to the law, e.g. in the form of status of forces agreements that relieve one of the states of accountability (Hussein, Moorehead and Horowitz 2018). Indicators in this category may be most useful for circumstances in which the US is providing operational support or is involved with the partner in joint operations (so-called ‘partnered operations’).

Figure 6: Legal interoperability

Operational Factors

Operational capacity is unlikely to overcome factors at the political level that enable, encourage or tolerate human rights abuses. But some degree of tradecraft competency is necessary for **translating a political commitment to protecting rights or preventing harm into operational reality**. In the case of law enforcement operations, police, or security forces acting as police, can avoid or reduce harm through tactical proficiency in escalation of force or the effective use of non-lethal methods (OHCHR 2004, 27). Similarly, military forces can take meaningful steps toward preventing, mitigating, and responding to any ham they cause in the course of their own operations during the conduct of hostilities (Lewis 2019, 38). (Note: the small selection of sample variables here applies to military operations and civilian harm, rather than law enforcement activities and human rights. They are meant to be representative of the kinds of variables that may be appropriate.)

Figure 7: Operational

Similar to the other categories within this framework, operational risks derive not only from the characteristics of the partners, but also from the acts of cooperation they undertake. Just as **risks can emerge from** variations in the understanding and application of law, so too can they stem from **gaps in interoperability** in joint or partnered security operations, to include the ways in which partners plan, prepare, and execute missions, and in the ways in which they respond to allegations or reports of harm or abuse (Dalton et al. 2018, 20). When providing materiel or logistical support, the **US may benefit from ensuring it is able to undertake ‘operational oversight’** (or ‘operational end-use monitoring’) so that it can better understand the nature of the military activities it is supporting. (Lewis 2019, 28).

### 2nc – solvency – domestic political support

#### The counterplan ensures sustained domestic political support for SC by minimizing justifications for aid-reduction

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations”, CSIS, 10/30/2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protection-civilians-us-partnered-operations) FGY

The experience of policymakers and practitioners in security and humanitarian fields provide significant lessons about the best ways to mitigate harm and protect civilians in the context of security partnerships. The following are key emerging themes from select discussions facilitated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), and InterAction about practitioner experiences.

Reconciling Geopolitical Dynamics

In the **face of significant harm to civilians** resulting from a partner’s conduct, the **pursuit or continuation of the partnership may compromise** the **political viability of its operations and may affect U.S. credibility** in relation to other states, in multilateral forums, and in the eyes of the civilian population where the United States pursues the partnership. For instance, individuals familiar with the Saudi military intervention in Yemen report that Yemeni citizens largely blame the United States and United Kingdom for civilian loss of life resulting from Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, given the U.S. and UK role in providing arms and logistical support for the campaign. Continuing a partnership despite harm to civilians can also **erode domestic support**, both in the U.S. Congress and the public. U.S. foreign policy choices often prioritize relationships or perceived security interests at the expense of ensuring that partners have the capacity and commitment to maximize the protection of civilians, or even to meet their obligations under international law. The pressure to contend with a threat, the political or economic urgency of cooperation, lack of professional partner capacity, or simply the status quo of arms deals and security partnerships can obscure or overwhelm other, real costs. When the United States believes that partner conduct can or will improve, or that the near-term benefits of partnership outweigh the short- and long-term costs, the United States may tolerate greater levels of harm to civilians—including **possible patterns of human rights and international humanitarian law** **violations**—arising from the conduct of partner countries. Similarly, the United States has pursued partnerships with non-state armed groups in the context of volatile and evolving armed conflicts, where the United States focuses on its near-term security objectives while giving **minimal consideration to the longer-term implications** of the partnership and the conduct of those partners towards civilian populations. Policymakers are ultimately responsible for placing the short-term costs and benefits of partnership within the broader context of strategic objectives and enduring interests. In order to accurately assess the correlation between a partnership and its strategic ends, policymakers must have a realistic and accurate understanding of the benefits and limitations of partnership. Current practice suggests that although policymakers may express concerns about the costs of specific partnerships, the policy options available to them—and U.S. capacities to encourage changes in partner behavior and policy—are **not sufficient to address critical issues related to civilian harm**. Many of the good practices highlighted in this report come from U.S. and NATO experience in Afghanistan. But recent partnered operations indicate that lessons from Afghanistan are not systematized across U.S. security partnerships and military operations and, indeed, have not been sustained in re-escalation in military operations in Afghanistan itself.

### 2nc – solvency – aff fails/comparative

#### Aff alone fails – guarantees circumvention, fails to spread US norms, and wastes resources

* “security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably

Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/>) FGY

Daily news coverage of burned-out Russian armor, as well as Russia’s eastward retreat, serves as tangible evidence that U.S. weapons and other military supplies being delivered to Ukraine — about $3.5 billion authorized so far this year — are having real effects. **Less clear**, however, **are** the **results of** the roughly $20 billion in **military aid which the United States provides to other partners** around the world annually. When evaluated in terms of U.S. national interests and partner-nation outcomes, a **great deal of** this **security assistance fails to meet the mark.**

History is marred with episodes such as the initial failure of U.S.-trained and equipped Iraqi forces against ISIL in 2014, the collapse of Afghan forces following coalition withdrawal in 2021, and others in the more distant past. As E. John Teichert recently argued, the U.S. security assistance enterprise is slow-moving, outmoded, and requires a major overhaul if the United States wants to remain the partner of choice vis-à-vis strategic competitors such as Russia and China. He is correct, but only addresses half of the problem. **Currently, the United States uses an approach which prioritizes** what are known as “capacity-building efforts” — mainly the **unconditional provision** of equipment and training — but **fails to address underlying institutional weaknesses**. Instead, the **United States should use aid as leverage to achieve both reform in partner nations’ defense establishments and broader U.S. policy goals.**

#### Lack of flexibility prevents the potential of SC as an incentive to further US goals

Paul 15 – Christopher Paul, senior social scientist at the RAND Corporation, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, former statistics faculty and policy & defense research at the UCLA, Ph.D. in sociology from UCLA (“What Works Best When Conducting Security Cooperation”, testimony presented before the House Armed Service Committee, 10/21/2015, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT441.html>) FGY

Challenges to Security Cooperation Success

Our research also highlights various challenges that can reduce prospects for success in security cooperation. Some of these aspects can be controlled by the assistance provider and can (and should) be improved upon; others are inherent in or under the control of partners and are things the United States needs to keep in mind when managing its expectations for future security cooperation efforts.

First among these challenges relates to a previous section of my testimony today: partner willingness. One of the findings of our research is that you can’t want it more than they do.9 Lack of partner willingness can disrupt security cooperation at many levels, any of which can result in delay, diminished success, or outright failure. Examples include partners unwilling to participate in security cooperation (and this can be at the ministerial level, command level, or level of individual troop trainees), partners willing to participate but unwilling to focus their efforts in areas of U.S. strategic interest, partners unwilling to use the capacity built for the intended purpose (often because they would prefer to use it for something else), and partners unwilling to respect human rights while benefiting from and using the capabilities provided by security cooperation.

Many of the challenges to security cooperation success stem from shortcomings in U.S. practices. Because of funding and budgetary cycles and changing priorities, the United States funds and delivers security cooperation inconsistently, and that decreases effectiveness. This problem is exacerbated with partners who face **significant contextual challenges**. When the United States drops the ball with a robust partner, either that partner picks it up or the ball floats to some extent. When the United States drops the ball with a partner that faces significant contextual challenges, the ball sinks.

**Inadequate sustainment planning** hurts security cooperation effectiveness, too. As noted, unless they are sustained, forces and capabilities built through partner capacity-building efforts rapidly atrophy. Some partners have resources to dedicate to sustainment, as well as forces with backgrounds and training that support maintenance, and some do not. Even where sustainment support from the partner is possible, it needs to be an integrated part of the overall security cooperation plan. When partners lack the resources necessary for sustainment, sustainment needs to be provided as part of the security cooperation package.

Similarly, a **lack of flexibility** in security cooperation constrains its effectiveness. The administrative requirements of security cooperation often prevent executors from wielding necessary flexibility. For example, in one country, the commander of the partner formation designated for security cooperation refused to allow his troops to participate. U.S. personnel located a similar formation in the same municipality whose commander was enthusiastic about the planned activities, but program procedures prevented U.S. personnel from making the needed shift and engaging with the willing formation. In another case, partner stakeholders were delaying participation in planned activities, but materiel and **resources were still being delivered to the partner.** **U.S. personnel were extremely frustrated that they could not control the flow of resources sufficiently to use that as an incentive for better partner participation**.

These last three problems stem in part from weaknesses in the authorities. While the patchwork of authorities available to fund and support security cooperation enables a wide range of activities, the authorities rarely support an activity for more than a year or two at a time, resulting in uncertainty about their continuation. Programs under Title 10 authorities are short duration; some Title 22 authorities (such as Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing) can be more enduring but have fairly limited scope and application. There are few authorities that allow for sustainment support, and none that I am aware of can support sustainment of capabilities built as part of some other effort. While needs, objectives, and the situation on the ground can change fairly quickly, once an effort is launched and funded by a program, it is difficult to change important execution details.

### 2nc – at: squo safeguards solve

#### Current safeguards are insufficient – ensuring flexibility for potential curtailment is key

Lewis 19 – Dr. Larry Lewis, head of the CNA’s Center for Autonomy and AI, previous Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for human rights, lead analyst and co-author for the Joint Civilian Casualty Study in support of GEN Patraeus, subject matter expert on the subjects of joint and coalition interoperability, combat identification, and fratricide, Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Rice University (“Promoting Civilian Protection during Security Assistance: Learning from Yemen”, May 2019, <https://www.cna.org/reports/2019/05/IRM-2019-U-019749-Final.pdf>) FGY

Filling the policy gap: civilian protection and security assistance

The absence of a comprehensive US strategy in Yemen between 2015–2018 is a symptom of a larger problem: Although the US is the world’s largest dealer of military arms, it **does not have a policy addressing civilian protection challenges** **that** come when the recipient of military assistance uses force in armed conflict. The only safeguards are the Leahy law and a basic requirement that partner military forces comply with IHL.41 For example, DOD provides basic training regarding IHL through institutions such as Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). Previous analysis shows that these **safeguards are necessary but not sufficient** for avoiding significant harm to civilians in armed conflict: many **civilians can be harmed, and medical facilities and critical infrastructure can be damaged**, even when military forces do not violate international law.42 Given this policy gap, how can the US manage differing interests and risks with respect to civilian protection? The overall construct in the Leahy law is instructive here; it includes two types of activities: 1. Improving operational effectiveness: **general security assistance** that can include military equipment and weapons, tactical training, and operational support 2. **Promoting responsible behavior**: training and education on IHL and human rights law **to avoid gross violations of human rights**, and working with the partner military and their justice system to **promote accountability**. **When specific concerns arise with a partner, the first** (improving operational effectiveness) **can be curtailed or paused while the second is continued**, or even intensified, with the intent of remediation and restoring the security assistance relationship. This overall approach can also be taken with civilian protection. The specific tools for promoting responsible behavior will differ, but the overall approach helps promote the interest of both the US and the partner force, and the security of civilians. This approach to managing risk in security assistance is shown in Figure 2.

#### Status quo accession requirements fail

Wallander 18, resident and CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and Senior Adviser at WestExec Advisors. From 2013 to 2017, she served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council (Celeste, “Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations, 97.4)//BB

BACKSLIDING AWAY

In the early years of this century, some observers, including me, worried that the credibility of NATO's admission criteria was being undermined by new members that managed to meet NATO's standards only to backslide after joining the alliance. When international organ- izations increase their membership, they often become more un- wieldy and slow to act. Greater numbers mean greater diversity in interests and priorities. NATO argued that a shared commitment to liberal democracy would mitigate this challenge, but that would be true only if new members sustained those values after accession. At the time, I feared that long-standing NATO members were being ex- ploited by states such as Hungary that had made promises of political reform they did not intend to keep. Giving backsliders a free pass would harm NATO's credibility and detract from its ability to cultivate liberal values. And if NATO became unwilling to enforce its member- ship requirements, the United States' most important multilateral alli- ance would become rife with weak links.

## solvency – say yes – general

### 2nc – say yes

#### Bargaining is effective, even with countries who aren’t currently aligned with US interests – furthers their economic and political stability

Sullivan et. Al 11 – Patricia L. Sullivan, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Davis with a concentration in international relations, comparative politics, and research methodology (“US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, July 2011, Vol. 7, No. 3, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24909798>) FGY

According to this model, a **powerful state can use military assistance as leverage** to compel recipient state cooperation. In this straightforward model, military aid is a source of **bargaining power** because donors can **link benefits to desired behavior** by recipients. This theory builds on early work on asymmetrical influence. Keohane and Nye. (1977) argue, for example, that dominant states can influence the foreign policy of dependent states using aid allocations to **reward or punish past behavior** and to act as an **incentive that encourages future compliance**. More recently, Palmer, Wohlander, and Clifton Morgan (2002) contend that "Foreign aid, at the most general level, is a tool of influence—states give it because they believe it encourages recipients to take desired actions". Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) propose a model in which donors give foreign aid to **purchase policy support** from recipients. States are most likely to give aid to "countries **whose leaders do not inherently support the policies of a prospective donor** but are **willing to back those policies in exchange for aid sufficient to improve their political and economic welfare**" (254). If military aid gives the US bargaining power, recipient states that receive larger amounts of aid and those that have a greater need for assistance should be more willing to accommodate their foreign policy to US preferences. While Derouen and Heo (2004) suggest that aid is more often used as an ex post reward than as an ex ante inducement, we suspect that the relationship is circular; a state's level of cooperation with the United States influences the amount of aid it receives and the amount of aid a state receives influences subsequent levels of cooperation with the United States. The example of US military aid to Georgia is consistent with the expectations of the Arms for Influence model. US military aid to Georgia spiked from an average of $2.76 million per year from 1991-2001 to $92 million in 2002 and then aver aged $13.9 million per year between 2003 and 2006 (USAJD 2006). Most aid was directed toward the 2002-2003 Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) (Shan ker 2002). As part of GTEP, about 2,000 Georgian soldiers were trained by US military personnel and equipped with American weapons and technology in order to better prepare Georgia to help the United States counter global terrorism (United States Department of Defense 2002). One year after the initiation of the GTEP, Georgia was a dedicated member of the "coalition of the willing" that sup ported the US war in Iraq. In the years after the Rose Revolution of 2003, new President Mikheil Saakashvili sent a total of 2,000 soldiers to support US opera tions in Iraq, making it the third largest contributor of forces by 2007. Aiding the United States in Iraq was part of a larger pattern of cooperative behavior by Geor gia; our events data indicate that Georgia's overall level of cooperation with the United States more than tripled after 2002 (King and Lowe 2003a,b)

#### Material inducements are a sufficient incentive

Ross and Dalton 20, Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Melissa Dalton, directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (“A ROADMAP FOR BETTER CHOICES FROM SECURITY PARTNERS,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners/>)

Toward a Framework for Positive Conditionality

What if the United States had approached its relationship with Uganda differently in pursuit of shared objectives? It’s possible that if the United States had structured its assistance in a way that incentivized Uganda’s politicians and security officials to take specific steps toward clearly — and mutually — identified milestones, that could have led to the development of stronger capabilities for and commitment to civilian protection and governance by Uganda’s military over time. Instead, a reactive posture to human rights and corruption transgressions has had limited effects, and punitive measures may only strain the relationship and undermine possibilities for cooperation.

The United States should develop a framework for positive conditionality in security sector assistance to better shape political and security outcomes with partner countries. On balance an affirmative framework will offer the United States the widest latitude in shaping outcomes in a broad range of circumstances. This approach also does not rule out the sequencing of punitive steps — or a pause to assess partner performance.

First, this framework assumes an ex ante/positive approach to conditionality, at least in some manner. With the U.S. government providing security sector assistance to nearly 200 countries around the world, it is unlikely that the United States will be initiating a security sector assistance relationship wholly from scratch. An ex ante approach would focus on developing concrete plans, including triggers for clearly identified conditions, at the inception of an initiative or set of programs. It should involve a plan covering at least five years, identifying ultimate objectives and intermediate milestones, a theory of change for how objectives will be achieved, and metrics to provide a basis for assessing progress. Policymakers and planners can then link conditions to milestones and metrics. Moreover, such an approach builds on recognized best practices for capacity-building initiatives.

Second, the framework must include a partner government’s mutual participation in the creation of the assistance plan, the identification of objectives, and the agreement on conditions. The partner will be more incentivized to progress toward objectives when it understands and commits to such objectives based on its own identified interests. A memorandum of understanding, bilateral compact, or some other formal written instrument can commit both parties to its terms.

Third, the framework should structure conditions as positive inducements for the recipient to take steps toward milestones or objectives. Milestones could include completion of defense institutional reforms, starting with development of a process to align budget to strategy, progressing to completion of a first budget cycle with the new process, and culminating in institutionalization of the process through policy and/or law. They might also include progress toward capability or interoperability milestones (e.g., ability to conduct nighttime counter-terrorism operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict or command and control and intelligence integration across platforms and systems). In addition, milestones could include transparency and accountability activities (e.g., publication of public budget, completion of audit, investigation of specific incidents of resource waste and abuse or diversion, establishment and activity of an independent third-party investigative unit for accountability).

Partners will likely respond to inducements that are material in nature, including access to an expanded variety of types of assistance and an expanded quantity of assistance. However, partners may also value incentives such as eligibility for key agreements to facilitate access and information and/or technology sharing (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing, general security of military information, etc.) or eligibility for expanded partnership opportunities (e.g., National Guard State Partnership Program or the Military Personnel Exchange Program). Moreover, incentives may also be political, such as access to membership in certain organizations or eligibility for certain agreements.

#### Security Cooperation provides sufficient leverage

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

Recipients are more likely to follow U.S. direction when the United States combines teaching and persuasion with bargaining and/or direct command. Bargaining is well suited to the context of SFA [Security Force Assistance]. Bargaining is in a sense a much simpler, less ambitious influence strategy than persuasion. This study argues that the United States has ample bargaining power in most cases of security assistance, and is therefore well-positioned to wield carrots and sticks to shape recipient decision-making. Bargaining power, in Glenn Snyder’s framework, varies as a function of the 54 two sides’ relative dependence, commitment, and interest in the object of bargaining.59 Lumpy (each variable could be further subdivided into many constituent pieces), subjective, and consequently hard to measure as those variables are, the argument that recipients of United States SFA, particularly in the context of severe internal threats, have more bargaining power than the United States, does not hold up to scrutiny. Recipients of SFA [Security Force Assistance] may not always depend for their survival on the United States, but they are almost always far more dependent on the United States than the United States is on them. With respect to relative commitment, SFA [Security Force Assistance] recipients often view the U.S. commitment to an SFA [Security Force Assistance] partnership, or to the leaders themselves, as fickle. In such cases, the United States’ relative lack of commitment should be a bargaining asset, because it should help increase the credibility of its threats to withdraw support or to replace the leadership. Moreover, SFA [Security Force Assistance] is as conducive to the establishment of credibility with respect to promises of carrots and threats of sticks as any international partnership can be. Providers need not rely on the nuclear threats of complete support or total abandonment. Rather, SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships create myriad opportunities for the application of calibrated carrots ranging from the provision of additional ammunition to a particular unit, to a dramatic increase in the scale of U.S. assistance to the recipient military as a whole, and calibrated sticks ranging from the disbanding of a particular unit, to a dramatic decrease in assistance, to the ouster of the civilian leader. SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships are also typically long-term, and involve iterated interactions between provider and recipient. There is, therefore, an extended shadow of the future,60 and opportunities for the United States to demonstrate the credibility of its promises and threats through consistent follow-through. These two features of SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships—the opportunities for calibrated carrots and sticks, and the shadow of the future—should help to resolve the credibility problem that plagues, for instance, the challenge of extended nuclear deterrence. In the context of SFA, threats to decrease support to a unit or increase support to a unit, or even to support or oust a civilian leader, are far less difficult than the challenge the United States faced in its efforts to convince the Soviet Union that it would trade New York for Paris. SFA [Security Force Assistance] is the United States trying to convince brigade commanders that their interests are better served following U.S. direction to remove a corrupt battalion commander than ignoring that direction. It may not be an easy task, but the United States certainly has the carrots and sticks to do it, and the context of SFA [Security Force Assistance] is more conducive than most

### 2nc – say yes – pressure

#### NATO says yes – allies see it as an opportunity to expand their sphere of influence, others rely on security assistance to counter Russia and China and face international pressure to cooperate

Larsen 22 – Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (“NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China, 5/22/2022, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>) FGY

Fourth, NATO should revisit its partnership policy, which allows the alliance to delegate certain aspects of resilience to third countries and actors that are better placed. The partnership policy has not been reformed since 2011, when the alliance was experimenting with the idea of “going global.” NATO presently comprises 30 allied countries—soon 32, when Sweden and Finland expectedly join. However, it also has as many as 43 partners in Europe and around the world, from Columbia to Mauritania, with little idea of what their partnerships are supposed to add. NATO needs to better [differentiate](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2021.1945486) among its partners as it engages competition with illiberal contenders; given the fault lines of the conflict, technologically advanced and **like-minded liberal partners** should [**assume greater importance**](https://transatlanticrelations.org/publications/forward-resilience-protecting-society-in-an-interconnected-world/). This primarily concerns NATO’s partnership with the European Union and Switzerland due to their shared resilience across technologically advanced and highly integrated countries that share the same values. NATO partners in the Western Balkans, Georgia and obviously Ukraine need the **resilience assistance that NATO can provide them to defend against Russian and Chinese subversion**. Additionally, the Asia-Pacific partners—Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand—are gaining prominence due to the values they share with NATO and their advanced experience with technological and economic decoupling from China in sectors sensitive for national security.

#### That means that the affirmative’s “say yes” justifications apply to the counterplan as well

Tankel 17, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Stephen, “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” *Lawfare*, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-improve-return-investment-security-assistance>)//BB

Negative conditionality, which is what many people think of when the idea of conditioning assistance comes up, entails threatening to end, suspend, or reduce assistance if conditions are not met. Positive conditionality, which has been used for years in the development world, promises assistance in return for “good behavior” that is defined in advance. Rather than authorizing aid and then withholding it, the United States would identify positive actions that a recipient is considering—or at least open to taking—and then incentivize them. Critically, we argue the process of identifying these actions and benchmarks to measure them should be done in consultation with the recipient. This would help to reduce the potential for mismanaged expectations on either side and get the recipient more invested in the process, signaling that it is a partner and not merely a proxy benefiting from U.S. paternalism. It would also reduce the chances for caving by the United States. Positive conditionality may also be the most optimal route for cases where the United States has little leverage over a recipient, but where the recipient desires further U.S. engagement and investment. We envision at least three different ways to implement this approach.

### 2nc – say yes – civil society

#### Recipient-states say yes. The counterplan builds support through political pressure, even if the government is initially reluctant

Goldberg 21, master's degree in International Affairs from Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, et al, (Ilan, “A People-First U.S. Assistance Strategy for the Middle East,” *Center for a New American Security*, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/a-people-first-u-s-assistance-strategy-for-the-middle-east)//BB>

Third, by creating a regional pool of funds the United States could generate competition among regional states that could incentivize reforms and better projects. Proposals for various projects could be judged across the region and given to the most compelling investments based on their impact on democracy and development objectives instead of starting with an assistance number for each country. Recent research demonstrates that introducing competition among the beneficiaries of foreign assistance and shifting aid toward successfully reforming countries raises the enticements for reform.26 Still, the leverage of U.S. assistance should not be overstated, particularly in the Middle East where Gulf countries provide significantly more assistance with no strings attached. However, as evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) shows, positive conditionality can provide that extra nudge to catalyze reform where there is already a willingness to do so. A recent Brookings Institution study found that this so-called MCC effect allows “‘sympathetic interlocutors’ in low- and lower-middle income countries who consider the prospect of receiving the MCC’s ‘good housekeeping seal of approval’—and access to hundreds of millions of dollars in flexible grant assistance from the U.S government—as an opportunity to rally domestic reform efforts and neutralize anti-reform opposition.”27

#### Even if the government drags their feet, US prioritization of democracy builds support for civil society and political opposition that guarantees say yes.

Carothers 21, senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Benjamin Press, research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program (Thomas, “Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/04/navigating-democracy-security-dilemma-in-u.s.-foreign-policy-lessons-from-egypt-india-and-turkey-pub-85701>)//BB

In addition, policymakers should not limit their expectations for positive change only to potential liberalizing actions by the partner government. They should also ask whether greater attention from the United States on democracy issues helps bolster the will and steadfastness of embattled leaders in civil society or the political opposition of the country in question. A common mistake is to think of the push on democracy and rights issues with a problematic security partner only in terms of effects on the government. But other parts of the political and civic communities are highly important and reactive to external signals. However, U.S. policymakers need to be careful of crossing the line between support and perceived (or real) interference in a foreign country’s domestic politics. For example, pushing the government hard on maintaining electoral integrity may be more effective than expressing direct support for opposition forces.

#### That’s necessary and sufficient

Rand and Tankel 2015 Dr. Dafna H. Rand is the former Deputy Director of Studies and the inaugural Leon E. Panetta Fellow at CNAS. She formerly served on the National Security Council staff and as a Middle East expert on the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff. Stephen Tankel is an Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University, and an adjunct fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security program at CNAS. He previously served as a Senior Adviser for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense. “Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment,” August 2015.

Critics of conditionality within the United States government often argue that it has rarely directly changed the domestic decisionmaking of U.S. allies.50 However, advocates of conditionality within the U.S. government have argued that withholding assistance and cooperation is not always about direct effect; in fact, withholding items to partner governments that they could use to support internal repression signals the broader range of goals and objectives constitutive of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. values and the role of international norms. There is a signaling function of conditionality, since the United States can use it to send a message of discontent to the local governments in question and, more importantly, to their publics. Therefore, while many within and outside of the U.S. government are debating the relative impact of the recent Bahrain and Egypt conditionality exercises, the larger discussion will continue about the purpose of conditionality. Up for debate is how U.S. policymakers use it, either proactively or retroactively, and how specifically the United States must tie the specific punishment to the desired change of behavior in a partner state. Such discussion must also account for concerns among some that conditioning assistance could deleteriously affect other U.S. objectives in the recipient country or its region. However, because it is nearly impossible to prove that partners have “punished” the United States by reducing cooperation in one area as a direct result of dissatisfaction with U.S. policy in another area, the concern about tradeoffs will remain largely speculative.

### 2nc – say yes – EDT-specific

#### New security challenges underscore the importance of embedding democratic values in emerging tech to NATO allies

Soare 21 – Simona R. Soare, former Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS, former advisor to the vice president of the European Parliament, analyst with the Romanian Ministry of Defense, Ph.D. in political science from the National School of Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, recipient of the US Department of State fellowship on US Grand Strategy (“Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies”, 6/11/2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies>) \*\* recut FGY

* EDT = Emerging and Disruptive Technologies

Key Drivers of NATO Innovation in EDTs

There is an obvious prioritization in NATO’s innovation efforts in relation to five key drivers.

The first is that NATO’s defense and technological innovation does not occur in a political, ideological, or strategic vacuum. The rise of China as a long-term great-power competitor, the return of Russian revisionism, the **rapid progress and “democratization” of advanced technologies** among state and non-state actors, and new transnational security challenges like climate change shape the strategic environment and set new **requirements for innovation.** Though allies are concerned with Russia’s adoption of EDTs, Chinese investment and leadership ambitions in the adoption of these technologies is the main geopolitical driver behind allied innovation plans.11

The second and related driver is maintaining a technological edge. The **perception that technological dominance** (and the imperative to avoid strategic technological surprise) **is an inherent strategic advantage is well established in the strategic culture of NATO and** many **allies.** Over the past two decades, the technological dominance of the West—from stealth to long-range precision strike capabilities—has been increasingly challenged, especially by Russia and China. Officially, NATO and some of the leading allies continue to pursue the goal of maintaining a technological edge—in relation to EDTs.12 This message is an essential component of NATO’s geopolitical signaling and **consistent with its policy of competing from a position of strength**. However, there is a growing informal recognition among the allies of the magnitude of the challenge to maintain technological dominance across all critical emerging technologies. In view of the trajectory of Chinese investment in EDTs, it is important for NATO to develop its resilience, deterrence, and defense, to improve its adaptability, and to be prepared to mitigate adverse conditions where rivals temporarily achieve technological parity or even dominance.

The third driver is to foster the interoperability of military capabilities that are enabled by emerging technologies13 and to incentivize transatlantic defense cooperation on EDTs to avoid or bridge technology gaps between allies. This goes to the core of NATO’s mission to deter and defend against threats, but it is an enduring challenge. Streamlining standardization and testing, evaluation, verification, and validation procedures remains important. However, NATO should also double down on its efforts to ensure greater compliance with interoperability and baseline requirements for the security of critical infrastructure. Recent challenges in relation to national compliance with the 2019 NATO requirements for security of telecommunications infrastructure are a case in point, but there are wider and enduring challenges with hardware and communications interoperability.14 While the plans for the new Defence Innovation Accelerator promise to contribute to maintaining NATO’s technological edge, it also remains to be seen whether they will contribute sufficiently to building technology capacity among some of the smaller and more vulnerable allies. As they establish governance procedures and participation rules, allies need to mitigate the risk that the accelerator could contribute to a two-speed, two-tier alliance, dividing the technology haves from the technology have-nots.

The fourth driver is a desire to lead in setting global, normative EDTs governance. The Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, for example, has emphasized that NATO “is exceptionally well placed to be a global driver of a values-based innovation agenda.”15 **Democratic values are at the core of what defines security for transatlantic allies** and the target of adversarial subversive measures. Consequently, **embedding democratic values into the development, adoption, and use of EDTs by the allies is key to NATO’s mission**. Thus, innovation efforts need to be closer linked to NATO’s democracy-centered tech diplomacy with like-minded global partners, some of whom could be invited to join the Defence Innovation Accelerator.

The fifth driver is organizational and procedural change, notably to build “a resilient innovation pipeline for the alliance”16 and a sustainable innovation ecosystem. This is a more challenging undertaking than it may first appear. Military organizations have historically innovated more coherently and efficiently than other public organizations.17 However, in the case of EDTs, this pattern is challenged. NATO and allied military organizations are not driving technological progress, are not the main agents of innovation, and depend on effective civilian-military collaboration for their own innovation efforts.

#### **Mounting danger in emerging tech means that NATO allies are willing to cooperate to counter threats**

Harper 22 – Jon Harper, managing editor of DefenseScoop covering the Pentagon and military technology (“Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO’s new strategic concept”, 6/1/2022, <https://www.fedscoop.com/emerging-tech-to-have-prominent-role-in-natos-new-strategic-concept%ef%bf%bc/>) FGY

Emerging and disruptive technologies will be a key focus area of NATO’s new Strategic Concept which will be unveiled later this month, the U.S. ambassador to the alliance told reporters Wednesday.

The document is expected to be adopted at the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid, marking the first time in more than a decade that the transatlantic military pact has released a new Strategic Concept. The guidance sets the alliance’s strategy and security tasks, outlines the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment, and provides direction for its political and military implementation.

There will be “a lot on new threats and challenges, a heavier emphasis on things like emerging and disruptive technologies, heavier emphasis on new domains like cyber and space, more on climate change,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told the Defense Writers Group in Washington.

Smith did not elaborate on what the emerging technologies are, and FedScoop did not have the opportunity to ask her about them before the meeting with reporters ended.

However, **individual members of NATO have already their signaled interest and concerns** about unmanned systems, AI, autonomy and hypersonics, among other emerging capabilities. For example, last week senior Pentagon officials and their U.K. counterparts signed an Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Statement of Intent, setting shared strategic objectives related to AI readiness. The agreement “will deepen AI cooperation between the two Allies, maintaining and increasing interoperability and promoting values-based global leadership for the responsible development, procurement, and use of AI in defense,” according to a DOD news release.

Non-NATO members from the Asia-Pacific region will also be attending the summit for the first time, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. The **threat posed by Russia and China** will be addressed during discussions and in the new Strategic Concept.

At the meeting leaders will have an opportunity “to have a conversation about what we’re both seeing. It’s been interesting for me to watch, say, **countries in the Asia-Pacific talk about hybrid threats** on their side of the Pacific, how are they grappling with disinformation, cyberattacks, the aggressive tactics that they’re seeing, acts of intimidation from China. And then you pair that with an **Estonian or a Lithuanian** and they talk about some of the **challenges that they’re seeing from Russia**,” Smith said.

“It’s about sharing lessons learned, sharing new policies that we’re developing. We’ve had a number of conversations about emerging and disruptive technologies [and] how are we grappling with that,” she added.

Other topics expected to be discussed at the confab include NATO’s force posture in Eastern Europe, and Sweden and Finland’s plans to join the alliance.

#### Ukraine exacerbates Europe’s dependency on the US for security – forces compliance

Brookings 22 – The Brookings Institution Press Release, American research institution (“Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense”, 6/25/2022, <https://www.einnews.com/pr_news/578390972/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense>) FGY

**Russia’s war has exposed Europe’s dependencies**

Vladimir Putin’s greatest achievement thus far in renewing his brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine has been to reinvigorate the Atlantic alliance. North American-European unity has been remarkable, exemplified by harsh and complementary sanctions against Russia; efforts to wean Europe off its dangerous dependence on Russian energy; military, financial, and political support for Ukraine; and actions to strengthen NATO’s own defense.

A more corrosive effect of Putin’s war, however, has been to **deepen even further Europe’s strategic dependence on the United** States — a trend that had already become unsustainable even before the conflict began. As the alliance continues its most urgent task — helping Ukraine beat back Russia’s assault — it must address this important longer-term challenge of rebalancing trans-Atlantic defense.

Doing so means squaring a triangle of issues: ensuring Europe’s capacity to defend itself against Russia and manage a range of additional crises, many along its southern periphery; addressing European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy; and maintaining confidence that the United States can adequately uphold its commitments in both the north Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.

### 2nc – even if say no

#### Even if some allies say no, signaling pressures others to follow on

Bushey 17, J.D., SUNY Buffalo Law School, Buffalo, New York, 2007 (Adam, “GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING INGREDIENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION,” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf)//BB>

Creating a Basis for Unified Action through Conditions

In a few countries, agreements already exist between DOD and USAID on how the two agencies will coordinate future programs at the country level.240 However, the policy should dictate that this should be the norm and not the exception. Further, U.S. agency partnership is not enough. In situations where the circumstances require, DOS policy must be willing to make SC/SA conditional based on corruption reform benchmarks. It was not until the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework Conference in July 2012 that the Afghan government had to meet hard conditions regarding reductions in corruption to receive U.S. military and other aid.241 Political conditions for assistance need to be tailored to a specific, identified reform and done in coordination with the interagency (and other donors if possible) if it is going to be effective and not have unintended consequences.242 Diplomatic methods for creating conditions include sanctions, embargoes, conditional aid, and domestic legislation with international scope and reach. Some critics contend that conditionality does not work. Others contend that even if it does not work, it sends a message, both to the host nation and to other nations around the world, that the U.S. is serious about its commitments to universally recognized rights for all people, such as those outlined in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 243 Regardless, it is already in practice. Both USAID and Millennium Challenge Cooperation have conditions for recipients to receive government-togovernment assistance.244

### 2nc – at: backlash

#### Member states say yes. Making support conditional is more likely to induce states to join US-led efforts

Gannon and Kent 21, PhD in Political Science @ UC-San Diego, \*\*PhD in Political Science @ Ohio State (“Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 65.5)//BB

Because alliance membership is a club good, not a pure public good, worries about being excluded from the security benefits of an alliance can incentivize a state to try to shore up the alliance by sending a costly signal of their commitment to their alliance partners. “Today, we should expect the European allies to find that the best way to strengthen (or avoid weakening) their bonds with the United States is to contribute to out-of-area operations like ISAF. According to this line of reasoning, the allies who put the highest premium on NATO’s traditional products should be the ones—together with the United States—shouldering the heaviest burdens in Afghanistan” (Ringsmose 2010, 331). Yet the Afghanistan case demonstrates this is not just a story about club goods in formal alliances, but security cooperation more generally. States may use war efforts as a signal of their willingness to accept large costs in the hopes that this will improve their relationship with the coalition leader in the future. States use conflicts that are not of immediate strategic importance to— hopefully—gain the attention and respect of important international players. Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions. States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.

#### Fear of backlash is mistaken

Carothers 21, senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Benjamin Press, research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program (Thomas, “Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/04/navigating-democracy-security-dilemma-in-u.s.-foreign-policy-lessons-from-egypt-india-and-turkey-pub-85701>)//BB

A persistent tendency in the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy is to assume a negative effect: that pushing the security partner on democracy issues will make it less helpful with regard to U.S. security objectives. This has been the assumption, for example, of many policymakers working on Egypt over the years, undergirding the persistent U.S. reluctance to push the Egyptian government on its antidemocratic and repressive politics. Yet in many, arguably most, cases, the security interests that Washington hopes the partner will help with are mutual interests, not just those of the United States alone. India’s willingness to take an increasingly tough stance vis-à-vis China is not something that it does because Washington wants it to, but out of its own self-interest. Egypt’s brokering of peaceful relations between Hamas and Israel at times of crisis is very useful from Washington’s point of view, but also serves Cairo’s interests, since open conflict between Israel and Hamas could potentially destabilize Egypt. The notion that the security partner is taking a given stance on a certain issue as a favor to Washington—and thereby may abandon that stance if Washington is not nice to it—is frequently incorrect.

## solvency – say yes – specific

### 2nc – say yes – top-shelf

#### 26 states already say yes. It’s just three that would be denied aid at the outset. [This is 1nc Matthijs]

Matthijs 19 – Matthias Matthijs, assistant professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins University, Senior Fellow for Europe Council on Foreign Relations (“Hearing on Democracy and the NATO Alliance: Upholding Our Shared Democratic Values”, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy and the Environment, 11/13/2019, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Democracy%20and%20the%20NATO%20Alliance.%20Upholding%20Our%20Shared%20Democratic%20Values.pdf>) FGY

What can the United States and the European Union Do?

Both the United States through NATO and our European allies through the EU should do more to **encourage common values** like the rule of **law and democracy in Turkey, Hungary and Poland**. While it may be hard to achieve concrete results in the very short term, both organizations should be aware that they are playing a long game, and that **none of the three current leaders** in Ankara, Budapest, and Warsaw **will be in power indefinitely**. While lecturing allies and friends on democratic principles may easily backfire and be quickly condemned as hypocrisy, the US especially should stand by its enduring commitment to democratic freedoms and the rule of law in all its official (and unofficial) foreign policy statements. Going forward, the European Union can: • **make its funding more conditional on abiding by democratic principles and rule of law** and **withhold funding if necessary**. The EU is currently debating instituting tougher ‘rule of law’ conditions on its funding in the next budget cyle. • **condemn anti-democratic countries directly**, rather than focusing on economics, the EU could also rank countries based on political freedoms, by naming and shaming the worst performers. • encourage its mainstream pan-European political parties – especially the center-right EPP and the center-left D&S – to not allow parties with autocratic or illiberal tendencies within their political groupings. Going forward, the United States should: • continue to support civil society groups and free media in countries experiencing democratic backsliding. For instance, recent reports that Radio Free Europe would be recommencing operations in Hungary are a step in the right direction. • **emphasize that NATO membership means rights** as well as responsibilities beyond spending 2% of GDP on defense. NATO must be an alliance based on **basic common democratic values**. The transatlantic alliance has proven so strong and enduring not simply because of Realpolitik, but also because it has been an alliance based on a shared commitment to freedom and democratic values. If those **values are no longer seen as common to the alliance, it will inevitably erode**. • encourage overseas investment through OPIC in countries that show a strong commitment to the rule of law and democracy while showing a higher level of reluctance to support investment in regimes that are distmantling those institutions.

### 2nc – say yes – baltics

#### Baltics states say yes – Ukraine has made them desperate for more defense

Emmott & Sytas 22 – Robin Emmott, diplomatic correspondent for Reuters covering NATO, EU defense, and foreign policy; Andrius Sytas, journalist for Reuters covering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (“**The Baltic states want more NATO.** They won’t get all they seek”, 6/15/2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/baltic-states-want-more-nato-they-wont-get-all-they-seek-2022-06-15/>) FGY

TAPA MILITARY BASE, Estonia, June 15 (Reuters) - Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the **Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been calling for their region to receive the biggest build-up of** combat-ready **NATO forces** in Europe since the end of the Cold War, to be agreed at a summit on June 28-30 in Madrid.

It will not happen, interviews with seven senior diplomats and officials from leading NATO allies show.

This is partly because the proposals come as the NATO alliance faces a slew of demands not seen in decades: from countering Russia and China in the Arctic to quelling Islamic insurgencies in the Sahel, and tackling new frontiers in space.

Since Russia invaded, the U.S. Congress has approved extra funds and the Pentagon sent F-35 stealth fighters, as well as attack helicopters, to Estonia; Britain doubled its force presence at Estonia's Tapa military base to around 1,700 personnel.

But for many people in the region, which has been occupied by both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and which lies within striking distance of a Russian garrison at St. Petersburg, that is not enough. For instance, 84.6% of Latvian respondents to a Benu Aptiekas/Gemius poll in May said they were **highly anxious about Russia's invasion**.

"The fact that we could be in danger, it's been on the table all the time," said Dzintra Bungs, 82, head of the Latvian Occupation Museum Association in Riga. "It is very **important that we have woken up, and that all Europe awakes**."

The Baltics, with a combined population of just over six million, **want the alliance to boost its pre-Ukraine invasion** presence of around 5,000 multinational soldiers by as much as tenfold, as well as adding air and maritime **defences**.

Many of NATO's 30 allies in Europe and the United States support the calls for a bigger force in principle, but in reality say allies can only commit to maintaining higher troop levels, pre-positioning more equipment, weapons and ammunition in the region and promising rapid reinforcements.

The broad outline for leaders to agree at the summit, the diplomats and NATO officials said, is a model of larger multinational NATO battlegroups in the Baltics, with a commitment to quickly reinforce if Russia were about to invade. Planning for new air and maritime defences will come later.

Many members, including Britain and the United States, do not favour permanent new bases in the Baltics, three of the diplomats told Reuters. They said it would cost billions and be hard to sustain: The states may not have enough troops and weaponry, and a permanent presence would be highly provocative for Moscow.

"The Baltic states will not each get enough NATO troops to create a division," a NATO diplomat said, referring to their request for up to 15,000 troops across the region, as well as more on stand-by in allied countries to complement national forces. "Whatever is decided must be sustainable."

Instead, allied intelligence will help NATO act if Moscow looks set to invade. During informal discussions at NATO headquarters and in capitals, that view has won over the majority, the diplomats and officials said – the plans will need more work after the summit.

The Latvian government declined to comment. Lithuania's presidential office also declined to comment, but an advisor to the president said the **country would continue to insist**, in the run-up to the summit, on the need for more NATO troops. The office of Estonia's prime minister said it and allies were working out the details of how to strengthen the allied presence.

A senior U.S. defence official at NATO declined to comment. A British defence ministry spokesperson declined to go into details, saying it was "working closely with our friends and partners to explore how we can strengthen the alliance's defensive posture."

Russian President Vladimir Putin says his "special military operation" in Ukraine is essential to ensuring Russia's security. Ukraine and its Western allies call this a baseless pretext for an invasion which has raised fears of wider conflict in Europe.

NEXT IN LINE?

For the Baltics, the issue is clear: **They could be next.**

NATO currently rotates a multinational troop presence through the region, but the Baltic states say that leaves them vulnerable.

"After the war - I don't think Russia will be defeated - they will still have huge military capabilities remaining," Valdemaras Rupsys, Lithuania's Chief of Defence, told Reuters. "After some time ... they will try to threaten us by military means. You will see."

Since Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, the Baltics have been warning about a Russian threat that many NATO allies considered overblown. Now, looking at Moscow's playbook in Georgia and Ukraine of capturing a small portion of territory from which to build, Baltic states want NATO to change its approach to their region, a strategically crucial gateway to a busy commercial shipping route linking Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany and Denmark.

Tuuli Duneton, undersecretary for Defence Policy at the Estonian Ministry of Defence, told Reuters Russia has been preparing for the last 20 years for large-scale military confrontation with NATO while the alliance's focus was partly elsewhere, particularly in Afghanistan.

A public report by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service earlier this year said Russia's largest war game to date, near NATO's eastern borders in 2021, involved 200,000 troops, 250 aircraft, 290 tanks, 240 weapon systems and 65 warships. Called Zapad, or West, the war games were evidence of Moscow's long-term strategy to attack NATO, the report said. At the time, the Russian defence ministry said the exercise was rehearsing a purely defensive scenario and allegations it was preparing to invade Poland or the Baltics were false.

The Kremlin did not reply to an email seeking comment.

A MATTER OF TRANSPORT

In May, the kilted bagpipers and drummers of the Royal Welsh Battlegroup played marching songs at a parade ground filled with British, Danish and French troops in the Tapa military base in Estonia. It was a show laid on for visiting ambassadors.

Tapa is one of four bases, originally of around 1,000 troops each, that NATO set up in the Baltic states and Poland after Crimea, from 2017 onwards. That force presence has grown and after Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO activated its Response Force and the United States sent some 20,000 more U.S. troops to Europe. That gives NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) more than 42,000 troops under his command in Europe, with 120 jets at high alert and over 20 ships ready to respond.

But NATO's Baltic deterrent is still too small, the Baltic states say. U.S. officials have long warned about the Russian army's surface-to-air missile systems in its St. Petersburg Garrison, just 160 km (99 miles) from the Estonian border city of Narva.

"The situation in Ukraine shows we were right," said Estonian Colonel Andrus Merilo, referring to Baltic warnings since 2014. "Estonia cannot lose territory, **NATO cannot lose territory**."

He and others say the argument that NATO allies could quickly regroup to defend a Baltic state in the event of a possible Russian invasion overlooks an important hurdle: infrastructure.

Before the COVID pandemic, the European Union planned to spend 6.5 billion euros ($6.8 billion) between 2021 and 2027 to modernise Europe's disjointed road and rail links and weak bridges so states could move troops east in the case of conflict with Russia.

But the pandemic shock forced a rethink. Only 1.7 billion euros was allocated.

#### Baltic states are already asking for more defense from NATO – the Ukraine invasion makes them perceive danger

LRT 22 – Lithuanian Radio and Television, Lithuanian public broadcaster, media group that is owned by the public (“Estonian PM says Baltic states would be ‘wiped off the map’ under current NATO plans”, 6/23/2022, <https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1725924/estonian-pm-says-baltic-states-would-be-wiped-off-the-map-under-current-nato-plans>) FGY

Current NATO defence plans would not prevent **Estonia** from being **wiped off the map** and the capital Tallinn from being razed to the ground, the country’s prime minister, Kaja Kallas, was quoted as telling reporters on Wednesday by the Financial Times.

She said the **alliance’s current plans envisage that the Baltic states would be overrun**, but then be retaken 180 days later.

Noting that the invasion of Ukraine has been going on for over 100 days, Kallas said: “If you compare the sizes of Ukraine and the Baltic countries, it would mean the complete destruction of countries and our culture.”

“Those of you who have been to Tallinn and know our old town and the centuries of history that’s here and centuries of culture that’s here – that would all be wiped off the map, including our people, our nation,” the Estonian prime minister said.

She was commenting on NATO’s defence plans ahead of next week’s NATO summit in Madrid, where the **Baltic countries are asking the allies to reinforce their** deployed **capabilities** and to change their defence strategy from the current “tripwire” approach to one where the alliance defends every inch of territory at once.

Commenting on the current plan to “lose [territory] and liberate it afterwards”, Kallas pointed out that atrocities in Bucha near Kyiv were committed by Russian troops within 80 of the invasion. “Now everyone sees that this tripwire concept doesn’t really work,” the Estonian prime minister stressed.

She said she had spoken to allied troops stationed in Estonia, most of them British, who told her that under current plans, the Russian invasion would wipe out the troops: “They are not fond of the idea that […] they are supposed to die.”

Asked about Kallas’ comments, an unnamed NATO official said that the alliance had plans to defend members, “but we never go into operational details”.

The official noted that strengthening deterrence and defence will be the focus of the Madrid summit.

“We will do more to ensure we can defend every inch of allied territory, at all times and against any threat. We will **adapt the NATO force structure**, with more forces at high readiness. We will also have more NATO forward-deployed combat formations, to strengthen battle groups in the east,” the official is quoted by the FT.

Kallas asks that each Baltic country be assigned a division of 20-25,000 troops. This does not mean that all the troops would be permanently deployed in the Baltics, notes the FT.

Berlin has proposed the creation of a brigade assigned to Lithuania, which would be stationed in Germany. Kallas commented that “I wouldn’t be so fixated on these different models as long as they deliver the result that we are able to defend ourselves from the first day.”

### 2nc – say yes – turkey

#### Turkey says yes:

#### 1 – the counterplan’s transactional negotiation is a signal of prestige for Erdogan

Rossomondo 6-10-2022 (John, “NATO Must Confront Turkey’s Human-Rights Abuses,” Epoch Times, https://www.theepochtimes.com/nato-must-confront-turkeys-human-rights-abuses\_4522853.html?welcomeuser=1)//BB

“The real message he was trying to send to the Biden administration was that he wants to sit around the table and negotiate with them,” Bozkurt told me, noting that Erdoğan likely wants help to stop the upcoming trial of Halkbank, a Turkish state bank, that builds on the earlier Hakan Atilla/Reza Zarrab case that showed the bank was allegedly involved in helping Iran evade sanctions by laundering money through the U.S. financial system. “He is hoping to put pressure on the Biden administration that they will interfere in the judicial process and hush up, like he did in Turkey, the case,” Bozkurt said. Erdoğan fears being directly implicated in the case because he allegedly personally approved using Halkbank to move funds on Iran’s behalf, Bozkurt said. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Casuvoglu last month raised the issue with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, claiming that Halkbank that Atilla worked for was a Turkish-government bank and was immune from U.S. law. President Joe Biden snubbed Erdoğan last fall during the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, and Turkey’s president hopes to get attention from Biden by holding up Swedish and Finnish accession into NATO, Bozkurt said. “He has to play that relationship [with the United States] to the Turkish public and say, ‘I’m a leader that can do a deal here and there with very powerful figures in the world,” Bozkurt said. “He doesn’t care at all about the PKK; Erdoğan would bargain with the Devil for all he cares.” He dismisses rhetoric about the PKK and Gülenists as “packaging,” because Sweden cannot offer anything of value. Former Syrian opposition figure Kamal al-Labwani, who worked with the Turks in the past and likewise lives in Sweden, agrees. Sweden’s Left Party includes PKK supporters according to al-Labwani.

#### 2 – positive incentives that bind Turkey to NATO are successful

Kim and Utku 22, \*assistant professor of international affairs, \*\*Utku is a research intern at the Brussels School of Governance (Tongfi and Mehmet, “It’s time to bind Turkey to NATO,” The Brussels Times, <https://www.brusselstimes.com/223900/its-time-to-bind-turkey-to-nato)//BB>

Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has had an uneasy dance with both NATO allies and Russia for years. The ongoing war in Ukraine has accentuated Turkey’s ambiguous position in international relations, as Ankara criticizes Russia’s invasion and continues to sell armed drones to Ukraine while also taking distance from Western sanctions against Moscow. This ambiguity is sometimes useful, as can be seen in Turkey’s hosting of peace talks for Russia and Ukraine. NATO allies, however, should now strive to bind Turkey closely to the alliance, through positive economic incentives. One might wonder why NATO allies need to coax Turkey, a formal military ally since 1952, into solidarity, especially when Turkey’s largest external threat is invading Ukraine, a Black Sea neighbour of Turkey. The answer lies in Turkey’s geopolitical position and the recent history of Russia’s wedge strategy ­– the “attempt to prevent, break up, or weaken a threatening or blocking alliance at an acceptable cost.” Turkey plays a critical role in the region around the Black Sea, where ten wars have been fought since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, within NATO, Ankara has demonstrated its foreign policy autonomy from Washington and European allies on issues such as the Cyprus dispute, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, treatment of Kurds, and civil wars in Libya and Syria. Taking advantage of the frictions between Ankara and other NATO member capitals, Vladimir Putin has been driving a wedge between Turkey and NATO allies in recent years. Moscow has a variety of tools to pressure Ankara because of the two countries’ economic ties and involvement in various conflicts. After Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet near the Syria–Turkey border in November 2015, for instance, Russia imposed economic sanctions on Turkey in tourism and agricultural trade and raised military pressure against Turkey in Syria. The pressure forced Erdoğan to send a letter of apology. Then came the July 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan, after which Putin immediately expressed support for the Turkish president in contrast to the muted response from NATO allies. Turkey subsequently made a deal to purchase Russia’s S-400 air-defense system, reportedly worth US$2.5 billion, despite U.S. objections. Arguing that Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 system creates security risks, Washington imposed sanctions on the Turkish defense industry in December 2020 and expelled Ankara from its F-35 fighter jet program. Due to concerns over further U.S. sanctions, Turkey has yet to fully activate the S-400 system. In an international environment where Erdoğan was increasingly isolated, Putin offered precious diplomatic victories to him. Some Turkish analysts, for instance, suspect that Putin allowed Ankara to become a power broker in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia “to keep driving a wedge between Turkey and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” Turkey’s current role as the mediator between Russia and Ukraine, of course, is also a big boost for Erdoğan in the field of diplomacy. The West has greater leverage The West, however, has its own tools to bind Turkey to NATO. Most importantly, the West has a superior power to reward Turkey. For instance, analysts often refer to close economic ties between Turkey and Russia, but the EU is by far Turkey’s largest trading partner and main source of investments, accounting for 33.4% of Turkey’s imports and 41.3% of its exports in 2020 (and 21 out of the 27 EU member states are also members of NATO). Military relations between Turkey and NATO also favour the West. NATO’s collective defense protects Turkey, and the decades-old alliance ties have made Turkey far more dependent on the West than on Russia. The S-400 system is expensive, but the delivery to Turkey began only in 2019, and Russia accounts for only 5% of arms import by Turkey in the last ten years between 2012 and 2021. During the decade, Russia ranked below other weapons suppliers of Turkey such as the United States (51%), Italy (16%), Spain (13%), and South Korea (6%) according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Arms Transfers Database. For binding Turkey to NATO and wedging Turkey away from Russia, we recommend reward-based strategies rather than coercion. Academic literature suggests that positive sanctions work better and that a coercive approach is chosen by those with weaker reward power. A coercive strategy can easily antagonize the target, whereas a reward-based strategy is unlikely to worsen the status quo. Reward-binding is particularly important in relation to the Turkish public, who have resented the West’s treatment of their country in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis and the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan. This anti-Western sentiment has been further exacerbated by pro-government Turkish media. In fact, unlike the seemingly neutral position of the Turkish government in this Russia-Ukraine war, Turkish mass media is dominated by anti-Western discourse and criticism against NATO. A poll in March revealed that 48.3% of Turks blamed the United States and NATO for the current situation in Ukraine and only 33.7% thought Russia was responsible. In the same poll, 51.7% of Turks see the United States as the biggest threat to their country as opposed to Russia (19.4%). As a Turkish scholar points out, anti-Western sentiments that developed for years will not easily disappear from the Turkish public opinion even after Erdoğan’s recent U-turn. In international security and diplomacy, NATO allies have already begun taking a conciliatory approach toward Ankara. This can be seen in the recent Franco-Turkish rapprochement and the Biden administration’s support for “appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.” Economic reward-binding by NATO allies is likely to be appreciated by Erdoğan, who faces the presidential election in 2023. More importantly, this is a chance for the West to offer the olive branch to the Turkish public as Turkey experiences the highest level of inflation in 20 years, with Erdoğan’s economic mismanagement, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine creating a perfect storm for the economy. Deepening of the EU-Turkey customs union and other positive economic incentives are useful tools to improve media freedom and human rights in Turkey, and the West should ask for domestic political concessions from Erdoğan. Rather than using Turkey’s political problems as excuses to keep Turkey at distance, however, economic rewards should be employed to bind the hearts of the Turkish public to NATO.

#### Turkish dependence on NATO gives them unique leverage

Kirişci & Toygür 18 – Kemal Kirişci, nonresident senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Center on the United States and Europe, director of the Center on the United States and Europe's Turkey Project at The Brookings Institution, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies; Ilke Toygür, CATS Fellow at SWP Berlin, adjunct professor of Political Science at Carlos III University of Madrid (“As Turkish democracy declines, what’s the role for fellow NATO members?”, 7/23/2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/23/as-turkish-democracy-declines-whats-the-role-for-fellow-nato-members/>) FGY

WHAT IS NEXT?

One thing is clear: Turkey’s democracy is in trouble and it is likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future. It is also difficult to imagine that NATO could enjoy much influence over Turkey to ensure its commitment to the shared values so eloquently raised in [the NATO communique](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm) (in which member states reinforced their commitment to “common values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law”). The **emphasis of NATO—and of key member states such as Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States, which seek to defend liberal democracy**—in the near future should be on making sure that Turkey stays aligned with the trans-Atlantic community. In the meantime, allies need to be realistic and accept that until they can stop and [reverse democratic regression elsewhere](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/14/yes-russia-is-a-threat-to-nato-so-are-the-alliances-anti-democratic-members/) in the trans-Atlantic community, they will enjoy limited influence with respect to improving democracy in Turkey.

This does not necessarily mean that NATO should remain silent, especially with respect to egregious violations of democratic values both in Turkey and beyond. However, alongside its criticism, NATO should offer greater recognition of Turkey’s contributions to the defense of the alliance and **acknowledge Turkey’s unique national security needs** resulting from the ongoing war in Syria. In addition, **NATO members (particularly the United States and members of the European Union) could incentivize Turkey to re-establish rule of law** and restore a secure investment environment by offering to expand economic relations with Turkey. This could be **particularly promising**, since unlike its neighbors in the region, Turkey has no oil or gas to sell. Its economy has to produce, attract foreign direct investment, and trade—and the EU is by far Turkey’s most important partner in this regard. This dependence gives NATO members leverage over Turkey, even more so when the country faces a pending [economic crisis](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/business/turkey-economy-erdogan.html). Specifically, the United States could offer to exempt Turkey from new tariffs and the EU could offer to modernize the [Customs Union](http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/12/13/trade-as-turkey-s-eu-anchor-pub-75002) with Turkey in return for certain rule-of-law-related improvements.

At a time when we are starkly being warned that a “[world crisis is upon us](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/everything-will-not-be-okay/2018/07/12/c5900550-85e9-11e8-9e80-403a221946a7_story.html?utm_term=.35c5eff404df),” threatening to wreck the international order as we have known it, weakening of Turkey’s bond with NATO would deeply undermine the trans-Atlantic alliance. The challenge will be how to maintain a balance between realpolitik and the defense, if not the promotion, of shared democratic values within the alliance.

#### Turkey bows to collective pressure from democratic allies – empirics

Elleuhuus & Morcos 21 – Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon; Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow at the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, career diplomat with the French Foreign Service and Deputy Head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division focusing on NATO and European Defense Issues, B.A. and M.P.A. from the Paris Institute of Political Studies (“NATO Should Finally Take Its Values Seriously, 6/9/2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/>) FGY

The Price of Unity

Admittedly, pursuing a tougher course of action on values and principles comes with risks. Even measured steps could create serious rifts among allies, with the potential of paralyzing the alliance. Because NATO operates by consensus, any punitive action on an ally could provoke retaliatory action on other NATO business. In reaction to Norway’s stark criticisms against the Portuguese and Greek regimes at a June 1971 foreign ministers meeting, then-NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio [warned](https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-deal-with-authoritarianism-inside-nato/) that “if we undermine our solidarity, we run the risk of undermining the substance of our alliance.”

Overcoming this dilemma between prioritizing values and preserving unity requires a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach. First, NATO will need to be proportionate when dealing with an ally violating trans-Atlantic values. Allies should start with discussions behind closed doors rather than publicize the dispute. Open and frank dialogue among allies should always be the first step before adopting restrictive measures. If NATO moves too quickly or aggressively, it risks being counterproductive by widening divisions in the alliance. At the end of the day, this progressive approach should have a deterrent effect on NATO countries, especially on those that value their membership in the alliance and do not want to be singled out as “bad allies.”

Second, NATO’s response should be as collective and resolute as possible. If pressure is applied by only a few NATO countries, the ally in question may not take the warning seriously and could use the divisions among allies to avoid accountability. **If enough allies agree to lean on a problematic NATO country, then accepting short-term disunity for the sake of preserving trans-Atlantic values could be worth it.** In 2019, Turkey ultimately decided to [lift its longstanding veto](https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1193506/nato-endorses-baltic-defence-plans-after-turkey-withdraws-veto) to the defense plans of Poland and the Baltic states because it was facing a growing and **consistent pressure from numerous allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany**. The unity of the members of the Quad was critical in that case and changed Ankara’s strategic calculus.

Last but not least, all allies must be subject to the same objective criteria and scrutiny. Otherwise, the backsliding ally will simply claim it is being singled out and dismiss the charges. The International Secretariat can be helpful here by conducting an impartial, evenhanded assessment. Strong involvement of NATO’s secretary general will also be key in preserving political cohesion through this thorny process. Recently, Secretary General Stoltenberg played an instrumental role in easing the tensions between Greece and Turkey through the establishment of a bilateral [de-confliction mechanism](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_178523.htm) in which he did not assess blame but merely facilitated dialogue to be informed by international rules and norms.

While confronting NATO’s internal challenges is not an easy task, it is an essential one. Left unaddressed, political cohesion will falter and inhibit NATO’s ability to act in the defense of its collective interests. To prevent this, NATO leaders should act now to tackle the alliance’s democratic deficit. In the long run, this is the only way to restore unity and reinforce European defense.

### 2nc – say yes – poland

#### The US should use SC to leverage Poland. Key to global democracy.

Hegedus 5-12-21, nonresident fellow for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund. He previously worked at Freedom House, the German Council on Foreign Relations and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and has taught at the Institute for Eastern-European Studies at the Free University in Berlin, Humboldt University in Berlin and the Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest (Daniel, “Why the US should meddle in Europe to stop autocratizing NATO allies,” *The Hill*, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/552402-why-the-us-should-meddle-in-europe-to-stop-autocratizing-nato/)//BB>

While the Biden administration has elevated the fight against authoritarian trends and corruption to a foreign policy priority, the U.S. now faces a tough challenge to its democracy agenda: the authoritarian developments among its European NATO allies, particularly Hungary and Poland. Both countries experienced the sharpest decline in democratic quality in the Western world since the recent incumbents, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in Hungary and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, came to power in 2010 and 2015, respectively. The fact that neither of the world’s two leading democracy-measuring institutions — Freedom House and V-Dem — considers Hungary to be any sort of democracy anymore should raise alarm about the true authoritarian nature of illiberal projects among U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe. If Washington turns a blind eye to the authoritarian developments in its own self-described, value-based alliance system, the U.S. risks running into the accusation of double standards, which may significantly weaken its democracy agenda. However, the autocratization of Hungary and Poland poses more challenges for the U.S. than just its credibility when it comes to democracy and rule of law. Besides Turkey, Hungary is the only NATO member state that fails to comply, not only with democratic values that the current administration promotes, but also with the foreign policy priorities and interests of the U.S. regarding China and Russia. In stark contrast to Budapest, Poland’s commitment to NATO has been unshakeable because of the existential security threat stemming from Russia. Warsaw also has been ready in the past to comply with Washington’s main expectations regarding China, in order to keep the U.S. engaged as a security provider on NATO’s Eastern Flank. However, since the Biden administration took office, Poland appears to be distancing itself from Washington’s China policy by seeking a more intense and balanced relationship with Beijing and labeling U.S.-China strategic competition as a “bilateral issue.” Warsaw may believe it has the upper hand in U.S.-Poland bilateral relations if it rests on the assumption that the U.S. won’t reduce its security engagement on the Eastern Flank without undermining its own strategic approach to NATO. According to the Polish perception, the Biden administration cannot credibly threaten Poland with weakening security cooperation if the PiS government further proceeds with its authoritarian agenda. How can Washington then address the autocratization of its Central European NATO allies, Hungary and Poland, and their rapprochement with Beijing? While U.S. influence over Hungary might be limited, Washington still does have significant leverage over Poland because of Warsaw’s substantial interest in security cooperation. Washington should be ready to play out the security card to put pressure on Warsaw. First, it should calibrate its diplomatic and policy moves in a way that drives a wedge between Poland and Hungary. This could allow European Union institutions to address authoritarian developments in both countries, but primarily in Hungary, more effectively. How can such a strategy be realized? U.S. diplomacy should clearly communicate with Poland that Warsaw’s strategic alliance with Budapest poses a heavy burden on any further deepening of the security cooperation. Washington also should use the security cooperation card on the Polish domestic stage to weaken the vanguards of authoritarian politics in the Polish government coalition and strengthen moderate forces. It should communicate the message on all available channels that the policies of Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro pose severe obstacles to deeper transatlantic relations, while Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Gowin should be backed in parallel. Furthermore, as a strong contrast to former President Trump’s approach to the European Union, President Biden should recognize — and use — EU institutions as potential vehicles for amplifying U.S. interests. In this spirit, the U.S. should elevate the question of autocratizing EU member states to the highest levels of the transatlantic dialogue and create a discourse of reciprocity with regard to the democracy homework that both the U.S. and the EU have to do on the home front. The U.S. recently started working on strengthening democracy at home after Trump’s four-year onslaught on democratic institutions, but the EU largely has failed to do so for a decade. Since the European Union expressed its high expectations for a renewal and reinforcement of U.S. democracy, Washington should not shy away from communicating the same message to EU institutions and key European governments, including Germany. Germany lately has evolved into a key autocracy-enabler within the EU, so Berlin’s policy toward Budapest and Warsaw also should be put on the U.S.-German bilateral relations agenda.To provide the appropriate impetus for U.S.-EU dialogue on authoritarian developments in Europe, and to push EU institutions toward a more activist approach, Washington could consider moves that may ridicule EU passivity, especially towards Hungary. In similar fashion, as it happened recently with former Slovak general prosecutor Dobroslav Trnka, the Biden administration should trigger sanction mechanisms against key stakeholders of political corruption in Hungary — potentially including general prosecutor Péter Polt; the regime’s top oligarch, Lőrinc Mészáros; or Orbán’s son-in-law, István Tiborcz. That would put pressure on the EU to act and could help to push forward the application of the EU’s rule of law conditionality regulation, which is actually suspended. With an eye on the upcoming 2022 elections in Hungary, the U.S. should emphasize the question of electoral integrity both in its dialogue with the EU and within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and should act proactively to put in place a robust international electoral monitoring mission under an OSCE flag. On a bilateral level, the U.S. should renew its commitment to supporting democracy in central and eastern Europe, making financial resources available for the support of critical civil society and free media, and calibrating priorities in a way that will allow for grants to have real impact on the ground. If Washington would like to preserve the credibility of its democracy agenda, it must address the autocratization of its Central European allies in a convincing way. However, it can only succeed if the Biden administration is ready to meddle in European politics in unprecedented ways.

### 2nc – say yes – ai logistics

#### **NATO allies see AI defense as key to combat China – the US has already started leveraging its lead**

Warrell 21 – Helen Warrell, assistant opinions editor at the Financial Times (“Nato allies need to speed up AI defence co-operation”, 6/8/2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/61c1945c-d153-4d58-b9c5-dffd99a6919e>) FGY

As **Russia intensifies cyber hostilities** and **China weaponises artificial intelligence**, joining forces in the field of high-tech warfare will feature high on the list of topics discussed by Nato allies at a summit next week. But the transatlantic alliance’s 30 members will need to move fast if they aim to make up lost ground. Nato is proposing a new tech innovation centre bringing together military personnel with industry to foster digital defence start-ups. Some of these might be financed by a separate initiative, also set to be debated: a venture capital fund for innovation which member states could choose to opt in to. The efforts are belated, as Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg himself acknowledged. “For decades, Nato allies have been leading when it comes to technology, but that’s not obvious any more,” he told the Financial Times in an interview last week. “**We see China especially investing heavily in new, disruptive technologies** like artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, big data, and they implement them into new advanced weapon systems, drones, submarines, aircraft and so on.” He is not the first to sound the alarm. Eric Schmidt, the former Google chief executive who now chairs the US’s National Security Commission on AI, warned earlier this year that Beijing was planning to undermine conventional military forces by “leapfrogging” to new technologies. The commission’s report, published in March, raised concerns that China would use AI for “reconnaissance, electromagnetic countermeasures and co-ordinated firepower strikes”. Part of the problem is that western defence institutions have been slow to recognise the potential of innovation beyond their own industry. “For decades, a lot of technological development would happen within the defence sector — the internet, nuclear, GPS, all of that was developed by the defence industry and then shared with the civilian sector,” Stoltenberg said. “Now, it goes the other way around. It’s a civilian sector which is leading in the development of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and many of the new disruptive technologies.” Some Nato members are ahead of others. The US and France have published military AI strategies, while the UK announced this year that it is to establish a centre for defence AI. For the first time, Britain’s intelligence agency, MI6, is recruiting from the private sector for a new head of its “Q” branch — the technical lab made famous in the James Bond films. Establishing a new Nato hub — known as an “accelerator” — in which tech companies and members of the armed forces can experiment with new ideas has advantages, according to Professor Fiona Murray, co-director of MIT’s innovation initiative. Start-ups and investors do not always have the time to tackle defence challenges when solutions are “hard to test, markets are fragmented and procurement is slow”, Murray said. **Working together would create a wider market for new products and enhance collective security**, she noted. It was **“not enough” for countries to be handling this individually**, she said. The **US has started marshalling allies on the policy implications of using new** technology. The Pentagon’s “AI Partnership for Defense”, comprising 13 countries (including Nato members Canada, Denmark, Estonia, the UK, France and Norway) met virtually for the first time last year to agree joint military standards on AI. Schmidt’s commission has called on the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance (the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) to work more closely on developing AI systems. Ulrike Franke, an expert in military technology at the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Nato’s tech centre will be most effective if it prioritises systems designed to facilitate joint military operations. The alliance should look at areas such as AI-enabled command and control, she said, which could **give members a unified picture** of the battlefield across multiple regions, using intelligent data analysis to sift information. Franke said that in the vast arena spanning drones to quantum computing, there was a temptation to cover too much. “It makes massive sense for Nato to look more at this [technology]”, she said. “The question is, what exactly are they focusing on? There’s a danger of Nato spreading itself too thin.”

#### Allies are hyperaware of the mutual benefits of AI intel sharing

Ryseff 20 – James Ryseff, senior technical policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, M.S. in security studies from Georgetown University (“The United States Can Only Achieve AI Dominance with its Allies”, 10/9/2020, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-united-states-can-only-achieve-ai-dominance-with-its-allies/>) FGY

First, the Defense Department could create a 10-year roadmap for upgrading data interoperability that lays out specific operational objectives to demonstrate improvements. To ensure these objectives are met, they could be incorporated into the major annual exercises conducted with NATO and East Asian allies. For example, American and South Korean units could draw spare parts and other consumables from each other during their annual training exercises. Throughout the exercise, both sides could **confirm their logistics databases can combine to present a unified picture of the allied logistical situation** and provide projections of future needs as the simulated combat event evolves.

Establishing tangible objectives and aligning the timeframe with existing multinational exercises will be the key to success. Militaries invest a great deal of time and effort training their personnel to be ready for the fight. They must now learn how to “train” and prepare their data as well. This can mean many things. When training their personnel, militaries spend some of their time imparting specific skillsets that will be useful in combat. In other cases, soldiers learn how to work together to solve unforeseeable problems as they arise — or simply learn how the operational routines of other units or allied militaries differ from their own. Regardless, commanders recognize their soldiers must routinely practice their skills under real-world conditions if they will be expected to work as an effective team on the battlefield.

Data needs the same types of preparation to be ready for its role in the fight. Much as soldiers need to leave the garrison and work through practical exercises in the field, it is not enough to develop a technical specification documenting how two data sets are supposed to work together. Someone needs to actually make the data sets work together. They must be routinely explored, analyzed, and aggregated to solve real problems in order to ensure they will remain interoperable and effective. Similarly, the analysts and engineers responsible for curating data need opportunities to interact with each other in order to develop the operational routines necessary to ensure effective collaboration during a crisis. Without these forcing functions, too much military data will remain isolated and unusable at the scale needed to engineer AI algorithms.

Second, the military may need to collaborate with allies to achieve **common understandings about when and how to share data**. European governments in particular have begun to codify digital norms for the consumer space in frameworks like the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://gdpr-info.eu/) and the establishment of new legal concepts like the [Right to be Forgotten](https://gdpr.eu/right-to-be-forgotten/). The United States could play a role in shaping the equivalent norms in the national security and public policy space. Otherwise, fragmented data repositories from the United States and its allies may not be able to achieve the critical mass — that is, gather enough data — necessary to compete with China’s data warehouses.

Past disagreements between the United States and its allies over norms related to atomic weapons demonstrate how these considerations can ultimately impact military operations. In Europe, the United States managed to forge an agreement that allowed the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of its NATO allies, even in the face of significant domestic opposition in key nations such as West Germany. In contrast, the United States was unable to achieve a similar consensus among its allies in Asia. Both Japan and New Zealand banned the introduction of nuclear weapons into their territory, causing headaches for U.S. Navy operations in the region. While in that case Navy ships could find alternate ports to operate from, a similar divergence in norms would have much greater consequences for the U.S. military’s ability to develop AI. **Data withheld is data lost**.

**Most norms** about the use of military data **will likely be uncontroversial**. Unlike Facebook or Google, whose business models depend on precisely targeting ads at their user bases, militaries in democracies have little reason to exchange personally identifiable information or other sensitive details about their citizens. Norms about controversial topics such as [autonomous systems](https://warontherocks.com/2015/02/between-a-roomba-and-a-terminator-what-is-autonomy/) may prove more difficult to forge a consensus around. Agreements that data provided by partners would not be used to train these systems without explicit consent could be a compromise acceptable to all parties.

Finally, the United States could seek deeper integration and cooperation with its allies who have **unique resources to advance specific applications of AI**. Many, including the [National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence](https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Schmidt%20Testimony%20Attachment.pdf), have called for the United States to leverage its existing “Five Eyes” alliance and extend it to include cooperation in AI. A complementary approach might be to focus on partners who have unique technical assets to contribute. For example, East Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea have invested heavily in robotics and automation, which makes them attractive partners for developing more capable drones and other autonomous vehicles. They may also have fewer hesitations about [deploying these technologies](https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-policy-essay-south-korean-sentry%E2%80%94-killer-robot-prevent-war) than other potential partners. Similarly, the Israeli government has carefully incubated a [world-class cyber security sector](https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/07/18/6-reasons-israel-became-a-cybersecurity-powerhouse-leading-the-82-billion-industry/#6b99f394420a), potentially positioning it as a valuable collaborator in training AI-enhanced cyber defenders how to protect critical infrastructure and assets.

Ultimately, close collaborators in any AI alliance must pass two tests: They must be able to usefully contribute to the work, and they will also need to be trustworthy enough to share in these cutting-edge technical advancements. While achieving the kind of close collaboration with allies that the United States has enjoyed in other realms may be difficult, it will be essential if the United States hopes to achieve the data dominance needed to succeed in future combat.

#### The global threat landscape uniquely incentivizes collaboration and overcomes resistance

Konaev & Chahal 21 – Margarita Konaev & Husanjot Chahal, Research Fellow & Research Analyst, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University ("The Path of Least Resistance Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment", April 2021, <https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Path-of-Least-Resistance.pdf>) \*\* recut FGY

Strategically critical

The **strategic environment** in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region **heightens the importance of coordinating national and multinational logistics**, while collaboration on AI-enabled logistics can provide an operational advantage in multinational operations. The U.S. military is a global force that must remain ahead of competitors and adversaries and be prepared for a broad range of contingencies and missions. Yet in multinational operations, the **gap in** military and technological **capabilities** between the United States and its allies and partners, and more specifically, significant discrepancies in allies’ logistic capabilities, **can negatively impact survivability**, interoperability, cohesion, and ultimately, mission success. Thus, for the United States and its allies, collaboration on logistics and sustainment in general, and on AI-enabled logistics and sustainment in particular, is important for several operational and strategic reasons. Operationally speaking, logistic support during multinational military operations differs from unilateral operations. Nations have different national and military objectives, cultures, capabilities, and approaches to logistic support and functions. These differences impact how the United States military organizes, prepares, and eventually executes logistic support during multinational operations.56 Moreover, in multinational operations, nations share a collective responsibility for logistics in support of the mission. Thus, the logistic capabilities of each allied nation affect not only their ability to support their own forces but the operational-level support capabilities of the coalition as a whole.57 On a strategic level, the **global threat landscape and U.S. security posture** in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region **elevate the significance of joint, streamlined logistics** and comparable military endurance capabilities between the United States and its allies. In Europe, on NATO’s eastern flank, the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, (as well as potentially Lithuania) could be overrun by Russia’s superior military forces in a matter of days.58 Thus, in the event of a major conflict in the Baltic states, NATO would have to move thousands of troops and heavy military equipment from across Europe as well as from the United States very rapidly and efficiently to counter Russian aggression. Sound logistics—from the coordination and transfer of military cargo ships and private merchant vessels to the surge and movement of military equipment and supplies along Europe’s roads, rivers, and incompatible rail infrastructure—would prove essential to success. 59 Preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia and strengthening the U.S.-led security architecture in the western Pacific is high on the list of U.S. strategic interests. Yet the U.S. military has no local shore bases from which to project power in the region, and its dependence on more distant bases in Guam, Japan, and South Korea, presents significant operational limitations. Moreover, U.S. air bases, aircraft carriers, surface vessels, ports, airfields, and logistics systems—those already in the region and those surge forces moving into the theater in the event of a crisis or a conflict—are currently vulnerable to Chinese air and missile attacks and cyberattacks.60 U.S. national security experts are well aware of these challenges and recognize the need to work with allies to protect shared security interests in these strategically important regions. For instance, the NSCAI’s interim report recommends assisting NATO in its adoption of AI and negotiating formal AI cooperation agreements with allies and partners like Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam.61 Moreover, the report explicitly recommends that **U.S. alliances, primarily NATO, “explore pilot projects in low-risk areas** such as for enterprise AI applications (logistics and sustainment) to derive lessons that would support broader application of AI systems for alliance efforts.”62 Along similar lines, in their assessment of U.S. competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, the Center for a New American Security recommends integrating logistics and sustainment considerations into the U.S. military strategy and operational concept development for China in order to ensure that the United States is able to project and sustain combat power in the Indo-Pacific region. 63 These efforts, however, could be strengthened by paying closer attention to the role AI/ML technologies could have in enabling more responsive logistics systems as well as in building the capacity of key partners in the region. Certainly, when it comes to international collaboration in general, or collaborative AI projects related to military logistics and sustainment more specifically, disagreements and complications are inevitable. The past four years have seen more friction between NATO member states as well as between the United States and NATO. Rebuilding U.S. alliances is high on the Biden administration’s agenda. But **restoring trust and good collaborative relationships takes** time, effort, and **resources**. Moreover, NATO member states have very different military and technological capabilities which makes it difficult to implement alliance-wide initiatives. And while confronting China’s assertiveness is a top priority for the United States, many of the United States’ European and Asia-Pacific allies have economic and technological relationships with China. Their objectives vis-à-vis China on questions of geopolitics and technology are not necessarily aligned with those of the United States. Nevertheless, the **strategic and operational arguments** **in favor of working together on AI-enabled logistics and sustainment are quite powerful**. Coordination on AI embedded in logistic systems can make for more efficient and streamlined movement of personnel and equipment, enable interoperability between systems and forces, and expedite the provision of medical services. Such improvements directly contribute to the readiness and endurance of allied military forces and their ability to deter and defeat adversaries if conflict erupts.

### 2nc – say yes – cyber

#### Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forces NATO allies to remain open to cooperation and strengthen democratic values

Smith 22 – Brad Smith, president of Microsoft and chief legal officer, B.A. from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, J.D. from Columbia Law School, studied international law at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Switzerland (“Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War”, 6/22/2022, <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/>) FGY

This report offers five conclusions that come from the war’s first four months:

First, **defense against a military invasion** now **requires** for most **countries** the ability to disburse and **distribute digital operations and data assets across borders** and into other countries. Russia not surprisingly targeted Ukraine’s governmental data center in an early cruise missile attack, and other “on premise” servers similarly were vulnerable to attacks by conventional weapons. Russia also targeted its destructive “wiper” attacks at on-premises computer networks. But Ukraine’s government has successfully sustained its civil and military operations by acting quickly to disburse its digital infrastructure into the public cloud, where it has been hosted in data centers across Europe.

This has involved urgent and extraordinary steps from across the tech sector, including by Microsoft. While the tech sector’s work has been vital, it’s also important to think about the longer-lasting lessons that come from these efforts.

Second, recent advances in cyber threat intelligence and end-point protection have helped Ukraine withstand a high percentage of destructive Russian cyberattacks. Because cyber activities are invisible to the naked eye, they are more difficult for journalists and even many military analysts to track. Microsoft has seen the Russian military launch multiple waves of destructive cyberattacks against 48 distinct Ukrainian agencies and enterprises. These have sought to penetrate network domains by initially comprising hundreds of computers and then spreading malware designed to destroy the software and data on thousands of others.

Russian cyber tactics in the war have differed from those deployed in the NotPetya attack against Ukraine in 2017. That attack used “wormable” destructive malware that could jump from one computer domain to another and hence cross borders into other countries. Russia has been careful in 2022 to confine destructive “wiper software” to specific network domains inside Ukraine itself. But the recent and ongoing destructive attacks themselves have been sophisticated and more widespread than many reports recognize. And the Russian army is continuing to adapt these destructive attacks to changing war needs, including by coupling cyberattacks with the use of conventional weapons.

A defining aspect of these destructive attacks so far has been the strength and relative success of cyber defenses. While not perfect and some destructive attacks have been successful, these cyber defenses have proven stronger than offensive cyber capabilities. This reflects two important and recent trends. First, threat intelligence advances, including the use of artificial intelligence, have helped make it possible to detect these attacks more effectively. And second, internet-connected end-point protection has made it possible to distribute protective software code quickly both to cloud services and other connected computing devices to identify and disable this malware. Ongoing wartime innovations and measures with the Ukrainian Government have strengthened this protection further. But continued vigilance and innovation will likely be needed to sustain this defensive advantage.

Third, as a coalition of countries has come together to defend Ukraine, Russian intelligence agencies have stepped up network penetration and espionage activities targeting allied governments outside Ukraine. At Microsoft we’ve detected Russian network intrusion efforts on 128 organizations in 42 countries outside Ukraine. While the **United States has been Russia’s number one target**, this **activity has also prioritized Poland**, where much of the logistical delivery of military and humanitarian assistance is being coordinated. Russian activities have **also targeted Baltic countries**, and during the past two months there has been an increase in similar activity targeting computer networks in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Turkey. We have also seen an increase in **similar activity targeting the foreign ministries of other NATO countries**.

Russian targeting has prioritized governments, especially among NATO members. But the list of targets has also included think tanks, humanitarian organizations, IT companies, and energy and other critical infrastructure suppliers. Since the start of the war, the Russian targeting we’ve identified has been successful 29 percent of the time. A quarter of these successful intrusions has led to confirmed exfiltration of an organization’s data, although as explained in the report, this likely understates the degree of Russian success.

We remain the most concerned about government computers that are running “on premise” rather than in the cloud. This reflects the current and global state of offensive cyber espionage and defensive cyber protection. As the SolarWinds incident demonstrated 18 months ago, Russia’s intelligence agencies have extremely sophisticated capabilities to implant code and operate as an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) that can obtain and exfiltrate sensitive information from a network on an ongoing basis. There have been substantial advances in defensive protection since that time, but the implementation of these advances remains more uneven in European governments than in the United States. As a result, significant collective defensive weaknesses remain.

Fourth, in coordination with these other cyber activities, Russian agencies are conducting global cyber-influence operations to support their war efforts. These combine tactics developed by the KGB over several decades with new digital technologies and the internet to give foreign influence operations a broader geographic reach, higher volume, more precise targeting, and greater speed and agility. Unfortunately, with sufficient planning and sophistication, these cyber-influence operations are well positioned to take advantage of the longstanding openness of democratic societies and the public polarization that is characteristic of current times.

As the war in Ukraine has progressed, Russian agencies are focusing their cyber-influence operations on four distinct audiences. They are targeting the Russian population with the goal of sustaining support for the war effort. They are targeting the Ukrainian population with the goal of undermining confidence in the country’s willingness and ability to withstand Russian attacks. They are targeting American and European populations with the goal of **undermining Western unity** and deflecting criticism of Russian military war crimes. And they are starting to target populations in nonaligned countries, potentially in part to sustain their support at the United Nations and in other venues.

Russian cyber-influence operations are building on and are connected to tactics developed for other cyber activities. Like the APT teams that work within Russian intelligence services, Advance Persistent Manipulator (APM) teams associated with Russian government agencies act through social media and digital platforms. They are pre-positioning false narratives in ways that are similar to the pre-positioning of malware and other software code. They are then launching broad-based and simultaneous “reporting” of these narratives from government-managed and influenced websites and amplifying their narratives through technology tools designed to exploit social media services. Recent examples include narratives around biolabs in Ukraine and multiple efforts to obfuscate military attacks against Ukrainian civilian targets.

As part of a new initiative at Microsoft, we are using AI, new analytics tools, broader data sets, and a growing staff of experts to track and forecast this cyber threat. Using these new capabilities, we estimate that Russian cyber influence operations successfully increased the spread of Russian propaganda after the war began by 216 percent in Ukraine and 82 percent in the United States.

These ongoing Russian operations build on recent sophisticated efforts to spread false COVID narratives in multiple Western countries. These included state-sponsored cyber-influence operations in 2021 that sought to discourage vaccine adoption through English-language internet reports while simultaneously encouraging vaccine usage through Russian-language sites. During the last six months, similar Russian cyber influence operations sought to help inflame public opposition to COVID-19 policies in New Zealand and Canada.

We will continue to expand Microsoft’s work in this field in the weeks and months ahead. This includes both internal growth and through the agreement we announced last week to acquire Miburo Solutions, a leading cyber threat analysis and research company specializing in the detection of and response to foreign cyber influence operations.

We’re concerned that many current Russian cyber influence operations currently go for months without proper detection, analysis, or public reporting. This increasingly impacts a wide range of important institutions in both the public and private sectors. And the longer the war lasts in Ukraine, the more important these operations likely will become for Ukraine itself. This is because a **longer war will require sustaining public support** from the inevitable challenge of greater fatigue. **This should add urgency to the importance of strengthening Western defenses** against these types of foreign cyber influence attacks.

Finally, the lessons from Ukraine call for a coordinated and comprehensive strategy to strengthen defenses against the full range of cyber destructive, espionage, and influence operations. As the war in Ukraine illustrates, while there are differences among these threats, the Russian Government does not pursue them as separate efforts and we should not put them in separate analytical silos. In addition, defensive strategies must consider the coordination of these cyber operations with kinetic military operations, as witnessed in Ukraine.

New advances to thwart these cyber threats are needed, and they will depend on four common tenets and — at least at a high level — **a common strategy.** The first defensive tenet should recognize that Russian cyber threats are being advanced by a common set of actors inside and outside the Russian Government and rely on similar digital tactics. As a result, advances in digital technology, AI, and data will be needed to counter them. Reflecting this, a second tenet should recognize that unlike the traditional threats of the past, cyber responses must rely on greater public and private collaboration. A third tenet should **embrace the need for close and common multilateral collaboration among governments to protect open and democratic societies**. And a fourth and final defensive tenet should uphold free expression and avoid censorship in democratic societies, even as new steps are needed to address the full range of cyber threats that include cyber influence operations.

An effective response must build on these tenets with four strategic pillars. These should increase collective capabilities to better (1) detect, (2) defend against, (3) disrupt, and (4) deter foreign cyber threats. This approach is already reflected in many collective efforts to address destructive cyberattacks and cyber-based espionage. They also apply to the critical and ongoing work needed to address ransomware attacks. We now need a similar and comprehensive approach with new capabilities and defenses to combat Russian cyber influence operations.

As discussed in this report, the war in Ukraine provides not only lessons but a call to action for effective measures that will be vital to the protection of democracy’s future. As a company, we are committed to supporting these efforts, including through ongoing and new investments in technology, data, and partnerships that will support governments, companies, NGOs, and universities.

#### European allies are already committed to enhancing cybersecurity but want access to U.S. intel

Holcomb 20 – Franklin Holcomb, Title VII Fellow in the Transatlantic Leadership program at CEPA with a focus on Russian and Eastern European security and political analysis, former analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, B.A. in Russian Language and International Studies: Politics and Diplomacy, M.A. in Democracy and Governance at the University of Tartu (“Countering Russian and Chinese Cyber-Aggression”, *CEPA*, 12/4/2020, <https://cepa.org/countering-russia-and-chinese-cyber-aggression/>) FGY

SECTION 3: THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

The United States must expand cooperation with its central and eastern European partners not only to help bolster their defense capacity but also to help the United States better understand hostile cyber actors’ activities and how to counter them. Central and eastern **European governments and societies are committed to improving regional cybersecurity** and have had to think creatively about becoming more resilient. The United States has partners across central and eastern Europe eager to share their frontline experience in defending against hostile hacking and information attacks on their cyberspace.

That experience dealing directly with hostile cyber actors, combined with U.S. resources and expertise, **could vastly improve the security of both the United States and Europe**. “If you want to be more secure, you need to do practical work with those who face a real threat from the East,” Kerza said. “If you sit at home thinking that a cyberattack will never reach you, you’ll be wrong.”[22](https://cepa.org/countering-russia-and-chinese-cyber-aggression/#footnote_21_6693) Meanwhile, Iti Press, the counselor for cyber issues and economic affairs at the Estonian Embassy in Washington, said many Estonian **cybersecurity experts have struggled to get access to their U.S. counterparts** and **emphasized the importance of improving participation in joint cyber exercises** taking place in the United States.[34](https://cepa.org/countering-russia-and-chinese-cyber-aggression/#footnote_33_6693) Sven Sakkov, the former director of ICDS, described U.S. involvement in the NATO CCDCOE in Tallinn, where only one member of the 30 senior staff is an American, as “underwhelming” and urged greater U.S. participation.[35](https://cepa.org/countering-russia-and-chinese-cyber-aggression/#footnote_34_6693) Likewise, the Latvian defense counselor in Washington, Rolands Heniņš, said, “We are there on the front line facing malign influence for over 30 years, and we have learned our lessons. Use our smart people and knowledge.”[36](https://cepa.org/countering-russia-and-chinese-cyber-aggression/#footnote_35_6693) Joanna Świątkowska, the former European Cybersecurity Forum official, said the United States and Europe should expand the sharing of threat indicators and early warning information to help harden European and American cyber defenses and present a united front to hostile actors.[3](https://cepa.org/countering-russia-and-chinese-cyber-aggression/#footnote_2_6693) And Solvita Denisa-Liepniece of the Baltic Center for Media Excellence said the United States could learn from eastern European journalists how hostile states conduct disinformation campaigns and media manipulation.[31](https://cepa.org/countering-russia-and-chinese-cyber-aggression/#footnote_30_6693)

American-European cooperation in cyberspace will be vital to ensuring the security of the transatlantic community in the face of shared threats from Russia and China. It is highly unlikely that these foes will ever be deterred from launching cyberattacks, but by working together American and European countries can be prepared to manage these attacks as they come and exact a high price on those conducting them. In the coming years, the United States should focus on engaging more with its European partners.

#### **Allies say yes – shifting towards prioritizing cybersecurity now, builds allied commitments, and key to combat Russia**

Herr and Schneider 18 – Trey Herr, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution; Jacquelyn Schneider, assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (“**Sharing is Caring**: The United States’ New Cyber Commitment for NATO”, *Council on Foreign Relations*, 10/10, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/sharing-caring-united-states-new-cyber-commitment-nato>) FGY

Given the recent blockbuster headlines about alleged Chinese snooping on server hardware sold to major technology companies and the latest joint-denunciation of Russian cyber operations, you could be forgiven for having missed an important NATO-related development. The Associated Press reports that the U.S. Defense Department will announce a new commitment to use offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities on behalf of NATO allies.

The new commitment is notable given how cybersecurity has long been treated as an exceptional domain of operations, and cyber capabilities reserved as strategic national assets to be shared with only the closest of allies. With this announcement, the Pentagon is suggesting that cyber capabilities might be used alongside conventional weapons with allies and indeed, **equal weight appears to be given to offensive and defensive operations**. Perhaps most significantly, the announcement **moves NATO partners closer** to what has been a tight coterie of U.S.-favored signals intelligence partners such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada.

The DoD announcement is a sign of the continued, if nascent, normalization of cybersecurity under the current administration and in Europe. Even where offensive cyber operations may not rise to the level of war, they provide decision-makers with options to influence the geopolitical environment. This aligns with recent trends in the U.S. military to integrate cyber capabilities into maneuver units and large exercises, and reflects the shift towards more risk acceptant and offensive measures to counter cyberattacks found in the 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy.

Moving cyber capabilities into the same strategic frame as conventional weapons, especially with NATO, reflects a shift in institutional cyber arrangements within the United States and the growing power of the military relative to the intelligence community. For the United States, cyber capabilities have always had a complicated relationship with the intelligence community, in particular the National Security Agency (NSA). When Cyber Command stood up in 2010 as a sub-unified combatant command within the Department of Defense, it moved into the NSA’s headquarters, staffed its management ranks with longtime NSA employees, borrowed networks and technical capabilities, and to this day shares a dual-hatted commander. In the immediate years after the command was created, it was logical that the structure of partnerships with allies looked more like the special signals intelligence relationships formed around the NSA rather than traditional alliance networks in NATO and Asia. The recent announcement aligns cyber operations more closely with Department of Defense missions, which are more likely to posture capabilities for deterrent effects, than intelligence missions, which view capabilities as assets to be carefully husbanded.

Treating cybersecurity capabilities more like conventional arms and less like national assets also helps drive the integration of cyber operations into the planning and execution of a broader array of conventional military missions. Early cyber operations were largely conventional espionage and surveillance activities supercharged by the spread of computing and the internet. In the United States, this led to the creation of large and complex software tools, carefully guarded by the intelligence community as national assets (sometimes unsuccessfully). The DoD’s announcement indicates a move towards treating at least some of these capabilities, along with their supporting infrastructure, more like conventional armaments and making them available for broader use; a model closer to Central or Special Operations Command and less like the National Security Agency.

The Pentagon’s new commitment also reflects changes in how Europe talks about cybersecurity and characterizes the Russian threat. The last two years have seen a trend toward more open discussion of offensive cyber operations and the possibility of the alliance adopting more assertive postures to counter cyber operations against its members. After years of devastating ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled information attacks, **NATO members are more willing to explore cyber** triggers to Article 5. They have also been more willing to **articulate the cyber threat against the alliance**. In addition to last week’s denunciation by Dutch, UK, and U.S. authorities, Russian state actors are widely suggested to be responsible for an increasingly brazen series of operations, including targeting German government ministries, French and British TV stations, and more.

Sharing offensive cyber capabilities raises the question of whether cyber operations can extend effective deterrence to NATO partners. There seems to be little focus on using these operations to deter conventional or nuclear attacks on NATO countries, but this may evolve. The United States seems to want NATO to use cyber operations to deter other cyber operations, particularly those falling under the threshold of armed conflict. Cyber operations have all sorts of problems for deterrence: signaling is difficult, they can be perceived as a cheap threat, and their effects are largely uncertain. By contrast, moving new military forces in Eastern Europe or conducting ground exercises are credible signals of extended deterrence, but are costly and time consuming. Cyber capabilities aren’t free, nor are they necessarily cheap, but the promise to use them can add new credibility to a deterrent threat without the same investment and delay as conventional alternatives. **Sharing cyber capabilities may be a cheaper way to signal alliance commitment** than other options and might signal a further maturation, and acceptance, of cybersecurity into geopolitics.

#### Allies are already firmly committed to attribution

Marks 21 – Joseph Marks, reporter for the cybersecurity 202 newsletter at the Washington Post, M.S. in foreign service at Georgetown University (“The Cybersecurity 202: The U.S. and allies are taking a stand against Chinese hacking. Here are three takeaways”, 7/19/2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/19/cybersecurity-202-us-allies-are-taking-stand-against-chinese-hacking-here-are-three-takeaways/>) FGY

The Biden administration and **a bevy of allies are calling out China** this morning for a raft of bad behavior in cyberspace, including a hack into Microsoft email servers that compromised at least 30,000 organizations in the United States alone.

U.S. officials are formally attributing that [hack](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-hack-microsoft-email-biden-response/2021/03/06/7fe6652c-7e1a-11eb-85cd-9b7fa90c8873_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_4)to China’s Ministry of State Security, as are **allies from the European Union, NATO, the United Kingdom**, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

The group is also condemning the Chinese government for working with criminal contract hackers, including for cyberattacks aimed solely at personal gain rather than intelligence gathering. Those operations include ransomware attacks, a senior Biden administration official said — including at least one attack in which hackers locked up computers at a U.S. company and demanded a multimillion-dollar ransom to unlock them.

It's among the **most far-reaching condemnations** of Chinese hacking to date. And the behavior it describes is far more thuggish than Beijing's traditional hacking, which has focused on espionage and helping Chinese firms outcompete their rivals rather than on common theft.

Such close links between government and criminal hackers are a trademark of Russia’s cyber operations. They were thought to be less common in China, but not unknown there.

The move comes as the Biden administration is already in a cyber face off with the Kremlin, threatening severe punishments for criminal ransomware gangs operating on Russian territory that have wreaked havoc on U.S. businesses.

“We’ve raised our concerns about both the Microsoft incident and [the People’s Republic of China’s] broader malicious cyber activity with senior PRC government officials, making clear that the PRC’s actions threaten security, confidence and stability in cyberspace,” the senior administration official said.

The administration isn’t announcing any sanctions or other punishments against Chinese officials for the hacks but isn’t ruling them out, the official said.

In a separate action, the Justice Department revealed indictments this morning against four Chinese officers in a provincial arm of the Ministry of State Security for a seven-year hacking campaign focused on stealing intellectual property including information about infectious disease research.

Here are three big takeaways:

1. **Allies, allies and more allies**

It’s [not uncommon](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-and-more-than-a-dozen-allies-to-condemn-china-for-economic-espionage/2018/12/20/cdfd0338-0455-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_19) for the **United States to join with allies in jointly attributing government-backed hacks** that have global consequences. But there’s an **especially long list of nations and alliances making this attribution**. NATO, for example, has never before attributed a cyberattack to China.

Other nations may make similar attributions in coming weeks, the administration official said.

The message is clear: These **nations all basically agree** about what’s in and out of bounds for government hackers. And China, despite its status as an economic and military powerhouse, is firmly out of bounds.

“[China’s] pattern of irresponsible behavior in cyberspace is inconsistent with its stated objective of being seen as a responsible leader in the world,” the senior administration official said. The official later added, “we're putting forward a common cyber approach with our allies and laying down clear expectations on how responsible nations behave in cyberspace.”

2. Strong words, but no punishments yet.

The United States has slapped sanctions on Russia, Iran and North Korea for hacking. But it has been wary of sanctioning China, with which it has a much broader relationship, including massive trade ties.

But harsh words have not been sufficient so far to change China’s behavior, and some analysts say it’s time to give stronger measures a try.

“The lack of any sanctions by the U.S. government against Chinese cyber threat actors is a huge problem that transcends four administrations,” Dmitri Alperovitch, chairman of the Silverado Policy Accelerator think tank, told my colleague Ellen Nakashima. “We need to stop treating China as if they have a special immunity to being held accountable and we need to act in parity as we have with the other major malicious cyber actors, including Russia.”

The E.U. has been somewhat more aggressive, [sanctioning Chinese hackers](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-slaps-sanctions-on-hackers-in-russia-north-korea-china/) last year for a 12-year hacking campaign dubbed Cloud Hopper that vacuumed up data from major industries in a dozen countries.

The Biden official emphasized that today’s naming and shaming campaign is just one step in responding to Chinese hacking, and more responses may be coming.

“We’re also aware that no one action can change behavior, and neither can one country acting on its own. So, we really **focused initially in bringing other countries along with us**,” the official said.

## competition

### 2nc – at: perm do both

#### Perm can’t solve the net benefit – inclusion of the plan’s unconditional cooperation fails to generate reform

* “security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably

Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/>) FGY

Security Assistance as Incentive

Security assistance generates a **classic principal-agent problem**. In such relationships between a principal and its agent or proxy, there exists an information asymmetry where the agent inherently has more information about their own capabilities, activities, and interests than the principal. Agents, being rational actors, place their own interests above those of the principal and, in the absence of other incentives, behave accordingly. The **greater the degree of misalignment, the more problematic this becomes**. U.S. frustration during its 20-year war in Afghanistan over Pakistan’s perceived failure to adequately confront extremist groups, despite significant military aid, is an example of principal-agent problems at work.

Fortunately, these are not insurmountable obstacles. **Security assistance** in the form of arms, equipment, or other support **can be an effective incentive when it is used as a carrot to reward desired behavior**, such as achieving a specific reform or taking some other action aligned with the interests of the principal. Alternately, such aid becomes a stick when it is withheld. An example of this carrot-and-stick approach being used effectively is described in Walter Ladwig’s study of U.S. assistance to the Philippines to combat the Hukbalahap rebellion in the decade following World War II. Heavy-handed tactics used by the local constabulary forces were a major factor driving support for the rebels. Recognizing this problem, U.S. advisors insisted on a series of **reforms within the security forces as a precondition for further aid**. These measures, along with the appointment of the reform-minded Ramon Magsaysay as defense chief, contributed to a far more effective counterinsurgency campaign and the eventual defeat of the rebel movement.

This approach of using aid as an incentive stands in **sharp contrast to** Ladwig’s other case study, Vietnam, where **U.S. aid** was used **as an inducement** in the hope that it would eventually change partner behavior. In this case, U.S. advisors tried in vain year after year to cajole prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem and successor regimes to implement reforms that would have broadened domestic political support and made the South Vietnamese forces more effective. All the while, **massive U.S. assistance continued to flow** in with the expectation that it would eventually bring about a change of heart in the host-nation government. Such **change never came**, and the United States and its South Vietnamese proxies lost the war.

The more recent U.S. experience in Iraq from 2003 until the withdrawal in 2011 contains echoes of Vietnam. David Lake’s study of that conflict suggests that provision of **unconditional security assistance may still be America’s default setting**. Despite massive volumes of military aid provided to the Iraqi government during this period, **U.S. urging to reform the security forces and national government repeatedly failed**. Nouri al-Maliki, prime minister during much of this period, resisted efforts to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive and apolitical, instead continuing to employ them as his own sectarian instrument. Again, the United States used an approach focused on training and equipping, known in the current lexicon as building partner capacity. The Iraqi **government received assistance regardless of its effort, or lack thereof, to implement much-needed reform** while the **United States failed to use the leverage which hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance could buy**. Several years later, the Iraqi military in which the United States had invested so much fell apart virtually upon first contact with the Islamic State’s irregular militia.

The **“building partner capacity” approach has two main flaws**. First, it **ignores fundamental problems, such as corruption, coup-proofing, and otherwise weak defense institutions** which additional military capacity cannot overcome and may even exacerbate. Paradoxically, a focus primarily on capacity-building often fails to build meaningful, long-term capacity because it neglects underlying institutional problems. Second, it ignores principal-agent problems by assuming that once in possession of highly capable security forces, the partner will wield them in a manner aligned with U.S. interests. U.S. advisors and diplomats may recognize the pressing need for security sector reform in the partner. Unfortunately, the ingrained culture of U.S. security assistance seemingly relies on the false premise that with enough U.S. training and relationship-building, other countries’ militaries will voluntarily reform even though it is often not in their personal interests to do so.

Hard Is Not Impossible

These failings notwithstanding, there exists no shortage of arguments in favor of the status quo and against shifting America’s focus in security assistance to security-sector reform and conditional aid. In an era of great-power competition, Russia, China, or regional competitors may simply step in to fill the gap with the partner nation if the United States insists upon unwelcome reforms in exchange for aid. I know this is a valid concern because I have sat in meetings where partners made thinly veiled reference to other nations which may provide assistance if the United States is unable or unwilling. Still, the quality and technological edge of U.S. kit and the total-package approach which includes training and follow-on support do provide the United States a competitive advantage. But **the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for delivering aid is far too slow and, as a result, is a liability**. To outcompete, the security assistance enterprise itself requires major reform to shorten typical lead times from years to months. The Pentagon and State Department need the agility to turn aid on and off like a switch or rheostat.

Another argument against placing preconditions on security assistance is that the stakes are too high to deny a partner a critical capability while waiting for reform to happen. This is the “we can’t let them fail” mentality. It is also valid — but only in certain crisis situations where aid is needed immediately, and reform truly cannot wait. Ukraine today is a good example. Rather than ceasing aid writ large until a condition is met, place conditions on discrete packages of aid. The intent should be to provide sufficient incentive to the host-nation government to modify behavior, not threaten national survival. During the years I spent in Afghanistan, the security threats faced by the government never appeared to afford the breathing space to withhold aid while institutional reform took place. In hindsight, doing so may have required coalition forces to carry a greater operational burden while the Afghan forces sorted themselves out, but it also would have been worth it. As the events of August 2021 demonstrated, 20 years of unconditional capacity-building built shockingly little capacity. Implementing this change requires a recurring review of Defense Department-led train and equip programs to determine which truly qualify as crisis situations. Those which do not should be moved under State Department control for more deliberate, reform-focused approach.

There is also the simple argument that instituting meaningful reform in a recalcitrant partner nation is hard. This is true. But hard is not impossible. The security assistance enterprise should approach reform not in broad, sweeping terms but incremental steps. Rather than requiring the partner to eliminate corruption wholesale across the security forces, perhaps require that a particularly corrupt commander be removed before providing assistance to that unit. In the case of Iraq in the late 2000s, the United States might have required Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to fire certain commanders guilty of sectarian excesses or modify the personnel policy to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive. In other cases, reform measures may be as mundane as switching to an electronic pay system to reduce the opportunity for graft. Such a change in approach would also require a change in how the United States prepares officers for security assistance duties. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has made great strides in its educational program to professionalize the security assistance workforce in recent years. It could further improve this program by embedding security sector reform more deeply into the curriculum.

#### The plan and perm establish no-strings-patronage---that ensures the condition is not met

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

INDUCEMENT. Existing scholarship identifies several conditions for successful inducement. One critical condition for successful inducement based on reciprocity norms is the establishment of a pattern of tit-for-tat exchange.55 In the context of SFA [Security Force Assistance], however, the United States often provides inducements repeatedly, without waiting for intervening concessions. Far from bolstering a norm of reciprocity, the repeated provision of inducements without answer would logically erode any existing norm of reciprocity, establishing a norm of no-strings patronage in its place.

#### The condition must be met prior to US provision of aid, and must be cut-off if backsliding occurs. The perm violates both.

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB>

Currently, human rights considerations are rarely given significant weight in decisions about who to support and when with U.S. security assistance. In moving resources to the State Department, officials should conduct a full review of a partner’s capability, capacity, and political will to protect civilians and abide by human rights requirements before approving future U.S. assistance.92 These reviews, conducted at the outset of U.S. security relationships, could ensure that a partner is unlikely to abuse U.S. aid. Additionally, to counter the sizeable influence of regional bureaus, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor should be required to review and concur on security assistance projects that involve countries found to have a history or pattern of human rights abuses in the conduct of its security forces or security policy. This determination should be informed by the State Department’s own annual human rights reporting in addition to information from civil society groups. Human rights vetting should also be reformed. Under the current system, partners who purchase U.S. assistance and equipment circumvent Leahy law vetting, and aid that flows directly to ministries of defense, rather than individual units, is not subject to the same human rights restrictions.93 Closing these loopholes would not only bring all U.S. assistance in accordance with existing U.S. law, but it would also make for smarter policy. Researchers have found that when partners commit human rights abuses with known U.S. support, civilians on the ground are more likely to blame American foreign policy.94 Prioritizing partners that are willing to abide by international human rights standards would protect American interests and civilians on the ground. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in collaboration with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, should jointly increase the human rights vetting of arms transfers. Finally, the State Department should develop a framework of triggers and indicators on human rights and civilian protection that would require a reevaluation or termination of a security partnership. When partners commit abuses or refuse to abide by international law, the United States must be willing to cut off assistance. This would ensure that the United States is not complicit in abusive behavior and could incentivize partners to clean up security force conduct. This internal trigger should also automatically alert Congress to ensure that proper remediation is done by the executive branch.

#### Security Cooperation should not be a handout to non-democracies

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB>

While this report calls for realigning U.S. assistance toward democratic allies and partners, it avoids diving into the specific policy debates over what countries should or should not receive security assistance. Those are obviously critical foreign policy debates, but the authors focus on improving the ability of U.S. officials to make coherent policy decisions by first creating an effective management and organizational structure of security assistance. This will also require major reform to the State Department’s own security assistance programs, which routinely and without deliberation provide billions in aid to nondemocracies. Security assistance should not be a diplomatic handout or entitlement; it should serve U.S. foreign policy and be flexible enough in its administration to align with U.S. foreign policy objectives and values. That not only requires consolidating security assistance programs in one place, but also demands significant reforms to the decision-making structure and security assistance system at the State Department.

#### Doing both requires assistance to undemocratic states – undermines democratization

Sullivan 18, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina (Patricia, et al, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,” Defence and Peace Economics, doi:10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388)

Only a handful of other studies systematically investigate the impact of military aid on civilian populations outside the context of an ongoing war. This scholarship tends to focus on weapons transfers. Like much of the literature on economic aid, the bulk of the research on arms transfers concludes that major conventional weapons transfers to developing countries increase human rights abuses and impede democratization (Blanton 1999a, 1999b, de Soysa, Jackson, and Ormhaug 2010). More recently, Pamp et al. (2018) find that conventional weapons imports increase the risk of intrastate conflict onset – particularly in countries with other risk factors for political violence. This study echoes results from Craft and Smaldone (2002) who find that arms imports increase the risk of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, extant research leans toward a pessimistic outlook on the prospects for foreign assistance to improve human security in fragile and conflict-affected countries. While there is some evidence that economic aid could increase the capacity of governments to deter violent nonstate actors and lessen armed conflict, most studies suggest economic aid, military assistance, and arms transfers all negatively impact governance and human rights conditions.

### 2nc – at: perm do counterplan

#### Permutation severs

#### 1 – “security cooperation” – it must be binding and can’t be modified by one government

US JCS 17 – United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, body of the most senior uniformed leaders within the United States Department of Defense, advises the president of the United States, the secretary of defense, the Homeland Security Council, and the National Security Council on military matters (“Joint Publication 3-20: Security Cooperation”, 5/23/2017, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf>) FGY

3. Combatant Commands

Throughout the execution of SC activities, CCDRs and their staffs continually direct, assess, monitor, evaluate, and adjust the SC activities when possible and the CSCSs/country plans as required, while the component commands do the same with their supporting plans. However, once resourced, execution of **specific SC activities occurs as planned** unless a crisis affecting US forces and/or the PN precludes completion of those SC activities. SC activities normally take place through bilateral agreements that **constitute binding legal obligations** for both the USG and PN. As a result, any **deviation from the terms of a bilateral agreement** likely **requires the consent of both governments**. Consequently, major changes are unlikely during the execution of a specific SC activity. However, in the absence of a governing bilateral agreement and with several FYs of SC activities at various stages of planning, programming, and budgeting during any given calendar year, this process can make changes for the future.

#### It’s unconditional entitlement and not a QPQ

Munson 13, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer (Peter, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” *War on the Rocks*, <https://warontherocks.com/2013/09/the-limits-of-security-cooperation/)//BB>

If SC is incapable in many cases of building meaningful partner capacity or creating real influence, then wonks will argue that SC and especially military aid payments are needed to secure much more black-and-white U.S. interests: overflight and transit agreements and peace treaty compliance. Yet, this is another instance where the bankruptcy of SC ideology is demonstrated. SC [Security Cooperation] funding and services are generally not initiated as a quid pro quo for overflight and transit. Once the flow of cash has started, however, threats of closing off cooperation in the form of overflight, transit, or other agreements become tools of extortion in the hands of the foreign partner. No matter how inefficient or expensive, the U.S. cannot turn the spigot down or off. SC thus is not a tool to condition partner behaviors, but rather an entitlement—a fee for maintaining the status quo—a baseline bribe that creates a market of fees-for-service for the most mundane issues.

#### 2 – cooperation – it requires voluntary adjustment, not coercion

Berenskotter 8 – PhD @ LSE (Felix Sebastian, From Friends to Strangers: A Theory of Interstate Security Cooperation Applied to German-American Relations, 1945 – 1995, <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2986/1/U615938.pdf)//BB>

In this thesis cooperation is not understood as an instantaneous decision but as a process, that is, something occurring over time. It builds on Keohane’s definition of cooperation as the phenomenon when “the politics actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination”. Importantly, this process implies change where “actions of separate individuals...be brought into conformity with one another” (Keohane, 1984: 5 If, emphasis added). This is echoed by Grieco (1990: 22) who adds the qualification of cooperation as “voluntary adjustment” of policies, thereby limiting cooperation to those relationships where policy coordination was not a consequence of coercion but of choice, thus implying agency. Taken together, cooperation thus requires the convergence of policies through a process of mutual coordination and voluntary adjustment. The qualification that these policies are ‘actually followed’ is important and points out that cooperation goes beyond rhetoric and distinguishes, in Morgenthau’s (1960: 186) words, an operative from an inoperative alliance. In this sense, following Grieco (1990) and Stein (1990), cooperation is defined as costly investment in a shared institutions (or regime) on the international level over a period of time.

#### This definition of ‘cooperation’ is widely recognized. International relations distinguishes between QPQs and cooperation

Tang 9 – PhD, Professor of IR and Public Affairs @ Fudan U (Shiping, “Living with China: Regional States and China through Crises and Turning Points,” p. 4)

In contrast, issue linkage means many instances of quid pro quo, thus limiting the chances of obtaining cooperation in some issue areas via piecemeal cooperation building. Issue linkage is essentially a coercive measure to extract concessions from the other side, and "cooperation" obtained from such a process can be only tactical concessions, not genuine cooperation based on goodwill to forge a more cooperative relationship. As a result, even if one side succeeds in coercing the other side into concession through issue linkage, the chance for achieving a more cooperative relationship is reduced because such an outcome generates resentment rather than trust from the other side. More likely than not, the other side will want some payback next time, rather than a more cooperative relationship. Certainly, while issue linkage was one of Henry Kissinger's favorite tools for getting the Soviet Union to agree to some concessions during the Cold War years, he had no intention to build cooperation with the Soviet Union.9

#### As do military planners

Harold Jarche, 5-20-13, (Harold, graduate of the Royal Military College, Harold served over 20 years with the Canadian Armed Forces in leadership and training roles. Harold began his career as an officer with Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. He completed his service as a Training Development Officer with the Royal Canadian Air Force where he conducted the analysis and design of training for aircrew and technicians on the newly purchased CH146 helicopter “Social tools or tools that are social?”, JARCHE, <https://jarche.com/2013/05/social-tools-or-tools-that-are-social/>)

Sharepoint supports people who are collaborating, focused on specific objectives, and sharing the same documents. As I mentioned in my last post on this subject, Yammer has the capability to not just support collaboration, but also workplace cooperation (freely sharing without any quid pro quo). Platforms like Yammer enable serendipitous connections by making work more transparent. But is a separate collaboration platform necessary, or just an added extra? It will be interesting to see if the triad of Yammer + Sharepoint + Office will dominate in large organizations, over more pure-play enterprise social platforms

#### 3 – material qualification. Substantially requires *no* material qualification.

Black’s Law 91

[p. 1024]

Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.

#### 4 – certainty, immediacy and durability. Those are all topical requirements.

#### Resolved

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725)

Of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty, fixed, settled. Obs.

#### Should is mandatory

Zhang 15, Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. (Mo, Spring 2015, “ARTICLE: RETHINKING CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF RELATION SYNDROME”, 44 *Stetson L. Rev.* 831, 853-854. Lexis accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 4/17/22)

The primary purposes jus cogens and jus dispositivum serve are also different. Jus cogens are rules of law centered on public interest and intended to protect interests such as national economy and social justice in general, or weaker parties like consumers and employees in particular. 171 Jus dispositivum rules are aimed at more effectively protecting private interests. 172 By granting certain power to the parties, these rules attempt to help achieve justice and commercial expedience for the parties, especially in the area of contract law. 173 In many countries, jus cogens and jus dispositivum appear in their statutes as either mandatory or non-mandatory rules, differentiating from the "commanding" words in the specific rule. 174 If the word "should," "shall," or "must" is used, the rule is usually mandatory. 175 But when the word "may" or "could" is employed, the rule is generally non-mandatory. 176

#### Should is immediate

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16) [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### Substantial is immediate

Words and Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; **real at present time**, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

#### Key to neg ground – Allowing the aff to be uncertain and delayed breaks debate, the aff shifts the implementation date or allows roll-back in response to DAs

#### Durability is better for the aff – it prevents the aff from losing every debate on rollback or kicking the plan to avoid DA links.

#### “For DAs but not CPs” is arbitrary, it has zero definitional basis and is easily exploited by 2a’s.

#### C/I – functional competition alone – requiring both is bad

#### 1 – logic – ban the plan should be competitive

#### 2 – perms – textual +functional leads to perm abuse that obviates germane counterplans and generates artificial perm-benefits

### 2nc – at: lie perm

#### Genuine and effective conditionality is key to the credibility of US conditions across-the-board

Boutton 18, assistant professor of political science at the University of Central Florida (“POLICY ROUNDTABLE: THE PROS AND CONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Texas National Security Review, <https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/The-Future-of-Security-Assistance-PDF.pdf)//BB>

It would be wishful thinking, however, to argue that Washington could avoid working with such regimes altogether. In fact, many of the regimes in which Washington claims to have vital security interests are fragile and plagued by the same governance problems discussed herein. Working with these regimes is often unavoidable. Where this is the case, the United States should consider the following. First, due to misaligned security priorities, productive cooperation and capacity-building in these cases can only be achieved by shaping and altering host-state incentives through the establishment and credible enforcement of conditionality. This notion is widely recognized among development aid scholars, but has recently gained traction among those who study security assistance.32 Recent work on security assistance advocates allocating security assistance ex post as a reward for effort and reform, rather than ex ante as an inducement, in a manner similar to the Millenium Challenge Account.33 In a recent book,34 Walter Ladwig shows that the United States has been able to exercise greater influence over host government policy when it enforces conditions, as it did in the Philippines and El Salvador. Positive conditionality requires the United States to verify the efforts undertaken by the partner government, which in turn necessitates more intrusive monitoring. Many countries will balk at this as a violation of sovereignty, but the United States should insist upon it as a condition of military assistance. A larger presence will not only enable better monitoring of the host government’s coup-proofing actions, but may also mitigate the internal security dilemma that drives such behavior. The worst paranoid excesses of the Maliki regime did not occur until after 2011, when the United States was no longer present on the ground as a safety net protecting his regime. The United States should also signal that it is prepared to cut ties with regimes that work against its security interests. Washington’s reliance on security assistance to fight terrorism abroad, without putting large numbers of U.S. forces in combat, often undermines the credibility of any threats to withdraw this assistance. Even in the rare cases when punishment has been enacted, as it has been several times with Egypt and Pakistan,35 it has historically come in the form of temporary freezes that are later lifted even after little change in behavior. In the case of both Diem and Maliki, the United States ultimately withdrew its support when backing them became untenable. But the fact that this only happened after years of military assistance instilled in both leaders the perception that they could do no wrong, and that steadfast support would continue even as they further consolidated power. By the time America decided to advocate for their removal, it was far too late and the damage was already done. Unwillingness to enforce conditions and withdraw support can seriously undermine the objectives of U.S. assistance and makes it more likely that other leaders will test the limits of what the United States will tolerate from its clients.

### 2nc – at: ask perm

#### The “ask perm” relies on persuasion, not explicit bargaining. That fails.

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

This study offers a novel conceptualization of U.S. influence strategies in security assistance based on inductive analysis of U.S. security assistance projects since World War II. In conducting security assistance, the U.S. military has historically employed an influence strategy “ladder” comprised of four rungs: teaching, persuasion, bargaining, and direct command. Teaching refers to the transmission of information and expertise to recipient decision-makers. This didactic approach hinges on the assumption that recipients are actually interested in building stronger militaries, and only insufficient knowledge stands in their way. Persuasion, bargaining, and direct command each begin with recognition of interest misalignment between provider and recipient. Persuasion aims to reshape recipient preferences through a variety of mechanisms including inducements (no strings attached) designed to spur reciprocal concessions, conversation and argumentation to change minds, demonstration of “what right looks like” to inspire emulation, and the development of interpersonal relationships and rapport to motivate compliance on the basis of personal friendship. Bargaining, in contrast, refers to the use of conditionality—carrots and sticks tied to compliance or defiance—to overcome interest divergence. Finally, the U.S. may take direct command of partner militaries or military units, exercising influence directly by replacing partner decision-makers with Americans. In early examples of U.S. security assistance—to China during World War II, to Greece in the 1950s, and to South Korea in the 1940s and 1950s—the United States taught and persuaded, but it also escalated to bargaining and direct command to push partners to purge incompetent officers, root out corruption, follow the chain of command, and implement other professional military practices necessary for military effectiveness. In contemporary security assistance, however, persuasion has emerged the overwhelming rule. A review of U.S. security assistance doctrine reveals a strong emphasis on relationship building and argumentation as the preferred tools of influence in security assistance. Advisory efforts have been redefined as the absence of direct command, and bargaining is explicitly discouraged.14 Practice matches doctrine: in the post-9/11 period, U.S. military personnel frustrated with Afghan and Iraqi leaders for the politicization and corruption rotting the militaries they were trying to build nonetheless remained generally committed to persuasive tactics and eschewed conditionality or command. Building from the premise that the fundamental challenge of security assistance is influence, and observing the prevalence of persuasion in the contemporary period, this study asks and answers the following two questions: 1) How do different U.S. influence strategies in security assistance affect recipient military effectiveness? 2) What explains U.S. strategy selection? 1.2 Arguments This study proposes and tests two theories. The first theory examines the consequences of U.S. security assistance influence strategies for recipient military effectiveness. The second theory moves a link back in the causal chain and examines the causes of United States strategy selection. Causes of Influence Strategies Influence Strategies Consequences of Influence Strategies Influence Strategy Theory (Consequences) I argue that teaching and persuasion on their own will not suffice—the United States is more likely to influence partners to build better militaries when it employs the full escalation ladder. Teaching is unlikely to succeed because motivation, not lack of expertise, is almost always the reason recipient leaders make decisions that undermine the development of their militaries. Persuasion, bargaining, and direct command are all logical improvements over teaching because they begin from the more realistic premise that recipient decision-makers may not be interested in—and may actively oppose—the development of a more effective military. The persuasion strategy on its own, however, is ill-suited to the security assistance context, because the United States tends to provide the most assistance to states whose leaders are least likely to be receptive to normative or personal entreaties by U.S. personnel. Conversely, the ingredients necessary for successful bargaining—recipient dependence, iterated interactions, and the availability of calibrated carrots and sticks—are met in the context of security assistance. Direct command works because it removes the influence challenge altogether as American decision-makers replace partner decision-makers. United States influence strategies are by no means the only factor that affect security assistance outcomes. The United States might employ bargaining and direct command and still fail to build more effective partner militaries for a whole host of reasons. Though bargaining or direct command are not sufficient for effective security assistance in cases where interests between provider and recipient diverge (i.e. almost all cases of security assistance), I argue that they are necessary. I call this theory of influence strategy consequences “Influence Strategy Theory,” or, IST.

## net benefit

### 2nc – key to democracy / link

#### Failure to condition aid wrecks US democratic credibility

Carothers 21, senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Benjamin Press, research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program (Thomas, “Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/04/navigating-democracy-security-dilemma-in-u.s.-foreign-policy-lessons-from-egypt-india-and-turkey-pub-85701>)//BB

As President Joe Biden and his team seek to put the defense of democracy and protection of human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy, they confront the stubborn fact that the United States maintains cooperative security relations with a wide range of undemocratic or democratically backsliding governments. Such situations frequently give rise to a policy dilemma: confronting these governments over their political shortcomings risks triggering hostility that would jeopardize the security benefits that such governments provide to Washington. Yet giving them a free pass on democracy and rights issues undercuts the credibility of U.S. appeals to values, bolstering the damaging perception that America only pushes for democracy against its adversaries or in strategically irrelevant countries. And if, as the Biden administration claims, democracy is the best system at delivering for people, soft-pedaling democracy may undermine the effort to help countries build effective political systems that will make them better partners in the long run.

#### Concessions to authoritarian states enable backsliding

Hegedüs 22, visiting fellow for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He researches populism and democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe and the European and foreign affairs of the Visegrad countries (Daniel, “US, EU Face Higher Hurdles Now for Action Against Orbán’s Tightening Grip in Hungary,” Just Security, <https://www.justsecurity.org/81438/us-eu-face-higher-hurdles-now-for-action-against-orbans-tightening-grip-in-hungary/)//BB>

Clearly, democracy is not the only game in town anymore in Central Europe. While many Western stakeholders might be tempted to make concessions to the region’s illiberal strongmen in order to preserve EU and NATO unity, this approach was a key enabling factor and will only continue to weaken European and transatlantic organizations further. In the face of the clear authoritarian threat posed by Russia and China, challenging these trends in Central Europe to strengthen the democratic integrity of the Western alliance is more crucial than ever.

### 2nc – avoids politics

#### Avoids politics—the CP is directly in line with Congressional intent

Young 20 [Thomas-Durell Young, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School; "The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance"; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation; Published: 9-10-2020; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://www.dasadec.army.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2344014/the-politics-of-security-cooperation-and-security-assistance/; KL]

That there has been an apparent disconnect between congressional expectations that SC and SA encourage the adoption of democratic norms abroad is hardly subtle and suggests a political causation for these inconsistencies. After all, if there is no government requirement to produce concrete results, no one can ever be held accountable for failure to meet congressional intent. This inherent weakness to the U.S. Government’s approach to assisting its partners is no more glaringly obvious than in its experience in Afghanistan. For instance, who bears ultimate responsibility for the failure of DOD to re-create the Afghan air force: the originating policymaker, Headquarters Air Force, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan, or U.S. Air Force Central Command?22 A recent (and quite damning) Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s lessons-learned report on that lack of progress in the country was unsubtly titled Divided Responsibility.23

#### Avoids politics --- bipartisan majority for putting democracy front-and-center

Applebaum 22, staff writer at The Atlantic (Anne, “America Needs a Better Plan to Fight Autocracy,” The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/russia-ukraine-senate-testimony-autocracy-kleptocrats/627061/)//BB>

3. Put democracy back at the center of foreign policy.

It is no accident that Americans are united in their support for Ukraine. A large, bipartisan majority, for example, backs the U.S. decision to boycott Russian oil, even if it led to higher prices. This is because Americans identify with people who are clearly fighting for their freedom, their independence, and their democracy. It is a central part of how we define ourselves, and who we are.

I recognize that it is naive to assume we can have the same policy toward every dictator, that we cannot give the same support to every democracy movement; I understand that there are trade-offs to make in diplomacy as in everything else. This is not the Cold War, there is no Warsaw Pact, and not every judgment about every autocracy is black-and-white. But our preference for democracy and our willingness to defend key democracies should never be in doubt. The fact is that Russians clearly doubted whether we and our allies were even willing to help Ukraine fight back. We failed, in advance, to telegraph the fact that we would. We cannot let that happen again.

#### Solves agenda link

Rand and Tankel 2015 Dr. Dafna H. Rand is the former Deputy Director of Studies and the inaugural Leon E. Panetta Fellow at CNAS. She formerly served on the National Security Council staff and as a Middle East expert on the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff. Stephen Tankel is an Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University, and an adjunct fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security program at CNAS. He previously served as a Senior Adviser for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense. “Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment,” August 2015.

Over the past few years, as the number of security assistance and cooperation programs has grown, Congress has expressed concern about what it believes is the executive branch’s failure to implement these programs in a strategic, rather than ad hoc, manner. Members of Congress have repeatedly asked the Government Accountability Office to study individual programs and country outcomes.23 Clearly identifying the goals of a particular security assistance and cooperation initiative, the time frame for achieving them, and agreed-upon metrics and methods for evaluating outcomes is essential for improving the efficacy of these programs in support of broader national security policy. To assist this effort, we identify eight challenges that policymakers must confront in order to employ security assistance and cooperation in the most strategic and effective manner to support overarching U.S. foreign policy goals.

### 2nc – solves democracy/LIO

#### Unconditional SC fails to uphold US democratic norms – conditioning cooperation on democracy fill the gaps

Cole & Trenkov-Wermuth 21 – Emily Cole, program officer for governance, justice, and security in the Applied Conflict Transformation Center, served in the Peace Corps in Senegal, MALD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. from Amherst College; Dr. Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, security governance advisor at the US Institute of Peace, lead author of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, visiting fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute and the EU Institute for Security Studies, TAPIR fellow at the RAND Corporation and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Ph.D. and M.A. in international relations from the University of Cambridge, B.A. in world politics from Hamilton College (“**To Consolidate Democracy, Change US Security Assistance**”, 12/6/2021, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/12/consolidate-democracy-change-us-security-assistance>) FGY

As **the United States pursues its initiative to bolster democratic rule and human rights** after last week’s Summit for Democracy, a **priority should be to diagnose and repair the flaws in U.S. and allied approaches to helping vulnerable nations strengthen their security**. Our **existing** pattern of security sector assistance focuses largely on training and equipping such nations’ forces, and it emphasizes the security of governments and institutions, rather than of the people they are meant to serve. This type of **assistance prioritizes short-term tactical gains to the detriment of long-term U.S. strategic goals**—and it should be reformed.

Ample evidence—including the global surge in coups d’états and crises of police violence from Brazil and Nigeria to the Philippines—shows that dozens of countries must improve not only the “kinetic” capacities, but also their governance, of police, military and other security institutions. Yet a first outline last week of the new U.S. “initiative for democratic renewal” omits any mention of this vital task. The United States and its allies must re-shape their assistance to support democracy and human rights. In some countries—for example Egypt and Uganda—U.S. security sector assistance has helped to consolidate authoritarianism. Current trends risk exacerbating the problem in **a “race to the bottom” among the United States, Russia and China**.

U.S. policies too often set aside the nation’s commitment to democratic values on a flawed assumption that this is necessary to advance U.S. interests amid great-power competition. Yet **democratic backsliding** and **authoritarianism** create **long-term risks of violence, instability and extremism**. Even measured by the narrower metric of strategic military alliances, these risks weaken U.S. security interests. Serious democratic backsliding preceded Turkey’s decision to purchase one or more Russian S-400 missile defense systems. Democratic backsliding in the Philippines weakened the U.S.-Philippine security relationship to the point of endangering the agreement that has enabled a U.S. troop presence in the Philippines. Worldwide, democratic deficiencies help **push countries into the arms of China or Russia**.

How Security Assistance Can Hurt Democracies

The United States and others have historically ignored the significance of effective security sector governance for consolidating democracy. Donor countries have treated security sector reform as a technical problem, rather than a political endeavor that can change power dynamics and the political trajectory in a country. The recent coups in Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Myanmar and Chad show how an emboldened military and weak or absent civilian control over security forces may not simply weaken democracy, but end it.

To promote peace, stability, democracy and U.S. strategic objectives, the United States helps violence-afflicted nations with assistance to strengthen civil society, political parties, and legislative oversight. Yet the people overthrowing civilian, elected rule in Chad, Guinea and Mali this year were military officers who had been direct beneficiaries of U.S. training. This agonizing irony underscores that we can no longer neglect the central importance for democracy of helping nations improve security sector governance.

In these latest coups and in other examples, we see how security assistance itself can undermine democracy when it effectively “super-sizes” a vulnerable nation’s security services relative to weaker democratic, civilian institutions that are meant to control them. Where governments lack funding and capacities to meet populations’ basic needs, this danger skyrockets. Yet in too many cases—Egypt, Mali, Niger, the Philippines and others—U.S. and other security assistance has led to significant increases in military and security budgets at the expense of strengthening other critical services. Ill-balanced security assistance especially risks weakening democratic governance where it has backed major counterterrorism operations.

Egypt is a prime example. In the past four years, U.S. bilateral assistance to Egypt has been $1.4 billion per year, most of that to pay for Egypt to buy U.S.-made weapons. While this assistance has not enabled Egypt to end the threats from its terrorist groups in Sinai, it has buttressed the military regime, which now controls much of the country’s economy. Under current law and policy, only $300 million of the United States’ bilateral aid in FY 2021 was subject to being withheld by the State Department if Egypt failed to meet certain human rights and rule-of-law standards. The threat to withhold 23 percent of its assistance is far too little to show a powerful U.S. commitment to democracy, rights and governance. It reflects the relatively small amount that the United States has invested in promoting good governance.

President Biden often has said, “Don't tell me what you value. Show me your budget, and I'll tell you what you value.” This month, the Biden administration proposed spending up to $424.4 million next year on programs to strengthen democracy—an initiative that hardly compares to U.S. spending of roughly $18-20 billion each recent year on security assistance.

A Race to the Bottom

The United States’ current approach risks becoming a race to the bottom with China and Russia. In recent years, **countries receiving security assistance have encouraged bidding wars among Russia, China, and the United States to seek the most attractive possible aid packages**, including weapons. In fear of losing leverage over partners such as Philippines or Nigeria , the United States has participated. This allows authoritarian or authoritarian-leaning governments to procure weapons and other equipment and training for their militaries or police with little or **no requirement for human rights or security governance improvements**. In some cases, the fear of losing leverage may be unwarranted: After his initial flirtation with a closer relationship with China, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte understood that China’s threat to his interests is very real and shifted back to the U.S. camp.

This means the **United States has compromised on democracy and human rights** for, at best, short-term gains in relations with a given country. In the long term, however, this approach undermines stability and democracy. During the Cold War, the U.S.’s primary goal of maintaining partnerships with governments in Africa to prevent them from absorbing Soviet influences yielded a similar approach. A RAND study concluded that “U.S. assistance appears likely to have increased the incidence of civil wars in this period, likely by either exacerbating domestic instabilities or provoking proxy conflicts.” There is no reason to believe that a 21st-century race to the bottom with Russia and China, in the interest of maintaining partnerships, will not have the same results.

We Can Do Better

The current U.S. approach to security sector assistance not only detracts from President Biden’s expressed goals of consolidating democracy and countering authoritarianism, it damages U.S. strategic interests in making it easier for China and Russia to engage with authoritarian regimes. As the United States builds from last week’s Summit for Democracy, it needs to fully apply, and in some cases expand, existing policies supporting democratic governance of the security sector. Key steps will include these:

1. **Keep promises to withhold security assistance from human rights violators**. Following through on existing legislation and keeping promises to withhold aid to bad actors is critical for the United States’ ability to support democracy abroad and for its credibility on the international stage. U.S. policy statements describe **conditionality** for aid—**democratic governance and adherence to human rights norms**—that often is ignored. As in Egypt, the United States often sustains security assistance to security partners even when countries fall far short of critical governance and human rights benchmarks. Frequently, senior U.S. officials may threaten to withhold aid, but without follow-through. This needs to change if democracy consolidation efforts are to have teeth.

2. **Enforce assessment, monitoring and evaluation requirements**. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act required better assessment, monitoring and evaluation of security sector assistance. U.S. government officials admit that this is not happening yet, and big strides need to be taken to implement and learn from security assistance monitoring and evaluation. This is one way **to ensure programming is effective** and that it helps broader strategic objectives, including the **consolidation of democracy.**

3. Create a global architecture for effective security sector assistance. The Summit for Democracy offers a vital opportunity to start discussions with allies on the creation of a global architecture for effective security sector assistance, based on aid effectiveness principles borrowed from development aid. This would not only avoid duplication of effort and programming but would also show unity among allies and strengthen each individual democratic assistance provider to hold the line on human rights, good governance and democracy.

4. **Center U.S. security sector assistance on people’s security**. Human security must be at the center of security sector assistance for democracy to flourish. Otherwise, the United States risks empowering authoritarian governments, without regard to what makes communities safer. In this regard, we need to help countries to improve their accountability mechanisms, and also to enhance their citizen participation in the design and development of national security strategies.

5. Be transparent about security assistance programs. Publicizing details of the U.S.’s nearly $19 billion in assistance, including military and weapons projects, is vital to coordinate work among U.S. and international donor agencies and organizations and to cut programming that either wastes taxpayer funds or undermines strategic priorities. Moreover, this transparency is critical for recipient partners’ **security sector actors, civil society organizations, media, to hold their own governments to account** about how the aid is used.

#### Democratic principles must be explicitly tied to security cooperation. That solves.

Loening 21, served as the German government’s commissioner for human rights and was European policy spokesman of the FDP parliamentary group in the German Bundestag (Markus, “The US must get tough with NATO members brazenly backsliding on core values,” <https://emerging-europe.com/voices/the-us-must-get-tough-with-nato-members-brazenly-backsliding-on-core-values/)//BB>

But for the alliance to regain its bite, the US must first get tough with fellow NATO members – in particular Poland and Hungary – that brazenly backslide on core NATO values. Democratic principles and fundamental human rights such as press freedom must be welded to strategic geopolitical interests. For its part, Europe must earn Biden’s trust. The only way it can do this is by getting its own house in order. Starting with the prickly populists of Central and Eastern Europe. Shared democratic values have anchored NATO as the most successful alliance in history. These values are now being chiselled away in Hungary and Poland as well as Slovenia, which takes over Presidency of the EU Council on July 1. A spate of recent reports by international watchdogs has painted a grim picture of independent journalism being stifled. It came as no surprise when a few months ago Reporters Without Borders relegated Hungary to 92nd position in its World Press Freedom Index. Poland, meanwhile, has fallen over 40 spots on the Index since the ruling Law and Justice party came to power in 2015. It is now behind Niger and war-pocked Armenia. The Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán has used legislative and regulatory tools to muzzle critical outlets. This has included a law that puts journalists behind bars for up to five years if they are found guilty of spreading disinformation. The Hungarian government has used the fog of the Covid-19 pandemic to tighten the screws: starving independent media of advertising revenues while swallowing small independent outlets, either directly or through its large web of business cheerleaders. Earlier this year, Hungary’s government-controlled media regulator forced Klubrádió, a leading independent radio station, off the air. With only flickers of free press left in Hungary, Orbán’s state capture of the media is now almost complete. Poland follows Hungary’s lead No wonder that Orbán’s playbook is so appealing to other illiberal governments looking to put the press under its thumb. Following Hungary’s lead, Polish public broadcasters are being transformed into propaganda mouthpieces. Plans to ‘repolonise’ the media are already underway. In December, Poland’s state-controlled energy giant PKN Orlen bought German-owned Polska Press, giving it control over 20 regional dailies, 120 magazines and hundreds of online portals across the country. Independent minded editors and reporters have already started to be swapped for pro-government foot soldiers. In a few months time, there will be pockets of Poland without access to newspapers that do not toe the government line. Polska Press has a total reach of over 17 million readers. PKN Orlen’s shopping spree will be a valuable tool for the ruling Law and Justice party ahead of the 2023 parliamentary elections. Lawsuits and targeted taxes aimed at private media have become the norm. Government cronies with deep pockets have launched over 50 lawsuits against independent media outlets. The idea is to wear down the opposition into submission – or bankruptcy. There are echoes here of Poland’s dark past. During communism, editors were summoned to the party’s Central Office for the Control of the Press in Warsaw where their articles were often heavily massaged, redacted or withdrawn. Editors of unruly publications would be replaced or have their paper quota reduced. The irony is that the current government led by erstwhile anti-communist crusaders is now reaching for similar tactics. Independent television and radio stations are also facing the heat. Poland’s most watched news channel, TVN 24, owned by US-based TV content provider Discovery, has been waiting for over 18 months for its licence to be renewed by the National Broadcasting Council, an agency packed with government apparatchiks. TVN’s US-links have so far shielded it from more aggressive state meddling. But without assertive action from the EU and US, TVN 24 could still succumb to a similar fate as German-owned Polska Press. Another television channel, ATM Rozrywka, did not have its licence renewed on the grounds that it did not submit proper documentation. Earlier this year, the anti-monopoly watchdog stopped Agora, the publisher of Poland’s top-selling liberal newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, from taking over radio broadcaster Eurozet due to “competition concerns”. Time to deploy the right tools To protect what remains of the free media in Central and Eastern Europe, leading democratic lights within the NATO alliance must deploy the right tools to stop Europe’s worst offenders in their tracks. German Chancellor Angela Merkel should use her last months in office to flex political muscle. The EU can make sure that Budapest and Warsaw do not weaponise national regulation to intimidate independent outlets. Introducing EU legislation to weed out lawsuits against journalists will also go a long way. In turn, the Biden Administration can needle the populists where it hurts. Poland is an important ally, but US security assistance should not be unconditional. NATO is not solely about battle tanks and gleaming fighter jets; it is a community of values that have to be defended not only against external foes but also those trying to subvert basic rights at home.

#### The counterplan alone is key to the LIO

Lewis 22, Assistant Secretary of State (Jessica, “Future of Security Sector Assistance,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/031022_Lewis_Testimony1.pdf)//BB>

As shown in our response to Ukraine, our global network of allies and partners are a unique American advantage and strategic asset in competition with the PRC and Russia. As a fundamentally political, relationship-building tool, security sector assistance can play a vital role in strengthening those partnerships. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to drive a wedge between us and our allies and partners. For the foreseeable future, it will be a priority for the United States to continue leveraging security cooperation to help our partners deter and defeat Russian and PRC aggression. It is especially critical that our fellow democracies on the frontlines have the means to defend themselves against their larger, autocratic neighbors. I should be clear, however, that just because a strategic competitor is willing to transfer arms to a country, it does not mean we should, or will. We will approve arms transfers only when they are actually in our foreign policy interest. Indeed, we must keep in mind that strategic competition is not simply a struggle of might between great powers. It is at base a contest of values and norms – of two fundamentally different models of global governance. As President Biden has said, “We're living at an inflection point in history, both at home and abroad. We're engaged anew in a struggle between democracy and autocracy.” And as Secretary Blinken said last year in a message to all our diplomatic posts worldwide, “in a more contested, competitive world, America’s values and our commitment to supporting the rights and freedoms of people around the world are a competitive structural advantage that our undemocratic adversaries and competitors cannot match, and that we should not cede.” Therefore, the President has stressed the need to defend free societies and promote democracy around the world, including by elevating our promotion of human rights. We must keep the importance of security sector governance and respect for universal human rights front and center as we consider where to provide security assistance, and as we engage partner nations’ security institutions and empower them toward modernization, accountability, and reform.

#### Security incentives conditioned on democratic reform are extremely effective – experts

Morton 18 – Christopher A. Morton, Major, United States Marine Corps, BSBA Ohio State University (“How Does United States Security Assistance Affect Host Nation Democratization?”, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, June 2018, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1060022.pdf>) FGY

F. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. U.S. Security Assistance Supports Host Nation Democratization

There are four causal mechanisms supporting the hypothesis that U.S. security assistance supports host nation democratization. The first mechanism is that when prosperous democracies set a good example of protecting human rights and individual liberties, it influences other countries to do likewise. Marcin Krol wrote, “The future of democracy in the world—and especially in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union—depends much more on the state of democracy in the West than it does on developments in the new democracies themselves.”22 His logic was that if established democracies produce unappealing results and lack credibility, then states in transition may opt for alternative systems of government.23 Charles S. Robb argued that U.S. democracy is not perfect, but the manner in which it overcame obstacles to increasingly protect freedom makes it a suitable example to democratizing states—who should mimic the function of U.S. democracy while customizing a locally appropriate form of it.24 He recommended that “building democratic competence abroad should [be] the central aim of U.S. foreign policy, for in the long run, the best way to promote our national interests is to promote basic democratic values.”25 In his view, implementation includes bolstering the host nation’s “democratic center” (whatever it may be); it is a bottom-up approach, because he argued a top-down approach leads to bloated government bureaucracy.26 The second mechanism is that **aid conditionality incentivizes state elites to democratize** to secure the future flow of aid money. Countering the idea that the “inconsistent application of human rights” conditionality undermines the moral force of the United States, Paula J. Dobriansky argued that coercion and aid conditionality are **significantly more influential than “moral force”** in stimulating liberalism and democratization in repressive governments.27 Her main argument was that “the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad is not only a moral imperative but also a sound strategic approach to bolster U.S. national security.”28 She detailed how, beginning in the 1970s, U.S. Congress made foreign assistance and security assistance conditional on host nation human rights considerations, but that the enduring dilemma is “how to reconcile human rights considerations with other foreign-policy factors.”29 She reasoned that **human rights-guided policy** choices **must provide tangible results and be actionable within the limits of U.S. resources** and capabilities. The third mechanism is that externally sourced peacekeeping operations, security force assistance, and security sector assistance efforts bolster the security necessary for democratic transitions, consolidation, and all other aspects democratic governance itself. Kristine Hoglund argued that security sector reform—especially civilian control of the military and police reform—delivers the security that is fundamentally necessary for liberal democracy.31 Jeroen de Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar argued that “domestic political will and commitment to political reform” are influential factors in democratization, but that external democracy assistance can also make a difference.32 They specified what is required for a successful war-to-peace transition: “disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, the installation of democratic civilian control over the military, and other related security reforms.”33 Particularly relevant is de Zeeuw and L. van de Goor’s focus on security sector reform: “Unless security forces are accountable to democratically elected civil authorities and oversight bodies under the rule of law, the sustainability of democratic transitions of postconflict societies will remain fragile.”34 They recommended **integrating security sector reform into a comprehensive democracy assistance strategy**.35 In short, they proposed a **maximalist approach** to support host nation democratization with the view that SA supports democratization.

#### Ensuring that alliances on emerging tech forefront democratic norms is vital for global democracy

Rasser 21, Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Prior to joining CNAS, Mr. Rasser served as a senior intelligence officer and analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency (Martijin, “The case for an alliance of Techno-Democracies,” https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-case-for-an-alliance-of-techno-democracies/)

An effective tech alliance will need to balance the national interests and shared interests of its members, a difficult but feasible proposition when one considers common values and goals for economic competitiveness. A change in mindset in what ‘sovereignty’ in this context means is also necessary. Ultimately, interdependencies with allies and like-minded countries should be viewed foremost as a shared techno-democratic sovereignty, while those with autocratic countries such as China are fraught with economic and national security vulnerabilities that pose a direct challenge to liberal-democratic norms and values.

The other critique would be that a tech alliance would exacerbate a ‘Tech Cold War’, referring primarily to the strained US–China relationship. In less dramatic terms, this concerns a bifurcation of the tech ecosystem of China and that of the United States, as well as other tech-leading democracies. A partial divergence has already happened because leaders in both countries want it that way. American leaders are rightfully concerned about the risks associated with products from Chinese tech companies, and the Chinese Communist Party has been clear in word and deed that it seeks to be self-sufficient in a range of technology disciplines. China, like the US and its allies, also seeks greater resiliency and security in its supply chains.

American leaders are rightfully concerned about the risks associated with products from Chinese tech companies, and the Chinese Communist Party has been clear in word and deed that it seeks to be self-sufficient in a range of technology disciplines.

A tech alliance is unlikely to worsen these dynamics, nor is it destined to result in fully decoupled ecosystems. By cooperating and harmonising their efforts, the tech-leading democracies have considerable leverage and influence, making a more favourable dynamic plausible. The incentives and opportunity for China to establish an independent tech sphere of different standards, norms, and rules that other countries can join dwindle quickly if the countries accounting for most of the world’s GDP, science and tech infrastructure, and R&D spending offer a robust alternative. Should Beijing persist, it would isolate itself and any country that chose to follow from the bulk of the global economy.

A tech alliance is the best way to ensure technological leadership by the world’s techno-democracies. This leadership will be essential to safeguarding democratic institutions, norms, and values, and be a driver for sustainable and equitable economic growth around the world. Anything short of this goal carries major risk of a world marred by ascendant techno-authoritarianism, a direct challenge to the economic vitality, national security, and values of democratic nations across the globe. Ensuring that future never happens should be the clarion call to the leaders of the techno-democracies.

#### US key

HRW 20 (Human Rights Watch, “US: President Should Set a Human Rights Foreign Policy,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/10/us-president-should-set-human-rights-foreign-policy#R9)//BB

The United States should strive to be a world leader on human rights. Human Rights Watch offers 12 priorities for the next US administration to create a rights-focused foreign policy.

The United States has the power, influence, and resources to create positive change for human rights beyond its borders. The global defense of human rights is stronger when the United States joins with others to promote and protect them. Although US policymakers often espouse human rights and humanitarian values, the United States has been inconsistent in defending human rights abroad and has been complicit in or has committed serious abuses in its foreign policies and engagement. The US government has often invoked human rights selectively or to achieve a short-term diplomatic goal. Instead, the president should commit in word and deed to a foreign policy that consistently prioritizes promoting and protecting human rights, not solely as a means to an end.

### 2nc – turns case

#### Creeping authoritarianism zeroes solvency---it shreds cohesion and causes European instability

Ellehuus and Morcos 21, \* deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. and previously served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Pentagon, \*\*visiting fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and was formerly deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division in the French foreign service (Rachel and Pierre, “NATO SHOULD FINALLY TAKE ITS VALUES SERIOUSLY,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/)

From Russia and China to terrorism and climate change, NATO faces no shortage of external threats. Yet an equally serious challenge now comes from democratic decline within the alliance itself. Left unaddressed, the erosion of democratic values will further accentuate divisions between allies and create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by NATO’s rivals. The upcoming NATO summit is a unique opportunity for allies to tackle this underlying challenge. The trans-Atlantic alliance will only remain strong if members genuinely abide by its founding principles. The adoption of a “political pledge” in which allies recommit to upholding trans-Atlantic values would be a start. But NATO countries will need to move beyond words if they want to have a meaningful impact. This means regularly reviewing allies’ compliance with NATO values and principles and using incentives and disincentives to raise the political cost for countries breaking the rules. This is a challenging path with potential risks for NATO unity. But turning a blind eye [ignoring] to the ongoing erosion of NATO’s founding principles will be even more damaging to its political cohesion and credibility. Democratic values are not only important to the alliance in the abstract. They also help create the societal resilience that gives it strength. As such, NATO should link democratic progress with its existing resilience metrics and draw on joint NATO-European Union resilience response teams to assist struggling allies. This would enable NATO to take a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach to addressing democratic decline and shoring up trans-Atlantic values while also preserving its political cohesion. The Threat from Within Over the past decade, several NATO allies have taken a turn away from democracy. Hungary and Poland are sliding into illiberalism, while the rule of law has long since unraveled in Turkey. In Greece and Slovenia, press freedom is rapidly deteriorating. NATO’s newest members made substantial progress since the end of the Cold War, but democracy remains fragile in Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia. As a result, internal corruption or malign influence could readily unleash new instability. From the beginning, NATO has faced tensions over how much emphasis to put on democratic values. On one hand, NATO has always been more than just a military alliance. Its strength and resilience have long derived from the shared commitment of allies to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. The preamble to this document stresses democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law while its second article explicitly commits to “peaceful and friendly international relations.” But the alliance has not always lived up to these ideals. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, NATO debated how to deal with authoritarianism in Portugal and Greece as well as multiple coups in Turkey. Ultimately, members decided not to address the problem, instead prioritizing cohesion and geopolitical interests during a tense Cold War period. As explained by then-National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, “[T]he time has come to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics.” This was the wrong choice then and an even worse one today. The risks of ignoring NATO’s internal strains far outweigh the benefits of addressing them. Some of the reasons are longstanding: A country’s treatment of its own citizens reflects, positively or negatively, on NATO’s brand, and an unstable domestic environment inhibits that country’s ability to meet its international obligations. Today, though, ignoring democratic decline carries new risks. NATO’s adversaries have become increasingly skilled at taking advantage of and, in some cases, actively exacerbating countries’ societal vulnerabilities. A compromised media environment allows disinformation campaigns to flourish, while corruption opens space for Russian networks to operate and gain influence. Moscow is also preying on the grievances of racial and ethnic minorities in NATO member countries in order to weaken national-level governance and cohesion.

#### Rising authoritarianism turns the case. Expands Russian influence, causes European instability and shreds interoperability

Katz and Taussig 18, \* director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, \*\*was the research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. She was also a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe (Jonathan and Torrey, “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” *Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/)//BB>

There is also significant democratic backsliding among NATO member states. The cast of illiberal characters—who are leading the charge in the wrong direction—includes the recently reelected and empowered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS) Party in Poland, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the ruling Fidesz Party. Each has proven more than willing to repress free media, dismantle checks and balances, demonize political opposition, clamp down on civil society, and diminish the rule of law. America’s democratic system and norms under President Trump are also under duress; as a result, Freedom House downgraded the country’s score on the basis of weakening political rights and civil liberties. Despite these alarming developments, NATO leaders have relegated democratic backsliding to the backburner. Opponents of making the case for democracy within NATO might argue that pushing Ankara, Warsaw, and Budapest too hard on their commitments to good governance will exacerbate already tense divisions in the alliance. Others might say that Russia would be the prime beneficiary of a contentious democracy discussion at NATO. Yet this is a counterproductive approach with current and potential costs to NATO’s future. Here are three security-based reasons why the United States and NATO should care about democratic backsliding, and actions the alliance can take to address them. 1 Russia is already benefiting from and effectively leveraging its relationships with Hungary and Turkey to exacerbate discord within Europe and NATO. Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin see one another as allies in their disdain for the European Union and Orbán has courted Russian financial and political support as he builds an illiberal democracy in Hungary. Russian propaganda also finds fertile ground in Hungarian media. A 2018 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report noted that Russian state-owned media content “by Sputnik and RT is widely referenced by pro-government news sources in Hungary.” The report cited Orbán as the EU and NATO’s most supportive leader of Putin’s worldview and leadership. Acting as the Russian “camel’s nose under the tent,” Orbán is thwarting Ukraine and NATO’s partnership efforts by blocking the Ukraine-NATO Commission from meeting at the upcoming summit. In Turkey, Erdoğan has rattled the NATO alliance by pursuing a deal to purchase the S-400 missile system from Russia. In addition to hurting NATO’s ability to cooperate on security, the system is also not compatible with NATO’s defenses. Through arms and energy deals, Putin uses Turkey as a wedge to divide NATO. Similarly, Erdoğan might see his deals with Putin as a way to free Turkey from Western leverage, particularly as European states push back on his brand of authoritarian politics by cutting EU pre-accession funds. After winning the recent twin parliamentary and presidential elections, an emboldened Erdoğan will likely become an even more problematic partner for NATO. President Putin is building ties with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies. Other illiberal and populist governments, including Italy’s new anti-establishment government, could follow suit in enhancing their partnerships with Russia, creating future intelligence-sharing and cohesion problems for the alliance. President Putin is building ties with illiberal leaders across Europe while attacking fundamental elements of Western democracies, including electoral process and open information spaces. 2 There is a strong link between democratic governance and security gains. Liberal democracies have historically been less likely to experience intra- and interstate conflict, generate refugees, and harbor violent extremists. They are also better at maintaining transparent institutions, civilian control of the military and intelligence services, and working together on confidence-building measures, all of which are core features of NATO’s ability to collectively defend its members. On the other hand, corruption and insecurity grow under politicized institutions and poor rule of law. This hurts NATO’s renewed efforts to combat terrorism, as military and security communities have long acknowledged the connection between corruption and the existence of criminal networks, traffickers, and terrorists within state borders. Corruption also opens space for Russian kleptocratic networks close to Putin to operate and gain influence. For example, in 2014 Orbán awarded Rosatom, a Russian state-owned nuclear company, the sole contract to build two nuclear plants in Hungary in exchange for a 10 billion euro loan from Moscow. The Hungarian parliament, dominated by Orbán’s Fidesz Party, then passed a rushed vote to keep data from the nuclear deal confidential for 30 years in the name of “national security.” The deal diminished transparent economic competition within the European Union and solidified Hungary and Russia’s energy ties. 3 Distrust among allies hurts alliance interoperability. The PiS Party’s assault on independent media and the Constitutional Court, including efforts last week to summarily force out 27 Polish Supreme Court justices, have isolated Poland from France and Germany, diminishing trust among the European nations. This could make it increasingly difficult for Washington to gain consensus on joint decisions, communications, and operations. If NATO is dedicated to building resiliency along Russia’s periphery by placing multi-national battalions in Poland, then it should not ignore the accountable institutions that would strengthen this joint effort.

#### Creeping authoritarianism is the death knell for NATO

Katz and Taussig 18, \* director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, \*\*was the research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. She was also a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe (Jonathan and Torrey, “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” *Brookings*, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/)//BB

An even greater risk than Russian short-term exploitation, however, is a possibility that in 10 years’ time the NATO alliance becomes unrecognizable—a hybrid club of autocratic, illiberal, and liberal democratic states that, devoid of shared values, do not agree on security threats or areas for cooperation. In the long term, dictators tend to maintain their power and legitimacy through strongmen power plays at home and sometimes abroad. And almost always, they leave a legacy of destruction, chaos, human rights violations, social strife, and other grievances. They rarely contribute to international peace, stability, and prosperity, which are the central objectives of an effective security alliance. The alliance should be a clear-eyed about this risk. Like a cancer, illiberal practices can metastasize if not addressed. Deepening autocracy among member states would be a death knell for NATO as an alliance that has provided protection for the Euro-Atlantic community over the last 69 years.

#### Erosion of democracy collapses NATO

Wallander 18, resident and CEO of the U.S. Russia Foundation and Senior Adviser at WestExec Advisors. From 2013 to 2017, she served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council (Celeste, “Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations, 97.4)//BB

NATO today faces multiple challenges. Terrorists have attacked European capitals, migration is putting pressure on border and homeland security systems, Russia is both able and will- ing to use military force and other instruments of influence in Eu- rope, and U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to scrap the alliance altogether. But the most serious problem is not one of these obvious threats; rather, it is the breakdown of liberal democracy within the alliance itself. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has never been a typi- cal alliance. From its inception in 1949, NATO has not only deterred and defended against external threats; it has also advanced the principles of liberal democratic governance. Although its cohesion initially rested on the common threat of the Soviet Union, NATO was more unified than most multilateral organizations thanks to the common character of its members. Nearly all were democratically elected governments that were accountable to their citizens, bound by the rule of law, and dedicated to upholding political and civil rights. Article 2 of NATO's founding treaty committed members to "strength- ening their free institutions." Countries facing a common threat have often banded together for defense and survival, but most alliances don't last long once that threat is eliminated. That is why so many observers feared that NATO would disappear with the end of the Soviet Union. But thanks to the internal cohesion created by its democratic values, and the incentives its stan- dards created for aspiring new members, the alliance defied predictions. Instead of disintegrating, NATO adapted to new challenges and became a cornerstone of transatlantic security after the Cold War. Today, the Kremlin once again poses a serious threat in Europe and beyond. But unlike the last time the alliance faced down Russia, now NATO is in peril. Multiple members are dismantling the institutions and practices of liberal democracy that emerged triumphant in the Cold War, and things may get worse if autocratic demagogues exploit populist fears to gain political clout in other member states. Just when the alliance is needed as much as ever to meet challenges from with- out, the foundations of its power are at risk of crumbling because of challenges from within. THE PRICE OF ADMISSION After the fall of the Soviet Union, the liberal democratic credentials of NATO's members became even more important to the alliance. Al- though many experts and policymakers hoped that Europe would emerge from the Cold War whole, free, and at peace, others warned that without a shared enemy, the region might return to past cycles of instability and conflict fueled by revanchist, chauvinistic, and il- liberal European regimes. Far from being irrelevant, these observers argued, NATO would play a key role in bolstering liberal democracies and creating trust among countries that had spent centuries fighting one another. As if on cue, border disputes and simmering ethnic conflicts in eastern Europe began to threaten the peace almost immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. And with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, they ultimately broke it. In the face of these challenges, NATO sought to leverage the desire for member- ship to encourage political reforms by requiring that new members meet its standards for good governance. This decision was based on the belief that liberal institutions, practices, and values would pre- vent a return to the nationalist, nativist, extremist, and intolerant dynamics that had driven destructive conflicts in Europe for centu- ries. To foster security within Europe, NATO required that new members leave autocratic practices behind. Fulfilling these requirements was often politically contentious, and aspiring members did not always succeed. Countries that had spent decades under authoritarian communist rule had to root out the linger- ing influence of intelligence agencies, overturn politicized control of the military in favor of apolitical professional defense forces, establish legislative oversight for military procurement, and implement person- nel policies that would combat corruption. All of that has taken time: Montenegro set the goal of achieving membership in 2007 but had to wait ten more years to earn admission. And mere aspiration is not enough: Bosnia, for example, has yet to fulfill the criteria that the alliance set in 2010 for the country to be granted the Mem- bership Action Plan, a procedural pre- cursor to joining. These requirements may have slowed the process of NATO's expansion, but liberal institu- tions and practices are central to creating security and trust among Europe's diverse societies. Anything less would have weakened the alliance instead of strengthening it. Beyond its stabilizing effect on the broader continent, there is an- other reason NATO's liberal democratic character came to matter: in the absence of a shared external threat, the binding force of liberal democratic values and institutions has become essential to the alli- ance's effectiveness. NATO's ability to conduct security operations depends on its political cohesion as much as its members' military capabilities. Few question NATO's cohesion when Article 5 of its found- ing treaty is invoked—that is, when an ally is directly attacked. Com- mon external threats generate unified responses. After 9/11, for example, NATO members quickly joined the U.S. campaign against Taliban- ruled Afghanistan.

#### Authoritarianism is NATO’s Achilles heel

Hamilton 21, Director, Global Europe Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC; former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe (Daniel, “Democratic Resilience is Foundational to the Alliance,” <https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-06/Democratic%20Resilience%20is%20Foundational%20to%20the%20Alliance-Daniel%20S.%20Hamilton.pdf)//BB>

In recent years, much strategic discussion has focused on competition among states of “great power.” It is becoming clear, however, that this competition extends beyond traditional measures of power; it centers increasingly on forms of governance. Adversaries big and small are selling autocracy as “efficient.” They tout their own systems and use a broad array of tools to amplify fissures and undermine confidence within democracies. When they can’t do that successfully, they use diplomatic and other means of coercion. They support illiberal democracies. Others are beginning to follow their model. This puts democratic resilience at the heart of the new international system and international competition. It is a fundamental issue for the next few decades. NATO must focus on it. The Security Case for Democratic Resilience Integrating democratic resilience more fully into NATO’s mission is not a task that is additional; it is foundational. The democratic values and institutions upon which the Alliance has been founded are under assault from external and internal challengers. Countries with weak protections for democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are vulnerable to subversion, corruption, and mis- and dis-information. Waning attention to NATO’s core values has resulted in some Allies prioritizing unilateral national decisions over collective Alliance interests, or using their position to block Alliance activities as a way to gain leverage in bilateral disputes. Some Allies are themselves manipulating information and distorting data, engaging in direct cyberattacks on their opponents, undermining democratic processes and the rule of law, even threatening each other. These points of disunity could be used by strategic competitors to destabilize individual allies or NATO as a whole. Malign influences within Allied states could mean that non-NATO countries could influence NATO decision-making. In each of these ways, deficits in internal values can become external threats. Celeste Wallander has called democratic fragility “the alliance’s Achilles’ heel.” The 2020 NATO Experts Group report warns that “a drift toward NATO disunity must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.”2

### 2nc – turns cyber

#### Creeping authoritarianism turns cyber

Grady 19, former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News (John, “Panel: Rise of Authoritarian Governments Pose Biggest Threat to NATO,” *USNI News*, https://news.usni.org/2019/06/28/panel-rise-of-authoritarian-governments-pose-biggest-threat-to-nato)//BB

Among NATO Members, the rise of populist authoritarian governments eschewing democratic values poses more of a threat to the alliance than an aggressive Russia on its borders or an expansionist China elbowing its way into Europe militarily and economically, a panel of security and diplomatic experts said Thursday.

“NATO should be in this game” of promoting independent judiciaries, free and open political debate and a free press, “and not just the EU” in advocating bedrock freedoms and ways of governing, Charles Kupchan, from the Council of Foreign Relations, said at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.

Nations such as Turkey, Poland, Hungary and Italy needed to be called out by other alliance “members when they see … backsliding” on defending those values domestically and, as an alliance, it should be pushing them overseas, he added.

“If we get this issue wrong, good night” in trying to keep a coalition together on a host of issues — from cyber to migrants to the common defense, Kupchan said. The rise of authoritarianism, reflected in the actions of Russia and China offering themselves as models to follow, “is the premier security issue of our time.”

The alliance needs a restatement of core values in a new strategic document. This would be one way of rebuilding trust among members for the future as the president of the United States often questions the alliance’s value to Americans, said Hans Binnendijk, with the Atlantic Council. He pointed the finger at Russia for undermining trust in political institutions and processes in Europe and the U.S.

### 2nc – rule of law !

#### **Otherwise, lack of human rights considerations for SC partnerships in the squo risks state instability and collapse of rule of law**

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations”, CSIS, 10/30/2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protection-civilians-us-partnered-operations) FGY

The United States’ national security and defense strategies, as well as trends in U.S. military operations around the globe, reflect a preference for working by, with, and through partners to achieve common security objectives. Partnership may enhance the capacity of a partner government to maintain effective control over territory. It can also signal unity in deterring or degrading a common adversary or threat, for example in the U.S.-led coalition and partnered approaches to confront the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As outlined in our policy brief, Civilians and “By, With, and Through,” security partnerships can take a wide range of forms, from support operations and advise, assist, and accompany missions, to direct participation in hostilities through “joint” or “partnered” operations and coalitions.2 Here, we report the practical experiences of policymakers and practitioners in security and humanitarian fields in **positively shaping the conduct of armed forces partnering with U.S. forces.** Their combined experience— supported by the available research—suggests that it is possible, with the right conditions for success, to affect the conduct of both state and non-state armed actors to minimize harm to civilians. Practitioner lessons also suggest that in some cases, the **risk of harm to civilians may be too great** and the options to control risk too few to continue the partnership in an accountable manner which both effectively spares civilian lives from the effects of conflict and respects human rights. This report outlines considerations and recommendations for policymakers, military actors, and humanitarian professionals, all of whom play a role in encouraging improved policies and practices of armed forces with whom the United States partners. **Partnerships** in armed conflict **can aggravate** or reduce the **risk of harm to civilians**, depending on the form and significance of the partnership and the technical and political attributes and tendencies of each partner. Effectively reducing the risk of harm to civilians and optimizing positive results **depends on candidly assessing the most likely sources of harm** and using available options to address them throughout a partnership (i.e., before, during, and after active fighting). Partnered military operations in armed conflicts **expose civilians** to a **wide array of risks**, including **injury, death, trauma, displacement**, and the **destruction of homes, schools, infrastructure, and livelihoods**. Harm may occur because of negligence or deliberate misconduct by state and non-state actors; harm may also occur in spite of cautious and purposeful attempts to avoid it. Hostilities in urban areas can **particularly disrupt civilian life: water, health, electricity, and sanitation systems are often interconnected and interdependent**, and the destruction of part of the system impacts the whole.3 When explosive remnants of war contaminate the area and infrastructure damage is significant, the **consequences of conflict last well beyond the end of active fighting**. These challenges are evident in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria, both of which will take decades to rebuild after intense urban conflict. **Breakdowns in services and social cohesion** significantly **impact stability, governance**, and the **security** of populations, **creating challenges for restoring the rule of law.** When the United States partners with state and non-state forces, the **United** States **must consider what costs these partnerships will inflict on civilians, security, governance, rule of law enforcement, and transitional justice.** Whether a partnership is initiated in the context of an ongoing conflict or in preparation for one, the United States can and should institute adequate protections to minimize the risk of civilian harm. In order to effectively reduce harm to civilians from military operations conducted by U.S. partners, whether jointly or alone, the U.S. government must have internal clarity about desired outcomes, political and strategic commitment to those outcomes, adequate resources and technical competence, and coherence and coordination among government agencies. Adding more than one partner to an operation increases the complexity of these variables. Fighting collectively only serves to underscore the importance of defining desired outcomes, as the actions of one partner affect the efficacy, reputation, and legitimacy of the other. Many of these factors for success are seldom implemented. The following policy approaches and practical suggestions may help minimize harm to civilians in the context of security partnerships.

### 2nc – terror !

#### Lack of robust assessment of civilian casualties enables terrorist propaganda, radicalization, and decimates US legitimacy – threatens national security

Lewis 19 – Dr. Larry Lewis, head of the CNA’s Center for Autonomy and AI, previous Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for human rights, lead analyst and co-author for the Joint Civilian Casualty Study in support of GEN Patraeus, subject matter expert on the subjects of joint and coalition interoperability, combat identification, and fratricide, Ph.D. in physical chemistry from Rice University (“Promoting Civilian Protection during Security Assistance: Learning from Yemen”, May 2019, <https://www.cna.org/reports/2019/05/IRM-2019-U-019749-Final.pdf>) FGY

Information gap: preventing an evidence-based approach During the US advisory effort to the coalition in 2015–2016, a key question was: is this assistance having a positive effect? And even more broadly, could the US determine how its support, in terms of bombs, aircraft, intelligence, and refueling, was being used? To what degree was US assistance contributing to the disaster on the ground in Yemen? How accurate were the findings of the JIAT? As the US wrestled with policy decisions, having this information would have enabled more of **an evidence-based approach to US strategy** in Yemen. However, **there is no established assessment process** to help answer these questions regarding security assistance to partners. Operational end use monitoring It is worthwhile to note that the US has some processes in place to address accountability when defense equipment, including weapons, are sold or transferred to foreign militaries. This process, mandated by the Arms Export Control Act, is called end-use monitoring (EUM).51 As part of the foreign military sales process, the receiving nation must agree to certain conditions to enable EUM. These conditions include: • The equipment must only be used for the purpose intended; • No equipment can be transferred to a third party without the prior approval of the US; • The receiving nation must protect the equipment to US standards; and • The receiving nation must allow monitoring processes to verify the conditions above.52 Several programs conducted under the EUM process include Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern. These US end-use programs focus on verifying equipment presence and security.53 This matches their intended purpose: they were developed to protect against unauthorized exports and technical espionage involving sensitive military equipment. These programs do not address how US equipment are used operationally. For example, in the Vignette on page 2 where the Saudi-led coalition struck a school bus full of children, the US government had no idea that a US-provided bomb was used until third parties performed open source analysis and disclosed that fact. While the US has no process for capturing how its equipment and weapons are used operationally – what we refer to as **operational end use monitoring** – this information is relevant for the US. For example, understanding how partners use US-provided weapons should inform policy and assistance decisions. This information is also **relevant for foreign policy and national security**, since the **theme of US-provided weapons killing civilians is a frequent and powerful subject of messaging and terrorist propagand**a, **influencing US relations** with other countries and **contributing to radicalization** and support to terrorist groups that can then **threaten the US homeland and its interests.**54 Three sources of information If a government wanted to conduct operational end-use-monitoring, how can this information be obtained? Governments providing security assistance can leverage three different types of information for operational end use monitoring. They are: • Partner forces. Getting information from partner forces is invaluable for helping to understand the operational effects of assistance. For example, the Saudi-led coalition created a spreadsheet with mission reports documenting basic details on every strike conducted in the campaign, including the type of aircraft and weapon used. It is also helpful to know the rationale and intent for particular strikes. For example, if there are allegations that non-combatants were targeted, what was the intended target? What types of intelligence were used in that strike? And what is the partner force assessment for what happened? While such access is not guaranteed, this information was at times made available to the US when it specifically requested it. And greater access could be made a requirement for future assistance in order to strengthen monitoring efforts. • Government information. In Yemen, the US sometimes also had intelligence or other information that could be useful in helping to determine what was happening on the ground. This was not frequent, since the conduct of partnered militaries like the Saudiled coalition was not an intelligence requirement for the Intelligence Community. It is possible that making this a priority would enhance the value of intelligence in this operational end use monitoring process. • Open source information. Another rich information source for determining the outcome of operations is using open sources. This can range from civil society groups that do on-the-ground investigations to open source investigators leveraging social media. While militaries and governments are often dismissive of these types of sources, considering military data to be more reliable and accurate, the reality is that a complete picture of operational outcomes requires a merging of military and open source data. This is not limited to the Saudi-led coalition: a recent study by the US military determined that external allegations, based on open source data, were the source for the majority of the civilian casualties confirmed by the US-led coalition in Iraq and Syria. Militaries lack the full picture, and open source information can help complete that picture.

## AFFIRMATIVE

## solvency – general

### conditioning fails

#### Conditioning assistance rarely changes behavior

Stephen Tankel, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017 “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” Lawfare, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-improve-return-investment-security-assistance>, (accessed 5-24-2022)

Wielding influence and securing tactical cooperation is the second. This may translate into trading assistance for access to bases, airspace, or other transit routes. The United States sometimes uses assistance to incentivize short-term tactical cooperation against shared threats. In other cases, assistance is intended to reassure allies and partners of America’s commitment to its security, either in general or against common enemies. Here it is worth noting that plans to slash the State Department’s budget and cut foreign assistance compound concerns about U.S. abandonment and further reduce American influence. Finally, the United States has tried, often without success, to use assistance as a lever to shape a recipient’s behavior either domestically or internationally. Some U.S. objectives overlap with one another. Others conflict. And lest we forget, our partners also get a vote. American objectives for security assistance often do not align with theirs, due in large part to differences in how the United States and a recipient prioritize and perceive threats. The number of different objectives at play complicates efforts to condition assistance; enforcing conditions to achieve one set of objectives could hamper efforts to achieve another set. For example, after the Bahraini government’s security forces launched a major crackdown on protesters during the Arab uprisings, the United States temporarily restricted arms sales to the country. Some members of the Obama administration also argued for placing conditions on security assistance. Others worried that this would undermine Bahrain’s support for U.S. basing and access, which is important for Afghanistan, Iran deterrence, and counterterrorism operations. As a result of competing priorities, the United States often chooses not to condition assistance, as was the case with Bahrain, or attempts to do so in an ad hoc manner. Worst of all, the United States sometimes imposes conditions, but then blinks first and backs down when they are not met.

#### Countries will not allow intrusive monitoring

Andrew Boutton, assistant professor of political science at the University of Central Florida, 2018 “POLICY ROUNDTABLE: THE PROS AND CONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Texas National Security Review, <https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/The-Future-of-Security-Assistance-PDF.pdf>, (accessed 5-24-2022)

Positive conditionality requires the United States to verify the efforts undertaken by the partner government, which in turn necessitates more intrusive monitoring. Many countries will balk at this as a violation of sovereignty, but the United States should insist upon it as a condition of military assistance. A larger presence will not only enable better monitoring of the host government’s coup-proofing actions, but may also mitigate the internal security dilemma that drives such behavior. The worst paranoid excesses of the Maliki regime did not occur until after 2011, when the United States was no longer present on the ground as a safety net protecting his regime.

#### Positive conditionality fails because recipients pretend success

Samiratou Dipama, PhD Candidate at Marmara University and Emel Parlar Dal, Professor at Marmara University, 2015 “The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger,” Perceptions, Volume 10, No. 1, (accessed 5-24-2022)

Negative conditionality is generally criticized to be ineffective because sanctions imposed as a result of conditionality might hit the poor instead of the targeted government25 and the recipient country’s government might easily find access to alternative funding resources. In contrast, the application of positive conditionality is much less contested in the critical discussion. The EU’s enlargement strategy is generally used as a clear example of the effectiveness of positive conditionality to boost the democratic space in the Eastern European countries. In fact, the desirability of EU membership appears to have prompted candidate countries to adhere to a host of conditions contained in the so-called Acquis Communautaire. Yet, there are still problems with the way EU uses positive conditionality: it does not always deliver the incentives promised (extra aid, for example), or at least it does not deliver them quickly. Governments may even pretend progress without actually achieving a policy change.26

### uneven enforcement

#### Uneven enforcement [holding some allies accountable, but not others] damages broader democratic cred

Barone 22, MA in Public Management @ JHU (John, “A PROPOSAL FOR THE REVISION OF THE LEAHY LAWS TO ALIGN HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY COOPERATION POLICIES WITH NATIONAL STRATEGY,” https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/66912/Barone-Capstone%20Project-2022.pdf?sequence=1)//BB

Enforcement of human rights initiatives will often damage relations when the US finds that a foreign partner has violated them and then imposes military aid restrictions or sanctions on the guilty units or nations. The issue is compounded when the US does not hold states equally accountable to the US code on foreign aid and policy standards. Until recently, many US embassies did not share vetting results with partner nations, despite legal requirements to share the data with the host nation to avoid damaging relationships.2 As of 2017, the DOS publishes an annual list of suspended units on its website.3 This year, an advisor to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh disclosed that the country is debating whether it should follow procedures established by the Leahy Laws that would remediate Bangladeshi units sanctioned from receiving aid, noting that Bangladesh would then go to the PRC for support. The advisor identified inconsistencies in how the US administered its human rights policies to close allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others.4 The US must stand up for human rights abroad but must evenly enforce a policy that does not damage relations, ultimately preventing the US from influencing partners to adhere to human rights concepts.

## solvency – say no

### backlash – general

#### Conditional aid on human rights is counterproductive – causes retaliation from partner nations

Allendoerfer 10 – Michelle Giacobbe Allendoerfer, assistance professor of political science at George Washington University, program coordinator of International Politics at the Women’s Leadership Program at George Washington University, Ph.D. in philosophy in political science at the University of Michigan, M.A. in political science at the University of Michigan, B.A. in political science and international relations at Carleton College (“When Do Human Rights Matter? Finding a Place for Human Rights in Foreign Policy”, University of Michigan Doctoral Dissertation, <https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/78938/mallendo_1.pdf?sequence=1>) FGY

3.4 At What Cost? The Salience of Donor-Recipient Relations

Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) assert that leaders use foreign aid to buy policy concessions. Further, they argue that the salience of these policy concessions is one key determinant of whether a donor provides aid to a potential recipient and, if aid is provided, how much aid is allocated. I argue that donors consider the salience of these concessions when deciding whether to punish human rights violators. If a donor decides to punish a potential recipient by withholding or reducing aid, the opportunity cost of such action is losing the policy concession. I expect, therefore, that as the value of the concessions increases, the probability that a donor decides to punish a violator decreases. 27 I conceptualize the salience of policy concessions using two dimensions: security and economic ties. 3.4.1 Security Ties Many scholars place national security at the top of any list of foreign policy goals (c.f. Morgenthau 1951; Waltz 1979; Kennan 1985). It would be **too idealistic to assume that human rights concerns can trump national security concerns** in making foreign policy. In fact, punishing human rights violators may be **counterproductive** to security goals. For example, **violators may respond to being punished by retaliating** in such a way that hurts the donor’s national security interests. For example, a recipient may restrict donor access to military bases or air space. In a 1979 lecture on foreign policy and human rights, Morgenthau states: We have a great interest in continuing the normalization of our relations with mainland China, and for this reason we are not going to hurt her feelings. On the other hand South Korea is an ally of the United States, it is attributed a considerable military importance, and so we are not going to do anything to harm those relations. (Morgenthau 1979: 7). Another example of the strategic importance of foreign aid lies in Cold War foreign policy. In particular, western donors were concerned that cutting foreign aid could precipitate a fall to communism. For example, the United States used its foreign aid program during the Cold War to prop rightist regimes in the western hemisphere to contain communism (c.f. Carleton & Stohl 1986; Apodaca & Stohl 1999; Regan 1995). In addition, foreign aid often directly or indirectly supported repressive regimes over leftist opposition (Regan 1995). In these cases, cutting aid would have clear negative implications for the donor’s strategic interests. Morgenthau’s concern – and he is not alone (c.f. Gillies 1996) – is that **criticizing or punishing a human rights violator would very likely harm relations** with that country and, in turn, the soured relationships could **hurt the strategic or material interests of the donor**. When donors use foreign aid to punish human rights violators, that foreign aid cannot be used to buy important policy concessions. This represents the opportunity cost for using foreign aid as a punishment tool. If a donor has an interest in buying a policy concession from a recipient, then it is unlikely to manipulate its aid policy to punish human rights violations when, instead, it needs to provide aid to buy the policy concession. One way to conceptualize the strategic importance of potential donors is security alignment. **Donors are more inclined to buy policy concessions from states with which they are closely aligned** than enemies. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) find that “recipients who are moderately aligned with the donor receive the most aid” (331). If security alignment signifies the presence of important policy concessions, then it follows that close allies are unlikely to be punished for human rights violations because these countries can offer the donor valuable policy concessions. For example, until the mid1970s, the United States consistently turned a blind eye to rights violations by South American dictators with whom the U.S. was allied. Hypothesis 1: Donors are less likely to punish recipients as the strategic alignment between them increase, all else equal.

#### The counterplan promotes backlash, which undermines alliance solidarity

Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, 2021

“NATO Should Finally Take its Values Seriously,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/nato-should-take-its-values-seriously/>, (accessed 6-1-2022)

Admittedly, pursuing a tougher course of action on values and principles comes with risks. Even measured steps could create serious rifts among allies, with the potential of paralyzing the alliance. Because NATO operates by consensus, any punitive action on an ally could provoke retaliatory action on other NATO business. In reaction to Norway’s stark criticisms against the Portuguese and Greek regimes at a June 1971 foreign ministers meeting, then-NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio warned that “if we undermine our solidarity, we run the risk of undermining the substance of our alliance.” Overcoming this dilemma between prioritizing values and preserving unity requires a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach. First, NATO will need to be proportionate when dealing with an ally violating trans-Atlantic values. Allies should start with discussions behind closed doors rather than publicize the dispute. Open and frank dialogue among allies should always be the first step before adopting restrictive measures. If NATO moves too quickly or aggressively, it risks being counterproductive by widening divisions in the alliance. At the end of the day, this progressive approach should have a deterrent effect on NATO countries, especially on those that value their membership in the alliance and do not want to be singled out as “bad allies.”

#### Countries can’t easily democratize in response to political conditionality

Samiratou Dipama, PhD Candidate at Marmara University and Emel Parlar Dal, Professor at Marmara University, 2015

“The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger,” Perceptions, Volume 10, No. 1, (accessed 5-24-2022)

Finally, the one-model-fits-all approach commonly used by the EU in the application of political conditionality limits the effectiveness of conditionality policy and can no longer be used. Indeed, in the context of democratizing a country, several factors might infuence the outcome other than just the willingness of the government. These include the presence or absence of a strong opposition and civil society, the degree of development of the country, the socio-economic situation in the country, and the country’s history.80 The complexity of these intervening factors clearly indicates that a countrybased democracy promotion’s approach appears a must in order to enhance the effectiveness of political aid as an instrument of democracy promotion in SSA. A great step has been made in this sense by the EU in the revised CPA (in 2010), where more attention is given to flexibility and to the individual circumstances of each ACP country.

#### Strategic interests, not human rights, should guide US policy

Oleg Svet, PhD and Defense Analyst, 2017

“When Pushing Democracy On Others Backfires,” The American Conservative, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/when-pushing-democracy-on-others-backfires/>, (accessed 6-2-2022)

In her July 13 op-ed in Foreign Affairs, “How U.S. Officials Can Craft Innovative Human Rights Policy,” former Ambassador Sarah Mendelson recalls her work as a senior, politically-appointed foreign policy official in the Obama administration. Her personal mission, as she recalls, was to “elevate human rights”–first within USAID, and later when she worked for the US Mission to the United Nations. Her initiatives to promote civil society and human rights within small powers such as post-Ben Ali Tunisia are admirable. However, her implicit suggestion that we ought to elevate human rights in our relations with great powers such as China and Russia is strategically incorrect. Our country’s policies vis-a-vis great powers (and to some extent medium powers, such as Turkey) must be guided, first and foremost, by a grand strategy rooted in our strategic interests, not one that aims to reflect our values.

### --- gwinn rehighlgiht

#### Conditioning fails – delays critical cooperation with partner countries, causes Russia and China to fill in – we’re green

* “security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably

Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/>) FGY

Hard Is Not Impossible

These failings notwithstanding, there exists no shortage of arguments in favor of the status quo and against shifting America’s focus in security assistance to security-sector reform and conditional aid. In an **era of great-power competition, Russia, China, or regional competitors may simply step in to fill the gap** with the partner nation if the United States insists upon unwelcome reforms in exchange for aid. I know this is a valid concern because I have sat in meetings where **partners made thinly veiled reference to other nations which may provide assistance if the United States is unable or unwilling**. Still, the quality and technological edge of **U.S.** kit and the total-package approach which includes **training and follow-on support do provide the United States a competitive advantage**. But the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for delivering aid is far too slow and, as a result, is a liability. To outcompete, the **security assistance enterprise itself requires major reform to shorten typical lead times** from years to months. The Pentagon and State Department need the agility to turn aid on and off like a switch or rheostat.

Another argument against placing preconditions on security assistance is that the **stakes are too high to deny a partner a critical capability** while waiting for reform to happen. This is the “we can’t let them fail” mentality. It is also valid — but only in certain crisis situations where aid is needed immediately, and reform truly cannot wait. Ukraine today is a good example. Rather than ceasing aid writ large until a condition is met, **place conditions on** discrete **packages of aid**. The **intent should be to provide sufficient incentive to the host-nation government to modify behavior**, not threaten national survival. During the years I spent in Afghanistan, the security threats faced by the government never appeared to afford the breathing space to withhold aid while institutional reform took place. In hindsight, doing so may have required coalition forces to carry a greater operational burden while the Afghan forces sorted themselves out, but it also would have been worth it. As the events of August 2021 demonstrated, 20 years of unconditional capacity-building built shockingly little capacity. Implementing this change requires a recurring review of Defense Department-led train and equip programs to determine which truly qualify as crisis situations. Those which do not should be moved under State Department control for more deliberate, reform-focused approach.

There is also the simple argument that **instituting meaningful reform in a recalcitrant partner nation is hard**. This is true. But hard is not impossible. The security assistance enterprise should approach reform not in broad, sweeping terms but incremental steps. Rather than requiring the partner to eliminate corruption wholesale across the security forces, perhaps require that a particularly corrupt commander be removed before providing assistance to that unit. In the case of Iraq in the late 2000s, the United States might have required Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to fire certain commanders guilty of sectarian excesses or modify the personnel policy to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive. In other cases, reform measures may be as mundane as switching to an electronic pay system to reduce the opportunity for graft. Such a change in approach would also require a change in how the United States prepares officers for security assistance duties. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has made great strides in its educational program to professionalize the security assistance workforce in recent years. It could further improve this program by embedding security sector reform more deeply into the curriculum.

Better Rewards, Tougher Inducements

The United States is **not getting the most for its security assistance dollars**. Programs intended to build partner capacity tend to underperform because **they fail to address underlying weakness in defense institutions** or take principal-agent problems into account. To build meaningful, long-lasting capacity in partners and better align security assistance with policy goals, the United States should shift from a “building partner capacity” **approach to a reform focus using conditional aid as leverage**. Doing so in an environment where security assistance is yet another **arena for strategic competition** with Russia, China, and others will require internal reform of the U.S. security assistance apparatus. Rather than a slow-moving bureaucracy, the United States needs an agile and streamlined security assistance enterprise able to deliver aid rapidly when needed and be paused or turned off just as easily when conditions require. In short, the **United States needs sweeter carrots and harder sticks**.

While the current U.S. effort to arm and equip Ukrainian forces is the most visible example today, it is not representative of the day-to-day work of security assistance which the United States carries out around the world. In most cases, the greater threat facing these partners is not an invading army but rather defense institutions for which reform is needed but not properly incentivized. **Modifying the U.S. approach to security assistance is one way to create that incentive and better align aid with policy goals.**

### backlash – russia

#### The counterplan gets perceived by Putin as another US-backed bid for democratic expansion – Russia responds with military intervention

Person & McFaul 22 – Robert Person, associate professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy, director of West Point’s International Affairs curriculum, term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, faculty affiliate at West Point’s Modern War Institute; Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, professor of political science at Stanford University, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (“What Putin Fears Most”, *Journal of Democracy*, 2/22/2022, <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/what-putin-fears-most/>) FGY

Putin’s True Fear

The **more serious cause of tensions has been a series of democratic breakthroughs** and popular protests for freedom throughout the 2000s, what many refer to as the “Color Revolutions.” Putin believes that Russian national interests have been threatened by what he portrays as U.S.-supported coups. After each of them—Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, the Arab Spring in 2011, Russia in 2011–12, and Ukraine in 2013–14—Putin has pivoted to more hostile policies toward the United States, and then invoked the NATO threat as justification for doing so.

Boris Yeltsin never supported NATO expansion but acquiesced to the first round of expansion in 1997 because he believed his close ties to President Bill Clinton and the United States were not worth sacrificing over this comparatively smaller matter. Through Partnership for Peace and especially the NATO-Russia Founding Act, Clinton and his team made a considerable effort to keep US-Russian relations positive while at the same time managing NATO expansion. The 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo severely tested that strategy but survived in part because Clinton gave Yeltsin and Russia a role in the negotiated solution. When the first post-communist color revolution overthrew Slobodan Milosevic a year later, Russia’s new president, Putin, deplored the act but did not overreact. At that time, he still entertained the possibility of cooperation with the West, including NATO.

However, the next round of democratic expansion in the post-Soviet world, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, escalated U.S.-Russian tensions significantly. Putin blamed the United States directly for assisting in this democratic breakthrough and helping to install what he saw as a pro-American puppet, President Mikheil Saakashvili. Immediately after the Rose Revolution, Putin sought to undermine Georgian democracy, ultimately invading in 2008 and recognizing two Georgian regions—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—as independent states. U.S.-Russian relations reached a new low point in 2008.

A year after the Rose Revolution, the most consequential democratic expansion in the post-Soviet world erupted in Ukraine in 2004, the [Orange Revolution](https://www.amazon.com/Revolution-Orange-Ukraines-Democratic-Breakthrough/dp/0870032216). In the years prior to that momentous event, Ukraine’s foreign-policy orientation under President Leonid Kuchma was [relatively balanced between east and west](https://www.csis.org/analysis/ponars-policy-memo-291-paradoxes-kuchmas-russian-policy), but with gradually improving ties between Kyiv and Moscow. That changed when a [falsified presidential election](https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/McFaul-16-3.pdf) in late 2004 brought hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians into the streets, eventually sweeping away Kuchma’s—and Putin’s—handpicked successor, Viktor Yanukovych. Instead, the prodemocratic and pro-western Orange Coalition led by President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko took power.

Compared to Serbia in 2000 or Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 was a much larger threat to Putin. First, the Orange Revolution occurred suddenly and in a much bigger and more strategic country on Russia’s border. The abrupt pivot to the West by Yushchenko and his allies left Putin facing the prospect that he had “lost” a country on which he placed tremendous symbolic and strategic importance.

To Putin, the Orange Revolution **undermined a core objective of his**[**grand strategy**](https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/four-myths-about-russian-grand-strategy): to establish a privileged and exclusive sphere of influence across the territory that once comprised the Soviet Union. Putin believes in spheres of influence; that as a great power, Russia has a right to veto the sovereign political decisions of its neighbors. Putin also demands exclusivity in his neighborhood: Russia can be the only great power to exercise such privilege (or even develop close ties) with these countries. This position has hardened significantly since Putin’s conciliatory position of 2002 as Russia’s influence in Ukraine has waned and Ukraine’s citizens have repeatedly signaled their desire to escape from Moscow’s grasp. Subservience was now required. As Putin explained in a [recent historical article](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181), in his view Ukrainians and Russians “were one people” whom he is seeking to reunite, even if through coercion. For Putin, therefore, the loss of Ukraine in 2004 to the West marked a major negative turning point in U.S.-Russian relations that was far more salient than the second wave of NATO expansion that was completed the same year.

Second, those Ukrainians who rose up in defense of their freedom were, in Putin’s own assessment, Slavic brethren with close historical, religious, and cultural ties to Russia. If it could happen in Kyiv, [why not in Moscow](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/480974)? Several years later, it almost did happen in Russia when [a series of mass protests](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/480973) erupted in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other cities in the wake of fraudulent parliamentary elections in December 2011. They were the largest protests in Russia since 1991, the year the Soviet Union collapsed. For the first time in his decade-plus in power, ordinary Russians showed themselves to have both the will and the capability to threaten Putin’s grip on power. That popular uprising in Russia, occurring the same year as the Arab Spring, and then followed with Putin’s return to the Kremlin as president for a third term in 2012, marked another major negative turn in U.S.-Russian relations, ending the [reset](https://www.amazon.com/Cold-War-Hot-Peace-Ambassador/dp/0544716248) launched by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in 2009. **Democratic mobilization**, first the Middle East and then Russia—not NATO expansion—**ended this last chapter of U.S.-Russian cooperation**. There have been no new chapters of cooperation since.

But U.S.-Russian relations deteriorated ever further in 2014, again because of new democratic expansion. The next democratic mobilization to threaten Putin happened a second time in Ukraine in 2013–14. After the Orange Revolution in 2004, Putin did not invade Ukraine, but wielded other instruments of influence to help his protégé, Viktor Yanukovych, [narrowly win the Ukrainian presidency](https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/understanding-ukraines-presidential-shift/) six years later. Yanukovych, however, turned out not to be a loyal Kremlin servant, but tried to cultivate ties with both Russia and the West. Putin finally compelled Yanukovych to make a choice, and the Ukrainian president chose Russia in the fall of 2013 when he reneged on signing [an EU association agreement](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraine-under-pressure-from-russia-puts-brakes-on-eu-deal/2013/11/21/46c50796-52c9-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html) in favor of membership in Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.

To the surprise of everyone in Moscow, Kyiv, Brussels, and Washington, Yanukovych’s decision to scuttle this agreement with the EU triggered mass demonstrations in Ukraine again, bringing [hundreds of thousands](https://euromaidanpress.com/2016/02/20/the-story-of-ukraine-starting-from-euromaidan/2/) of Ukrainians into the streets in what would become known as the [Euromaidan](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-modern-ukraine-was-made-on-maidan/) or “Revolution of Dignity” to protest Yanukovych’s turn away from the democratic West. The street protests lasted several weeks, punctuated by the killing of dozens of peaceful protestors by Yanukovych’s government, the eventual collapse of that government and Yanukovych’s flight to Russia in February 2014, and a new [pro-Western government](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/27/world/europe/ukraine.html) taking power in Kyiv. Putin had “lost” Ukraine for the second time in a decade.

This time, **Putin struck back with military force** to punish the alleged American-backed, neo-Nazi usurpers in Kyiv. Russian armed forces seized Crimea; Moscow later annexed the Ukrainian peninsula. Putin also provided money, equipment, and soldiers to back separatists in eastern Ukraine, fueling a simmering war in Donbas for eight years, in which [approximately 14,000 people have been killed](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-ukraine-conflict-photos-2014/). After invading, not before, Putin amped up his criticisms of NATO expansion as justification for his belligerent actions.

In response to this second Ukrainian democratic revolution, Putin concluded that cooption through elections and other nonmilitary means had to be augmented with greater coercive pressure, including military intervention. Since the Revolution of Dignity, Putin has waged [an unprecedented war](https://www.google.com/books/edition/Putin_s_War_Against_Ukraine/frfXAQAACAAJ?hl=en) against Ukraine using a full spectrum of military, political, informational, social, and economic weapons in an attempt to [destabilize and eventually topple Ukraine’s democratically elected government](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/06/heres-why-putin-wants-to-topple-ukraines-government-not-to-engineer-a-frozen-conflict/). Ukraine’s relationship with NATO and the United States is just a symptom of what Putin believes is the underlying disease: a sovereign, democratic Ukraine.

Putin’s Real Casus Belli: Ukrainian Democracy

Amazingly, eight years of unrelenting Russian pressure did not break Ukraine’s democracy. Just the opposite. After Putin’s annexation and ongoing support for the war in Donbas, Ukrainians are now more united across ethnic, linguistic, and regional divides than at any other point in Ukrainian history. In 2019, President Volodymyr Zelensky won in a landslide, winning popular support in every region of Ukraine. Not surprisingly, Putin’s war also has fueled greater popular support among Ukrainians for joining NATO.

So now, Putin has decided on a new strategy for ending Ukrainian democracy: **massive military intervention**. **Putin** **claims that his purpose is to stop NATO expansion. But that’s a fiction**. Nothing in the past year in Ukraine-NATO relations has changed. It is true Ukraine aspires to join NATO someday. (The goal is even embedded in the Ukrainian constitution.) But while NATO leaders have remained committed to the principle of an open-door policy, they have also clearly stated that Ukraine today is not qualified to join. Putin’s casus belli is his own invention.

Putin has fabricated this crisis about NATO expansion to undermine Ukrainian democracy even more directly. Already, the Russian military mobilization on Ukraine’s borders has triggered [significant damage to the Ukrainian economy](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-has-seriously-wounded-ukraines-economy-without-firing-a-single-shot/) and fueled new divisions among Ukraine’s political parties over how Zelensky has handled the crisis. Some argue that Zelensky should have created a new grand coalition or unity government; others lament his alleged inadequate preparations for war. And some contend that Zelensky showed his diplomatic inexperience by arguing with U.S. president Joe Biden about the probability of a Russian invasion at a time when unity with the West is most needed. In other words, Putin’s military mobilization already achieved some early successes in his war against Ukrainian democracy.

Paradoxically, Putin’s use of force may have strengthened Ukrainian democracy in the short term. His [decision to invade Ukraine](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67836) by sending Russian forces into the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (still recognized as sovereign Ukrainian territory under international law) has united Ukrainians and strengthened Zelensky’s popularity and image as a leader of the nation. But the long-term survival of Ukraine’s democracy hangs in the balance, and Putin’s [bellicose rhetoric](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828) suggests that Moscow’s assault is just beginning. A blitzkrieg invasion and rapid encirclement of Kyiv could result in Zelensky’s forcible removal from power. New elections held at gunpoint could deliver the desired government, just as they did in [post–World War II Eastern Europe](https://ipn.gov.pl/en/digital-resources/articles/7193,Rigged-elections-19-January-1947.html) in the shadow of Soviet tanks. It is too early to predict the outcome. But Putin’s objective is clear.

**Putin may dislike NATO expansion, but he is not genuinely frightened by it.** Russia has the largest army in Europe, now much more capable after two decades of lavish spending. NATO is a defensive alliance. It has never attacked the Soviet Union or Russia, and it never will. Putin knows that. But Putin is threatened by a successful democracy in Ukraine. He cannot tolerate a successful, flourishing, and democratic Ukraine on his borders, especially if the Ukrainian people also begin to prosper economically. That undermines the Kremlin’s own regime stability and proposed rationale for autocratic state leadership. Just as Putin cannot allow the will of the Russian people to guide Russia’s future, he cannot allow the people of Ukraine, who have a shared culture and history, to choose the prosperous, independent, and free future that they have voted for and fought for.

Though the chance of deescalation is remote, further negotiations and the [threat of sanctions](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/sanctioning-russia-over-ukraine-no-silver-bullet-200031) could still—in theory—prevent a Russian invasion beyond Ukraine’s Donbas region in the coming days or weeks. But regardless of where Putin finally orders his troops to halt—be it Luhansk and Donetsk or Kharkiv, Odessa, Kyiv, or Lviv—the Kremlin will remain committed to undermining Ukrainian (and Georgian, Moldovan, Armenian, etc.) democracy and sovereignty for as long as Putin remains in power and maybe longer if Russian autocracy continues. Tragically, George Kennan’s warning in his 1947 Foreign Affairs article on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” still holds true today:

“[The] Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry … Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities … And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal.”

There should be no illusions about Putin’s long-term strategic goal of stopping democratic expansion, in Ukraine and the rest of the region.

#### Putin lashes out to boost self-preservation – he fears democratic expansion, not NATO

Tafuri 22 – David Tafuri, international lawyer at Arent Fox, opinion contributor to The Hill, served as the US Department of State’s Rule of Law Coordinator for Iraq at the US Embassy in Baghdad and an outside foreign policy advisor to President Barack Obama (“**Putin doesn’t fear NATO or Ukraine – he fears democracy**”, 2/10/2022, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/593627-putin-doesnt-fear-nato-or-ukraine-he-fears-democracy/>) FGY

As the world waits to learn if [Putin](https://thehill.com/people/vladimir-putin/)will order a full-scale military offensive in Ukraine, Washington seems to be stumbling over a simple question: How much does Russian aggression in Europe matter to U.S. interests? One [view](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/584619-why-the-us-shouldnt-try-to-deter-a-russian-invasion-of-ukraine) is that Ukraine’s status is more important to Russia than to us, especially because Ukraine is not a part of NATO. Others go further, questioning whether even NATO members, guaranteed protection by [Article 5](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm), are worth defending.

Media have [noted](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/27/tucker-carlson-support-putin-republicans/) Tucker Carlson’s growing influence in Republican circles on this question. Two years ago, he previewed his stance when I [debated](https://video.foxnews.com/v/5989829150001#sp=show-clips) him on his show. He argued that NATO members Estonia and Latvia, are, like Ukraine, not worth defending if invaded by Russia. I countered, as I explain in more detail here, that it’s in America’s vital interest to support these sovereign nations — precisely because Putin is targeting them for their decision to turn away from the governance model on offer from Russia.

To understand why Putin’s threat to invade Ukraine — or any other independent state in Europe — matters, consider why he might do it. Putin wants you to believe it’s because NATO expansion to Ukraine threatens the Russian people and Russia’s security. He doesn’t genuinely believe this. It’s propaganda.

NATO is a defensive alliance. No member of NATO, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, has conveyed a credible threat to peoples or places inside Russia’s current borders. In fact, NATO sought a constructive [relationship](https://carnegiemoscow.org/2021/10/20/why-russia-officially-broke-with-nato-pub-85611) with Russia after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., until Putin steered the country onto its present course. Putin is a careful study and knows that NATO isn’t interested in gobbling up Russian territory or subjugating Russian people. Similarly, a sovereign and independent Ukraine presents no actual threat to Russian lands.

Putin fears an independent Ukraine with strong ties to the West for the same reason he [sent troops](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-sends-troops-into-kazakhstan-as-protests-turn-deadly/) to Kazakhstan last month to put down peaceful protests, [poisoned and imprisoned](https://time.com/6140102/alexei-navalny-russia-profile/) Alexei Navalny, his political opponent in Russia, and [directed Russian spy services](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/senate-committee-unanimously-endorses-spy-agencies-finding-that-russia-interfered-in-2016-presidential-race-in-bid-to-help-trump/2020/04/21/975ca51a-83d2-11ea-ae26-989cfce1c7c7_story.html) to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. There’s one **common thread** running through each of these endeavors — and nearly every other foreign policy initiative now championed by Putin: He **wants to undermine democracy**, wherever it is, or can take root, especially in countries on Russia’s border that he’s worried he can’t control.

Why does he fear democracy so much? Sure, Putin is a Cold War enthusiast, but his main priority is not to restore the eminence of old U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe. It’s to **boost his own prospect for self-preservatio**n. To Putin, this means [consolidating](https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-putin-controls-russia) all political powers in Russia inside his office and carefully **guarding against the appeal of democratic challengers to his “forever presidency.”** Last year, Putin [amended](https://www.theweek.co.uk/106126/putin-s-plan-to-rule-for-longer-than-stalin) the Russian constitution so he can remain President until at least 2036. This will make him Kremlin’s [longest serving](https://nationalpost.com/news/world/putin-signs-law-that-could-make-him-russias-longest-serving-ruler-since-stalin) leader since Peter the Great, even longer than Stalin.

NATO has never posed a real threat to Putin’s supremacy inside Russia. But a **well-functioning democracy on Russia’s border, which could inspire new democratic movements within Russia**, would. And this **threat could be especially dangerous for Putin** if it re-focused Russians inward, at their own lamentable [economy](https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/04/23/the-kremlin-has-isolated-russias-economy), instead of on Putin’s outward bluster that NATO is the greatest threat to their well-being.

Because the true source of Putin’s ire is the adoption of more democratic institutions by sovereign states in Russia’s neighborhood, **Putin is actually challenging not a particular nation or alliance, but the spread of democracy and rule of law.**

When the sovereignty of nations striving for more stable democracies is threatened, U.S. commitment to democracy in general is at stake.

The U.S. cheered Ukraine during three defining events in its democracy: first, when it held a referendum in 1991 and [90 percent](https://www.ft.com/content/0cbbd590-8e48-4687-a302-e74b6f0c905d) of its population voted in favor of independence; second, during [the “Orange Revolution”](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-ukraines-orange-revolution-shaped-twenty-first-century-geopolitics/) in the winter of 2004, when people took to the streets of Kyiv to protest an election clearly rigged to benefit the Kremlin-backed candidate (the pro-Western candidate [survived an attempted assassination by poison](https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-43611547)), and third, when a groundswell of democratic protests in 2013 [forced](https://www.vox.com/2022/1/30/22908600/ukraine-crisis-putin-russia-one-people-myth-nato-europe) former President Viktor Yanukovych from power after his decision to back out of a popular trade agreement with the EU in fealty to Moscow. All three were clear rejections of Russia, in favor of democracy.

What Russia is posing to do now, after 30 years of Ukrainian independence, is a clear violation of international law. The lack of a response could **usher the collapse of a rules-based order** which the U.S. has nurtured since the end of WWII. The U.N. is already absent on the issue of Ukraine’s sovereignty because of Russia’s [veto](https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/why-united-nations-can-t-solve-ukraine-crisis-n1288480).

In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait without any legal basis for doing so, the U.S. [organized](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war) a coalition and mobilized in Kuwait’s defense, with U.N. [authorization](http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678). This sent a message to aggressors around the world that if they invade their neighbors, they could be destroyed.

If Putin successfully invades Ukraine without serious consequences, it would send the opposite message — and might lead Putin to believe he can do it again, including to one of those NATO democracies in Eastern Europe that [Tucker Carlson](https://thehill.com/people/tucker-carlson/)believes aren’t worth defending.

It would also signal to other nationalist regimes with extraterritorial aspirations — including China, Iran, and Turkey — that they too could orchestrate cross-border offensives to stamp out democratic tendencies in their region without repercussion.

#### Putin is uniquely emboldened by democratization

West 22 – John West, adjunct professor at Tokyo’s Sophia University, executive director of the Asian Century Institute (“Saving democracy from Russian rage”, *The Interpreter*, 3/14/2022, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/saving-democracy-russian-rage>) FGY

Much is being written about Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, and much more will surely be said in the months and years ahead of this potentially epoch-defining event. But some of the most insightful and almost prescient analyses were made well before the conflict, such as in Larry Diamond’s excellent 2020 book, [Ill winds: Saving democracy from Russian rage, Chinese ambition, and American complacency](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/588987/ill-winds-by-larry-diamond/).

Diamond, a professor at Stanford University, documents the political transformation of the world through the “third wave of democratisation”, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a big bang after the fall of the Berlin wall, with the democratisation of central and eastern Europe. But then began a global democratic recession.

Badly governed, poorly performing democracies are indeed accidents waiting to happen. It may be difficult to remember but there were hopes back in the 1990s that a nascent Russian democracy might mature under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. But the country’s politics were then hijacked by Vladimir Putin. Putin led a backslide to authoritarianism.

Diamond begins the chapter “Russia’s global assault” by recalling the famous “Long Telegram” written in 1946 by George F. Kennan, the number two official at the US Embassy in Moscow. Kennan wrote of the “Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs” and “a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity” and “a fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organised” Western societies. The Soviet Union’s leaders knew that their “fragile and artificial” regime was “unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries”. Kennan predicted a relentless Soviet campaign to “disrupt national self-confidence” in the United States and Europe and “to stimulate all forms of disunity” within Western democracies.

Diamond argues that Putin’s view of Russia and the world is strikingly similar to that of the Soviet leaders whom Kennan described in the Long Telegram. Putin believes that the **West is seeking to encircle Russia and keep it weak**. Despite his unrivalled power, Putin is deeply insecure about the legitimacy of his rule. And he **panics at the sight of popular demonstrations, which he blames on Western plots to unseat him**.

So **Putin has responded by vast military interventions, cyber-hacking, and other interference and influence operations** against the West and its interests. He is using the openness and pluralism of Western democracies to subvert them and taking advantage of the West’s reluctance for military engagement.

In sum, Putin’s Russia is “waging a global assault on democracy”, according to Diamond.

## competition

### perm do counterplan

#### Should does not mean absolutely mandatory, it’s a discretionary term

Judge Mulrroney, Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration Chief Administrative Law Judge and Katherine Legel, Judicial Law Clerk at the Drug Enforcement Administration, 2017

“CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW: HIDDEN ROCKS IN SHALLOW, MURKY, DRUG-INFESTED WATERS,” Marquette Law Review, p. 384

The Agency disagreed with the ALJ's interpretation of the Oklahoma provisions, and held that "should" does not really mean "should," at least in those provisions, but actually means "must," and connoted a mandatory obligation in the context of the provisions at issue. 292 The Agency based its decision on its interpretation of cases from the Seventh Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, a federal district court in Florida, and a dictionary definition of "should," as well as an analysis of the Oklahoma Medical Practice Act and a Policy Statement. 293 Interestingly, a Tenth Circuit (which includes Oklahoma) case which held that ""should' indicates a recommended course of action, but does not itself imply the obligation associated with "shall,'" received no mention in the Agency's decision in Pope. 294 Thus, contrary to the Agency's view, the pertinent Circuit Court of Appeals holds the view that the most reasonable interpretation of the word "should" is really "should" - a discretionary term. 295 The Agency did not discuss the fact that there is some level of conflict in the circuit courts about whether to treat "should" as mandatory or permissive, 296 but the Agency has apparently taken the position that, if the state law supplying the practice standard in a DEA case uses the word "should," the Agency is likely to read that word as "must," irrespective of federal circuit law on the issue. 297

#### The term “should” carries flexibility and discretion

Sam Foster Halabi, Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2010

“ARTICLE: THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION'S FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS OF GUIDELINES ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES”, 39 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 121, 136

The purpose, scope, and applicability of the guidelines variously declare that States "should," "should consider," "should endeavour," "should ensure," and "should require" the measures adopted by the COP. 66The text of the FCTC uses the word "shall" as to certain of Parties' obligations. 67The use of the word "should," in most contexts, is "precatory, not mandatory." 68Yet the word "should" may also be used to express a duty or obligation albeit with a degree of flexibility or discretion. 69FCTC Article 11.1(b)(iv) illustrates this distinction, requiring that warnings and messages "should be 50% or more of the principal display areas but shall be no less than 30% of the principal display areas." 70Furthermore, many of the measures adopted without objection by the COP are styled "recommendations," the ordinary meaning of which does not entail mandatory action. 71In the following sections, the treaty language is juxtaposed with key language from the guidelines in an effort to sort out obligations imposed by the treaty language, obligations clarified by virtue of guidance from the guidelines, and non-obligatory provisions of the guidelines that are precatory or recommendatory. 72

#### Should means encouragement, not requirement

Ryan Williams, received his law degree in 2008 from Louisiana State University , graduating with honors. He was a member of the Law Review and served as a Senior Editor during his Senior year, 2008

“Reputation and the Rules: An Argument for a Balancing Approach under Rule 8.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct”, 68 La. L. Rev. 931, p. 936

As in Canon 29, use of the permissive "should" implies that the Georgia Rule is merely hortatory; it encourages reporting misbehavior without requiring it. Georgia Rule 8.3 goes a step further than Canon 29, in fact, by explicitly disclaiming any threat of disciplinary proceedings for failure to comply.

#### It’s not a mandatory obligation

Gil Fried, University of New Haven and Robin Ammon, Slippery Rock University, 2001

“What is Appropriate Signage for the Sport Industries?,” Journal of Legal Aspects of Sports, p. 190

The everyday use of signage affects the efficient and safe flow of vehicular traffic. Tort liability for traffic signage related issues is predicated upon standards established by each states' Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). Under these guidelines government entities are required to develop uniformity in communicating safety concerns. Uniformity means that the same type of device should be used for the same type of road condition, which helps drivers to develop and maintain certain expectancies (Blashke, 1990). The MUTCD uses terms such as "shall," "should," and "may" to suggest or demand the application of traffic control devices. If the word "shall" is used it is a mandatory term and the state has to follow the guidelines. In contrast, the term "should" indicates only a strong recommendation, but not a mandatory recommendation. A good example of this difference can be seen with stop signs. The MUTCD states that stop signs "shall" be an octagon and further provides that when two highways intersect the stop sign "should" be posted on the minor street (Blashke, 1990). The difference between "shall" and "should" is very significant for traffic sign cases since liability is harder to prove if the state was not required to post a sign when compared with instances where the state failed to post a required sign.

## net benefit

### squo solves

#### The United States already did the counterplan under Trump

Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Torry Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, 2018 “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/>, (accessed 6-2-2022)

In developing the communiqué’s language, the United States and its NATO allies should use momentum from Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia Wess Mitchell’s recent remarks at the Heritage Foundation, where he reaffirmed that when it comes to NATO, “[w]e have to be clear that we stand for strong democracy as the foundation of our security and prosperity.” Based on this positioning, Washington would likely support NATO allies if they insist that democracy, human rights, and rule of law be a focus of the NATO summit and its communiqué.

#### Countries other than the US solve

Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Torry Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, 2018 “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/>, (accessed 6-2-2022)

Regardless of U.S. leadership or support, other NATO states such as the Nordic countries, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other members must play a role in prioritizing NATO’s core values at the Brussels Summit and strengthening democratic institutions. In speaking to diplomats from several member states, it is clear that they recognize the growing democracy deficit in the alliance, and that the United States will likely not lead the charge on championing democratic institutions. In response, officials from such member states can use bilateral meetings and sideline conversations with the Hungarians, Poles, and Turks to raise concerns. Already the European Union is pressing Poland on its violation of EU democratic principles with the threat of sanctions and suspension of voting privileges. The security implications of their transgressions give NATO a role in maintaining this pressure, too.

### us fails

#### Jan 6 ruined US demo-cred

Soare 21, PhD in Political Science, Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations. Prior to joining EUISS, Simona served as advisor to the Vice-President of the European Parliament (2015-2019) and as an analyst with the Romanian Ministry of Defence, working on transatlantic and European security. She has also been a research associate with the Institut d’Études Européennes (IEE) at Université Saint Louis-Bruxelles (Simona, Biden’s Security Policy: Democratic Security or Democratic Exceptionalism?, <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2021/number/1/article/biden-s-security-policy-democratic-security-or-democratic-exceptionalism.html)//BB>

More broadly, Biden's team will emphasise human rights and democratic principles and shift from a transactional to a more traditionally conditional US pressure on partners. This could take the form of leveraging US strategic relations with challenging allies like Poland, Hungary and Turkey to achieve concessions on respect for the rule of law and human rights (Harvard-DGAP, 2020, 4). However, following the 6 January 2021 storming of the US Capitol by pro-Trump rioters, experts argue: 'The power of America's example will be dimmer than it once was; American arguments will be harder to hear' (Applebaum, 2021). Some have called on President Biden to abandon the idea of an international Summit for Democracy and instead focus inwards on American democratic renewal e.g. (Goldgeier and Jentlesen, 2021).

#### US human rights pressure fails because of hypocrisy

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, Professor of Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, SEA and China Studies, April 17, 2022

“Human Rights: US’ Double Standards, Hypocrisy,” ASEAN Post, <https://theaseanpost.com/opinion/2022/apr/17/human-rights-us-double-standards-hypocrisy>, (accessed 6-2-2022)

Unimaginably, the US is like a loose cannon with its double standards and hypocrisy in lecturing and pillorying other countries’ human rights shortcomings as if it has the moral and ethical superiority on this matter. It is as if the US is the world’s human rights judge and role model. Truth be told, the US hardly befits a nation that is a role model of human rights to be emulated by other countries. Relative to its size and power, the US, at the moment, is one, if not the most brazen and impertinent guilty party or delinquent in the international human rights community. Nevertheless, it is unashamed to castigate other countries across the world for their human rights deficiencies as if it has the moral ascendancy and credibility to do so, given that the US does not practice what it preaches more often than not. To note, the US is the only major world power that has failed to fully ratify or adhere to any of the significant human rights instruments introduced by the United Nations (UN) or other human rights bodies.

#### Domestic human rights violations prevent effective US pressure

Tanya Elahi, JD, assessment analyst at the Independent Office for Police Conduct, 2020

“Hypocrisy And Human Rights Abuses In The Land Of The Free,” Human Rights Pulse, <https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/hypocrisy-and-human-rights-abuses-in-the-land-of-the-free>, (accessed 6-2-2022)

The US has faced accusations of voter suppression by introducing policies such as requiring citizens to show ID and prohibiting early votes, both of which disproportionately affect Black Americans and disabled people. The report highlights that people of colour and specifically Black Americans are “particularly vulnerable to abuses of every single right measured”. This highlights a worrying disregard for human rights which appears to affect vulnerable minority groups at a higher level. THE HYPOCRISY OF THE US America has taken a leading role in condemning human rights abuses worldwide. In December 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo condemned Iran for violating human rights, including “the violent crackdown on protestors in November 2019”. This US subsequently placed sanctions on Iran. The current protests taking place in the US demonstrate the country’s outright hypocrisy. The death of George Floyd at the hands of US police officers has triggered worldwide protests against police brutality. American protestors have largely been met with further violence from the police. What began as a series of peaceful protests quickly became widespread chaos, with police cars driving into protestors, elderly men being pushed to the ground and seriously injured, and assaults on innocent reporters. Pompeo has also criticised Tehran for using violence against anti-government protestors. He stated that “we pray for a day when … all peoples can speak and assemble freely without fear of their own governments.” Whilst this violation of human rights should certainly be condemned, it is difficult to see how any country could learn lessons from the US, where the state is encouraging the use of violence against its own citizens during protests. For instance, Trump tweeted a controversial warning to protestors, stating that “when the looting starts, the shooting starts”. This statement was flagged by Twitter as violating their guidelines by “glorifying violence”. These protests are a clear example of the US committing the same violations it condemns overseas. THE EFFECTS OF HYPOCRITICAL POLICY The hypocrisy demonstrated by the US has a huge impact on the enforcement of international human rights. The US has a reputation for boasting about its citizens’ freedoms and claims to set an example for the rest of the world. US violations, however, of its own citizens freedoms have allowed countries such as China and Russia to undermine American efforts to condemn human rights abuses. America’s recent violations are likely to prohibit any effective intervention when encouraging other countries to respect human rights.

#### Global atrocities committed by the US undermine its ability to promote human rights

Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy, Professor of Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, SEA and China Studies, April 17, 2022

“Human Rights: US’ Double Standards, Hypocrisy,” ASEAN Post, <https://theaseanpost.com/opinion/2022/apr/17/human-rights-us-double-standards-hypocrisy>, (accessed 6-2-2022)

Externally, the war waged by America in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria alone have already caused more than 20 million people to become either refugees or migrants. During the US withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, a US drone killed 10 members of an Afghan family, including seven children, among which the youngest was only two years old. Also, to date, the US still holds 39 detainees at the Guantanamo high-security prison. Hence, given all these, it is imperative to ask if the US, a title-holder in pointing fingers at the human rights shortcomings of other countries, will take responsibility and address its dismal human rights record within its borders and beyond? Conclusion Indeed, “righteous indignation should be reserved for the truly righteous.” But America is far from being righteous given its blatant dismal human rights record within its borders and beyond. America lecturing the world on human rights is a farce, for it doesn’t have the moral ascendancy and integrity given its gloomy human rights record. Instead of schooling other countries on their human rights shortcomings, the US probably needs some self-introspection and should first address its human rights situation.

#### Failure to shore up democracy at home makes global democracy promotion impossible

Elisa Massimino, contributor to Washington Post, 2021

“America’s hypocrisy on democracy and human rights has a cost,” Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/letters-to-the-editor/americas-hypocrisy-on-democracy-and-human-rights-has-a-cost/2021/06/15/6f28fb3e-cd28-11eb-a224-bd59bd22197c_story.html>, (accessed 6-2-2022)

American diplomats have long understood that hypocrisy has a cost, especially for a nation that seeks to champion the ideals of democracy and human rights as the cornerstone of global peace and security. As E.J. Dionne Jr. rightly pointed out in his June 10 Thursday Opinion column, “Our national security now depends on civil rights,” failing to shore up our democratic institutions and uphold human rights at home deepens the United States’ credibility deficit and weakens its effectiveness as a champion of these values abroad. And that has serious national security implications, because we know — from hard data and grim experience — that Americans are safer when democracies set the rules of a global order. But though it’s true that our adversaries will use this hypocrisy to discredit the United States in the global struggle of ideas, there’s a deeper and more direct security threat posed by our failure to live up to those ideals at home. Societal divisions that result from systemic racism and other human rights violations left to fester, combined with weak institutions seemingly incapable of addressing these challenges, make us not just a weaker champion but also a weaker nation, increasingly vulnerable to attacks of all kinds from those with a different vision of the world.

### at: avoids politics

#### The counterplan threatens NATO allies. That links to politics.

Tamkin 18 [Emily Tamkin is a Reporter covering foreign affairs, "More than 8 in 10 Americans support NATO, study finds", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/03/more-than-americans-support-nato-study-finds/] GBS-HW

NATO is a popular punching bag for President Trump. Days before coming into office, he called it “obsolete.” As president, he’s railed against European spending on defense and noted time and again that many NATO allies don’t meet the target of 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. Other U.S. politicians — in Congress, for example — have rushed to make sure NATO allies know that the United States remains committed to the alliance. But as NATO approaches its 70th birthday Thursday, it’s worth asking — are Americans still behind NATO or have they been swayed by Trump’s arguments?

According to a new study by the Program for Public Consultation of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and released by the nonpartisan organization Voice of the People, the American people remain committed to NATO, too.

Respondents were put in the position of policymakers and presented with arguments for and against remaining in NATO. Just over 8 in 10, or 83 percent, of the roughly 2,400 respondents said that the United States should remain in NATO.

“The idea is that you’re putting the respondent in the shoes of the policymaker so they’ve really heard the essential side of the issue,” said Steven Kull, director of the survey.

President Trump speaks with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in the Oval Office of the White House, on Tuesday. (Evan Vucci/AP)

And support bridged the proverbial aisle, with 90 percent of Democratic respondents and 77 percent of Republicans saying the United States should remain in NATO. (Since at least 2009, according to the Pew Research Center, Democrats have taken a more favorable view of NATO.)

“Given that there is substantial discussion questioning whether NATO membership is necessary, and given that Russia has become relatively weak and that it’s been some years since the Cold War, I thought it was striking that support for NATO membership is as robust as it is,” said Kull, noting that, even in “very red districts,” 78 percent of respondents thought the United States should remain in NATO (and that millennials, many who do not remember the Cold War, overwhelmingly supported that option, with 77 percent opting to remain).

But it isn’t just that Democrats and Republicans alike think the United States should remain in NATO. Respondents were presented with three choices — press Europeans to spend more on defense and threaten to disengage if they do not; urge Europeans to spend more but do not threaten to disengage; or remain part of NATO but bring military investments in line with what Europeans spend.

The most popular option was actually to bring U.S. military investments in line with the investments Europeans are making.

“It wasn’t a conclusion we should necessarily spend less — it’s more to bring U.S. military investments in line with the European level,” Kull clarified, the thinking being that, “ ‘Well if the Europeans are comfortable at the level that they’re at, maybe we should adjust ours.’ ”

But the significant thing to Kull was that most people did not favor threatening NATO allies. For both Democratic and Republican respondents, threatening to disengage was the least popular option, with only 4 percent of Democrats and 21 percent of Republicans saying that they found it to be the most convincing.

It’s “one more indicator of how robust support is for the alliance,” Kull said. “That the threat to withdraw was so widely rejected.” A little something for NATO to celebrate, perhaps, on its 70th birthday.